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Abstract
This thesis is composed of four independent empirical essays that draw on and
contribute to aspects of health, urban, public, and environmental economics. The
chapters can be split into two distinct parts. The first part comprises two chapters
that provide new quantitative evidence about the impacts of recent health care policies
in the English National Health Service (NHS). While essentially describing policy
evaluations, the essays provide insights into the underlying economic forces of health
care demand and supply, and are linked to the urban economics literature by an ex-
plicit consideration of spatial issues. The second part comprises two further chapters
that focus on a core urban economics topic — housing markets — placing particular
emphasis on specific links between housing and environmental issues. The unifying
theme, and overriding contribution, of the thesis is to bring fresh evidence to bear
on policy-relevant issues in urban and public economics by the generation of new
datasets and the application of econometric techniques.
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Introduction
This thesis is composed of four independent empirical essays that draw on and
contribute to aspects of health, urban, public, and environmental economics. The
chapters can be split into two distinct parts. The first part comprises two chapters
that provide new quantitative evidence about the impacts of recent health care policies
in the English National Health Service (NHS). While essentially describing policy
evaluations, the essays provide insights into the underlying economic forces of health
care demand and supply, and are linked to the urban economics literature by an ex-
plicit consideration of spatial issues. The second part comprises two further chapters
that focus on a core urban economics topic — housing markets — placing particular
emphasis on specific links between housing and environmental issues. The unifying
theme, and overriding contribution, of the thesis is to bring fresh evidence to bear
on policy-relevant issues in urban and public economics by the generation of new
datasets and the application of econometric techniques.
I Health care in a spatial economic context
Health economics emerged as an independent discipline following a seminal article
by Kenneth Arrow in 1963 (Arrow, 1963). Arrow’s analysis pointed to several char-
acteristics of health and health care markets that distinguish them from textbook
treatments. These characteristics include, but are not restricted to, the pervasive
role of uncertainty, information asymmetry and agency inherent in the provision
of and demand for health care services; the unique role of ethical norms (think the
Hippocratic Oath) in guiding expert supplier behaviour; and the role of health in fa-
cilitating both income earning opportunities and the consumption of other goods.1
Health and health care issues are relevant to urban economists not least because
they are relevant to cities and their inhabitants. For example, in benchmarking city
wide revealed-preference quality of life estimates against alternative city rankings,
Albouy (2008) reveals health care as one of the nine dimensions used by the Places
1These issues lead McGuire (2000) to question whether any part of the neoclassical model in which
a firm “sets price and quantity to maximise profit subject to the constraint of market demand” holds
in this market.
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Rated Almanac to assess city quality (the others being climate, crime, transportation,
education, arts and culture, recreation, housing costs, and job outlook). Further, all
cities host a range of health care facilities and in some cities such as Philadelphia,
health care research and education accounts for a considerable proportion of jobs
and exports (McDonald & McMillen, 2010). Health and health care issues are rel-
evant to economic geographers because health care inputs, productivity, and out-
comes exhibit substantial, often unexplained, variation across space (Cooper et al.,
2015; Gobillon & Milcent, 2013; Skinner, 2011).
Despite this, the prominence of health and health care within urban and regional
economics appears to be relatively low when compared to – say – crime and educa-
tion. Standard texts on urban economics such as O’Sullivan (2007); Brueckner (2011)
devote considerable attention to these latter issues, with no mention of health or
health care.2 Similarly, introducing Volume 5 of the Handbook of Regional and Urban
Economics, Duranton et al. (2015) herald an intellectual broadening of topics to is-
sues that relate cities to the environment, urban amenities as well as more traditional
areas of agglomeration, land and housing markets, but the index to the volume in-
cludes only one reference to health or health care. That said, some recent cross-over
is evident in the health and urban and regional field journals. For example, Regional
Science and Urban Economics ran a special section on spatial issues in health econom-
ics in November 2014 and health or health care papers appear in recent volumes of
the Journal of Economic Geography and the Journal of Urban Economics.
A brief review of these literatures suggests some common health care research
agendas, for example in understanding the causes and consequences of spatial vari-
ations in health care (see the references cited above), agglomeration effects (Baicker
& Chandra, 2010; Li, 2014), competition between hospitals (Mobley, 2003; Gravelle
et al., 2014; Cooper et al., 2011), as well as spatial dimensions of health labour mar-
kets. More general shared questions include the links between housing/ neighbour-
hood quality and health outcomes (Kling et al., 2004; Jacob et al., 2013); the associ-
ation between urban form and obesity (Eid et al., 2008; Zhao & Kaestner, 2010; Chen
et al., 2013); and the health impacts of air pollution (Janke et al., 2009; Samakovlis
et al., 2005). Some other topics, such as reconfigurations of care (e.g. hospital clos-
ures or the introduction of new care models) or the impact of competition in primary
care, would seem ripe for greater integration across the disciplines and may provide
opportunities for contributions from economic geographers.
Similar opportunities may arise in the application of spatial methods to health
questions. While spatial econometrics is not entirely new to to health questions —
early applications can be found in Mobley (2003) and Costa-Font & Pons-Novell
2McDonald & McMillen (2010) is an exception, including a short discussion of location decisions
for health care facilities and an explicit consideration of health care as a local public good.
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(2007) — it is clear that the use of spatial methods and research designs is becom-
ing increasingly common in the health economics literature (Skinner, 2011). With
experience in working with spatial data, evaluating spatial effects of policy, and ap-
plying spatial techniques it seems likely that economic geographers would be well
positioned to assist with this development, for example in clarifying that spatial
models do not necessarily provide a general solution to problems related to omitted
variables (Gibbons & Overman, 2012).
II Housing and the environment3
In contrast to health, housing is centre stage in urban economics, with a quarter of
the chapters in Volume 5 of the Handbook of Regional and Urban Economics wholly or
largely devoted to housing issues. The chapter titles illustrate some of the many
aspects of housing that have excited research attention: Housing Bubbles; Hous-
ing, Finance and the Macroeconomy; The Micro-Structure of Housing Markets; US
Housing Policy; Mortgage Finance; and Regulation and Housing Supply.
The importance of housing to urban economics is mirrored in its importance to
everyday life. Duranton & Puga (2015) record that in the U.S. housing accounts for
around a quarter of household consumption expenditure, and estimate the value
of the housing stock at around 2 years’ worth of gross national product. Homes
provide comfort and entertainment, shelter, and refuge.4 Where we live influences
innumerable aspects of our lives, including the distance we commute to work, the
school our children attend, and the quality of the air we breathe.
In combination with market thickness, this catch-all nature of housing makes
the housing market a fruitful tool for applied empirical work. Hedonic studies con-
ceptualise house purchases as buying a bundle of goods, the bundle including the
characteristics of the structure itself, the views the house affords, but also accessib-
ility to good schools, green spaces or transport links. If residential housing markets
are efficient, house prices should reflect all the costs and benefits that these attrib-
utes collectively imply and — to the extent that other factors can plausibly be held
constant — prices and willingness to pay for individual attributes can be backed-
out. In this way, house prices can facilitate the estimation of the willingness to pay
for attributes or amenities with no explicit market price.
3The links between urban economics and the environment are complex and multi-dimensional —
see the excellent review in Kahn & Walsh (2015). In contrast to the previous sub-section, in this part
of the introduction I focus on areas of the literature which are directly covered in the essays below
and make no attempt to review other material.
4For example, the phrase “An Englishman’s home is his castle and his safest refuge” originates
from a legal doctrine granting individuals legal protections when at home, first introduced to English
common law in 1628.
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Research using revealed preference techniques in housing markets are common-
place in environmental economics,5 with applications centering on the valuation of
air quality (Smith & Huang, 1995; Chay & Greenstone, 2005), proximity to brown-
field and polluted sites (Gamper-Rabindran & Timmins, 2013; Currie et al., 2015)),
climate and climate change (Costa & Kahn, 2003; Albouy et al., 2013) and a “green
buildings” literature that explores the premium for energy efficiency, in commer-
cial buildings (Eichholtz et al., 2010, 2013) or residential ones (Brounen & Kok, 2011;
Kahn & Kok, 2014) . A recent development is the emergence of a strand of research
using property tenure to estimate housing market discount rates over long hori-
zons (Wong et al., 2008; Giglio et al., 2015a,b). These implied discount rates may be
valuable for contexts such as environmental regulation where benefits from upfront
policy costs materialise only in the far-off future, so that discounting assumptions
are paramount in deciding optimal policy.
Buildings account for a large proportion of economy-wide energy consumption
and greenhouse gas production. Introducing building standards that drive up en-
ergy efficiency standards for new homes reduces energy consumption (Jacobsen &
Kotchen, 2013; Aroonruengsawat et al., 2012). But new homes are a small fraction of
the housing stock, so what about energy efficiency in the existing stock? For these
homes, evidence from engineering studies often suggests that households seem to
under-invest in energy efficiency by leaving profitable upgrades — where discoun-
ted energy savings outweigh the upfront capital costs — on the table. Allcott &
Greenstone (2012) review the evidence for this “energy efficiency gap”. They con-
clude that investment inefficiencies — for example imperfect information, credit
market imperfections, and agency issues — may play a small role but also point
to substantial heterogeneity in the unobserved costs and benefits to households of
making upgrades.
III Summary of chapters
In chapters 1 and 2 of this thesis I explore healthcare policy in the English National
Health Service (NHS)—an institution which is estimated to be the fifth largest em-
ployer in the world and accounts for some 15% of the UK pubic purse.6
In chapter 1 I examine the effect of walk-in clinics have on hospitals, using an
explicitly spatial research design. Walk-in urgent health services outside hospitals
proliferate in many health systems despite limited empirical evidence showing they
5Examples in urban economics are widely reviewed elsewhere and include the valuation of school
quality, transport accessibility, crime, and green space.
6Scale is not unique to the English context: Cooper et al. (2015) note that the healthcare sector
accounted for around 17.5% of US GDP in 2013.
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reduce visits to hospital Emergency Departments (EDs). I re-evaluate the evidence
using the staggered deployment of a single wave of Walk-in Centres (WiCs) in the
English NHS, restricting attention to places hosting new facilities to mitigate en-
dogeneity concerns. Results indicate that WiCs significantly reduce attendances at
EDs, but suggest only 10-20% of visits to hospital-based WiCs and 5-10% of visits to
other WiCs substituted for an ED attendance. This suggests a dilemma in publicly
funded health care settings: walk-in services may widen access and divert patients
from costly hospital visits but may also attract new patients with little need for med-
ical care.
Chapter 2 provides a further analysis of policy in the NHS context but focuses
on individual medical practitioners. I investigate whether vesting budgets with
groups of family doctors impacts treatment decisions and the outcomes of patients
by exploiting the transitional phase of major recent health care reforms in Eng-
land. Applying difference-in-difference techniques to balanced treatment and con-
trol groups, I find that practices becoming actively responsible for group budgets
engaged in cost-saving prescribing and referral behaviour but that patients in these
practices experienced a relative deterioration in the quality of their care. I discuss
a number of explanations for these results, including that the reforms incentivised
doctors to reduce quality in order to save cash or that they simply distracted those
doctors most closely involved.
The aim of chapter 3 is to use the institutions of housing markets in England
to uncover discount rates. Most London housing transactions involve trading long
leases of varying lengths. We exploit this to estimate the time value of housing—
the relationship between the price of a property and the term of ownership—over
a hundred years and derive implied discount rates. For our empirical analysis, we
compile a unique historical dataset (1987 to 1992) to abstract from the right to extend
leases currently enjoyed by tenants. Across a variety of specifications we find that
leasehold prices are consistent with a time declining schedule and low long term
discount rates in housing markets.
Finally, chapter 4 explores the impact of historical preservation policies on do-
mestic energy consumption. Using panel data for England from 2005 to 2013 and
employing a fixed effects-strategy, we document that (i) rising national gas prices
induce an increase in home energy efficiency installations and a corresponding re-
duction in energy consumption and (ii) this energy saving effect is significantly less
pronounced in Conservation Areas and in places with high concentrations of Lis-
ted Buildings. Limiting Conservation Areas and Listed Buildings to 1980 levels—a
moderate reversion—would have lowered total domestic energy consumption in
England between 2005 and 2013 by 0.9 percent, a monetary saving of over £1.4 bil-
lion and a carbon saving of 7.3 million metric tons of carbon dioxide equivalent.
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We conclude that historical preservation policies, by preventing energy efficiency
improvements, impose a significant climate cost.
IV Themes and contribution
While these essays contained in this thesis are independent and should be read as
such, a common theme running through them is to bring fresh evidence to bear on
topics of policy relevance. Empirical analysis has the potential to aid and inform
policy-makers in a variety of ways — for example by describing problems, under-
standing causal mechanisms, and in evaluating policy impacts — but researchers
face a number of barriers including sourcing appropriate data, overcoming identi-
fication challenges to internal validity, and generating findings of external relevance
that can be generalised beyond the target study (Gibbons et al., 2014).
In this light, one contribution of this thesis is to bring forward new data and to
combine data together in new ways for the first time. The resulting datasets, which
represent a considerable research effort, provide a valuable source of information
for future research as well as underlying the findings contained here. For example,
in the course of chapter 1, a panel database of NHS Walk-in Centres was generated
from primary research, geo-coded, and merged with data on activity at Accident
and Emergency departments. For chapter 2 further primary research was under-
taken to construct a dataset of participation of individual GPs in the NHS reforms,
which was then merged with outcome data from hospital records, administrative
data, and patient surveys. Chapter 3 involved the painstaking creation and clean-
ing of a historic dataset of Prime Central London property sales in 1987-1992, a
period not covered by public (Land Registry) data. Finally, chapter 4 involved mer-
ging data on historic preservation policies with small area geography information
on domestic energy consumption.
In determining the value of empirical work for policy purposes, attention must
be paid to whether relationships uncovered describe causal relationships. The fun-
damental challenge here is that any real-world attempt to understand the effect of
one variable (x) on an outcome (y) will usually only be possible by making com-
parisons across different observations which are likely to vary along other (possibly
unobserved) dimensions that could influence the outcome y. Put differently, there is
no counterfactual: each observation cannot be observed in states of the world which
are identical but for differences in x. Further the gold standard of randomly assign-
ing x across observations directly is only rarely possible in practice. Happily, during
a ‘credibility revolution’ in applied research, researchers have become increasingly
adept at deploying research designs to construct couterfactuals that permit causal
interpretations (Angrist & Pischke, 2009, 2010); and in evaluating the effectiveness
14
of different methodological approaches to doing so (e.g. the Scientific Maryland
Scale).
A first step to address potential differences along these other dimensions — ad-
opted extensively throughout this thesis — is to exploit panel datasets to eliminate
the impact of time-invariant factors, which in practice may remove several sources
of bias. A related strategy is to work off before/after comparisons in outcomes in a
“treated group” against a well-matched “control group”. Several chapters contained
here rely on these techniques, with chapters 1 and 2 exploiting timing differences in
policy implementation to ensure similarities across the groups. In the latter case,
the validity of the counterfactual strategy is supported by showing that treatment
and control groups are well matched on observable characteristics and are on statist-
ically indistinguishable pre-treatment outcome trends. Data limitations sometimes
preclude these techniques so that studies must rely on “selection on observables”.
In such cases, demonstrating insensitivity of findings to the specification of the con-
trol function of variables, or using “placebo/falsification tests” can be worthwhile
ways to support the internal validity of findings.
Throughout the thesis, datasets and techniques are marshalled to answer re-
search questions of considerable policy relevance:
1. Walk-in health services of one form or another feature in many healthcare sys-
tems, including Canada and the United States. In England many services have
closed or are at risk of closure. Chapter 1 provides the first real hard evidence
— from either side of the Atlantic — on the extent to which they divert patients
from hospital settings.
2. Despite significant media interest in the recent NHS reforms, there is little solid
evidence about their quantitative effects. The analysis in chapter 2 goes some
way to filling this gap, and at the same time speaks to more general questions
about the way in which doctors respond to holding budgets.
3. Chapter 3 complements an emerging literature that evaluates long term dis-
count rates using housing market settings. These implied discount rates may
be valuable for contexts such as environmental regulation where benefits from
upfront policy costs materialise only in the far-off future, so that discounting
assumptions are paramount in deciding optimal policy.
4. Finally, chapter 4 provides new evidence exploring the impact of heritage pre-
servation policies on domestic energy consumption. The results suggest a pre-
viously undocumented trade-off between historical preservation and energy
conservation.
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Chapter 1
Walk this Way: the Impact of Walk-in
Health Services on Emergency
Hospital Visits
20
1.1 Introduction
Emergency health care services in many OECD countries have experienced demand
growth in recent times (Berchet, 2015). In some places growth has been pronounced,
for example between 1995 and 2010 visits to US Emergency Departments (EDs) in-
creased by 34% (National Center for Health Statistics, 2013) and visits to Accident
& Emergency departments in the English National Health Service (NHS) rose by
around 40% (Appleby, 2013). While the majority of emergency visits still take place
at EDs, the rise in medical emergencies has been accompanied by an expansion in
a variety of primary care led urgent care services outside hospitals in England, the
US, and the Australian Capital Territory (Forbes, 2013; Nursing Times, 2008; Wein-
ick et al., 2010; Parker et al., 2012) while in other places like Canada these types of
health facilities are well-established (Salisbury & Munro, 2003).1
Recent policy statements in the US (Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services,
2014) and the UK (NHS England, 2013) suggest that some officials envisage a role
for such facilities in future emergency care system configuration. Beyond the poten-
tial to ease access to care and reach new groups of patients, part of the appeal is that
they may divert patients away from hospital EDs. This is desirable since crowding
at EDs is commonplace and is associated with high mortality (College of Emergency
Medicine, 2014) and reduces capacity for hospitals to carry out planned treatments
(Royal College of Surgeons, 2013); because emergency care in hospitals is consider-
ably more expensive than elsewhere (House of Commons Health Committee, 2013,
Evidence p. 32); and because many attendees at EDs have low severity needs which
could be treated outside a hospital setting (Weinick et al., 2010).
However, increasing the supply of emergency care with new services away from
hospitals is not guaranteed to divert patients from EDs when services are free at the
point of care. Rather, the overall effect likely hinges on local demand. Where this is
inelastic, the number of patients using emergency health services is fixed so every
attendance outside a hospital represents a one-for-one diversion from a hospital ED,
but with downward sloping demand new services make accessing emergency care
more convenient and attract patient visits that otherwise would not have occurred.
Moreover, because individuals who suffer adverse health cannot usually evaluate
the level of treatment they need, and where free at the point of care face few incent-
1For example, in the NHS just under three quarters of visits take place at EDs: Consultant led
24 hour services with full resuscitation facilities and designated accommodation for the reception of
patients. I use this terminology throughout since the term “Accident and Emergency” is commonly
used as a catch-all term for any kind of emergency care facility. Primary care led urgent care ser-
vices outside hospitals go by a number of names including walk-in centres or clinics, urgent care
centres, retail clinics, minor injury units and primary care emergency services depending on access
conditions, services provided or simply local naming conventions.
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ives to limit service use, some proportion of new visits may be of low clinical value.2
In these circumstances policy-makers operating with tight budgets face a dilemma:
increasing services outside of hospitals may widen access to care and divert patients
from making costly hospital visits, but may lead to inefficiently high use of services
and spiraling costs.
The evidence relating emergency care services outside hospitals to ED visits is
fairly sparse with mixed findings. Around a quarter of patients surveyed self-report
that in the absence of walk-in services they would have attended an ED (Rizos et al.,
1990; Accent, 2013), a finding supported by case studies (for example Heaney & Pax-
ton (1997) and Simon et al. (2012)) which are consistent with new facilities reducing
activity at nearby EDs. On the other hand, more general quantitative evaluations
of walk-in services that use panel techniques to exploit time variation in ED visits
have tended to be unable to detect significant diversion from EDs, both in the US
(Ferber & Becker, 1983) and in the NHS (Salisbury et al., 2002; Chalder et al., 2003).
However, such studies either do not fully control for the endogenous availability of
walk-in services, or impose strict or arbitrary assumptions about the spatial reach of
new services.3
In this paper, I aim to provide quasi-experimental empirical evidence about the
extent to which one kind of urgent primary care facility — Walk-in Centres (WiCs)
in the English NHS — impact on ED outcomes. Some 230 WiCs were opened in Eng-
land in the last decade to provide easily-accessible primary care by offering patients
routine or emergency treatment from a GP or nurse without the need to make an
appointment. The centres, which usually operate extended hours and open at the
weekend and on public holidays, are equipped to deal with all but the most serious
cases such as major trauma, heart attacks or strokes. Despite proving popular with
patients, many centres have recently closed or are due to close, at least in some cases
because administrators are sceptical they have reduced pressure on other services.
Two main problems hamper the ability to find correlations between the availabil-
ity of WiCs and attendances at nearby EDs and to make a causal interpretation. The
first is that proximity to centres from any given location is the result of a series of
decisions about emergency service configuration made by health administrators, for
example whether to open a new centre and where it should be located. Although
it is possible to gain some insight into how these decisions are taken, in general
the decision making process is a black box and the suspicion must be that the local
2Services are free at the point of care for all NHS patients, to Medicare and Medicaid patients in
the US and users of walk-in services in Canada and Australia. There are few if any mechanisms to
limit visits to urgent care services where patients simply show up – the General Practitioner (GPs)
gatekeeper function only applies to planned services.
3Strictly speaking Simon et al. (2012) and Ferber & Becker (1983) refer to new freestanding emer-
gency rooms which are not primary care led.
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availability of walk-in services may well be correlated with unobserved underly-
ing drivers of ED attendances which cannot be controlled for. In other words WiCs
may be targeted towards places that are experiencing increasing ED attendances (or
factors that will cause increasing ED attendances in the future) with any observed
correlation reflecting this phenomenon.
To mitigate this I exploit staggered variation in the local availability and access-
ibility of walk-in centres for potential users of these services across space, basing
estimates on changes in ED outcomes in small geographical areas close to walk-
in centres when a centre opens or closes. This specification is designed to address
concerns around the endogenous location of WiCs by ensuring the control group
for these changes is provided by other areas that are suitable and feasible locations
for WiCs, but which do not experience any changes in the availability of walk-in
services at that particular time. In my main models, I push this strategy further
by relying exclusively on a single wave of WiCs that opened under a policy pro-
gramme that imposed certain criteria for the location and specification of roughly
150 new centres, exploiting timing differences in openings driven by administrative
constraints on the deployment of the new services to estimate effects.
A separate, albeit related, set of problems arises because the effects of WiCs are
likely to be conditional on where they are located — both in relation to existing pop-
ulation clusters and other similar services — but how spatial effects manifest is a
priori unknown. This is further complicated by urban density issues that may see
patients travelling further to use emergency services in places where other health
services are more scarce. To address these issues, I use a spatial strategy to create a
treatment intensity measure that is a non-parametric function of distance to walk-in
services. Counts of open WiCs in distance buffers centred on particular locations
provides variation in treatment intensity which is then compared to changes in loc-
alised use of EDs. Distance buffers vary across space based on the observed travel
distances that patients undertake to access emergency health care locally.
In contrast to the earlier research, when adopting these methods I find that WiCs
significantly reduce overall volumes of attendances at Emergency Departments.
Findings are largely intuitive: the scale of reduction is greater for patients living
closer to new centres, for WiCs co-located with EDs, and for those in places with
fewer substitute services available. From a policy perspective an interesting finding
is that effects are wholly driven by patients who are recorded as having made the
decision about where to attend on their own, and that WiCs have no effect on ED at-
tendees referred by a GP or conveyed in an ambulance. It may be that these patients
require the kind of services that an ED can provide but a WiC cannot, but may also
suggest an unwillingness of other health professionals to refer (or in the case of am-
bulances, bring) patients to WiCs rather than EDs. Taking account of WiC opening
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hours I estimate that between 10-20% of patients seen at hospital-based WiCs and
between 5-10% patients seen at other WiCs were diverted from more expensive high
acuity facilities at hospital EDs. The implication is that the WiCs could play a small
role in reducing pressure at EDs, the majority of patients attending WiCs would not
have attended an ED.
The main contribution of this paper is to provide fresh policy-relevant evidence
on the extent to which primary care led urgent care services can divert patients from
hospital EDs. As well as NHS officials making decisions over individual walk-in
centres, findings are relevant to policy-makers in a number of other health systems
— including Canada, the US, Australia, Norway, and Chile — where these types of
facilities play a role in emergency care configurations.
More generally, the research contributes to the evidence base on whether primary
care interventions can stem the pressure at EDs, both in the NHS (e.g. Cowling
et al. (2013); Dolton & Pathania (2015); Tan & Mays (2014)) and further afield (e.g.
Lippi Bruni et al. (2014) and studies reviewed in Berchet (2015)). The use of de-
tailed patient level hospital records and quasi-experimental methods to uncover
causal effects dovetails with a broader literature exploring empirical links between
primary care and secondary care in the NHS (e.g. Dusheiko et al. (2006); McCormick
& Nicodemo (2014)), and the explicitly spatial research design allows me to confirm
that distance appears to matter for choice in emergency care usage, mirroring sim-
ilar findings in other empirical studies of choice in primary care ( e.g. Salisbury
(1989); Santos et al. (2015)) and secondary care (e.g. Ho & Pakes (2014)) contexts.
1.2 Walk-in Centres in the National Health Service
1.2.1 Institutional background
The National Health Service (NHS) in England and Wales provides health care ser-
vices free at the point of service. It is estimated to be the fifth largest employer in the
world and with an annual budget of roughly £100 billion, represents around 15% of
public spending in England and Wales. In stylised terms, the traditional model for
NHS services comprised specialist care in a hospital setting alongside GP services
inside and outside normal hours for more routine health care needs. High severity
emergency cases were treated in hospital Accident and Emergency (A&E) Depart-
ments including both Consultant led 24 hour services with full resuscitation facil-
ities catering for all kinds of emergency (Type 1 units or Emergency Departments
(EDs)) as well as a small number of Consultant led single specialty services such as
eye and dental hospitals (Type 2 units). Patients with less severe unplanned health
care needs could access primary care services from their registered GP by making
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Figure 1.1: Walk-in Centres in England, quarters from 1999q3
an appointment (including emergency appointments), or outside normal hours by
using a GP Out of Hours (OOH) service.
Since the mid 1990s, policy-makers have introduced several new kinds of addi-
tional emergency and urgent care services specifically designed to meet the needs
of patients with minor injuries or illnesses. The benefits of providing emergency
services outside hospitals were reiterated in a recent review into the urgent and
emergency care system led by the National Medical Director (NHS England, 2013).
New services introduced to date include a telephone advice service — NHS 111,
formerly NHS Direct — and a range of NHS facilities offering patients face to face
advice and treatment for low severity emergences from a GP or nurse without the
need to register locally or make an appointment. Known as Type 3 units, they in-
clude NHS Walk-in Centres (WiCs), Urgent Care Centres (UCCs) and Minor Injury
Units (MIUs).4 Most were located outside of hospitals, although some were po-
sitioned within hospitals directly next to EDs. In some cases when a patient enters
the hospital for emergency treatment, she is met at the front door and directed to the
emergency service most appropriate to the presenting condition, a process known
as triage.
NHS Walk-in Centres provide routine and emergency primary care for minor
ailments and injuries with no requirement for patients to pre-book an appointment
or to be registered at the centre (Monitor, 2014). Around 230 centres were opened
in England in three waves in the period 2000-2010 (Figure 1.1). Roughly 70 nurse-
led walk-in centres (i.e. only staffed by nurses with no doctors present) opened in
4Little data is available for the latter two types of unit, and in some cases they are difficult to
distinguish from WiCs. See Monitor (2014) for a review. In the remainder of this study I focus chiefly
on WiCs.
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the period 1999-2004, including 20 pilot sites opened before December 2001 and a
group of facilities established at hospitals alongside pre-existing EDs in 2004. A
second wave of WiCs saw 6 Independent Sector GP led centres designed to cater
for the needs of commuters opened at train stations in major cities in the period
2005-2007. More recently, around 150 new centres — often referred to as GP-led
health centres or Darzi centres — were commissioned as part of a third wave of
WiCs following a policy initiative prompted by an interim report in October 2007
by then Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Health, Ara Darzi (Darzi, 2007).
The advent of this third wave led the number of open centres to peak in early to mid
2010 but since then, as many as 40 centres have closed with a strong possibility that
more will follow.
The third wave of centres forms the basis of much of the empirical work that
follows. Following the 2007 Darzi report, the Department of Health set up a new
policy known as Equitable Access to Primary Care (EAPC). The twin aims of the
policy were to improve access to primary care in the most under-doctored areas of
the country, and to deliver more personalised and responsive care across England.
To this end Ministers announced £250 million of new annual funding to support the
establishment of 100 new GP practices in the 38 Primary Care Trusts (PCTs) with the
lowest per capita GP provision, and additionally required each of the 152 PCTs to
establish one new GP-led health centre. The new services were to be commissioned
through competitive procurements. The policy background provides grounds to
suggest these centres should form a relatively homogeneous group both in terms of
the specification of services as well as the characteristics of the locations where they
were sited. The centres had to offer a regular registered GP practice service as well
as walk-in services for any member of the public from 8am until 8pm, 7 days a week,
365 days a year. Core criteria set out in policy documents also required them to be
located in areas that maximised convenient access to services and opportunities to
colocate and integrate with other local services (Department of Health, 2007).
As a result of the policy initiative, almost all PCTs commissioned at least one
wave three WiC from a GP-led consortia, a private sector provider, or a third sector
enterprise. Opening dates were for the most part restricted to a fairly narrow win-
dow with the first centre, the Hillside Bridge Healthcare Centre in Bradford, opening
in December 2008, roughly a third opening before the end of April 2009, more than
two thirds by the end of 2009, and all but two by the end of 2010. The timing of
contract award and the opening of the new centres across PCTs is an important part
of my identification strategy. Guidance issued by the Department of Health (De-
partment of Health, 2007) highlights the pressure from the centre on PCTs to com-
mission these services quickly with an expectation that all procurements should be
finished in 2008/9. It strongly suggests the main factors driving the timetable for
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the new centres were administrative — readiness on the part of the PCTs to specify
the new services and identify suitable premises, the speed of the procurement pro-
cess, and the time needed to prepare the new site. Although PCTs were free to set
contract lengths, centres were typically but not exclusively commissioned on five
year contracts. Combined with the length of contract awarded, the contract award
date serves to determine the contract end date. At this point, PCTs had the option
to recommission or decommission these services i.e. to close the service or to award
a new contract. Some commentators have suggested that closure decisions were
driven by the initial contract value awarded, which in some cases implied a cost per
patient far above most traditional GP practices.
1.2.2 Walk-in Centres and Emergency Departments
The objectives of WiCs are often couched in terms of widening access to health care
services (NHS Executive, 1999; Darzi, 2008), but a further rationale is that many
patients attending EDs might be treated more efficiently in lower acuity facilities
outside hospitals.5 Hospital records show that only around a quarter of ED attend-
ances result in an admission and a further quarter of attendances result in no kind of
treatment at all (Figure 1.2). Although difficult to evaluate precisely, it is estimated
that around 15-30% of patients attending EDs in the NHS could be treated safely in
primary care settings.6 Given the lowest administered price for an ED treatment (a
urine test) is higher than the highest tariff for any activity performed at a walk-in
clinic (House of Commons Health Committee, 2013, Evidence p. 32), diverting any-
where near this proportion of patients to low acuity emergency units would likely
generate considerable savings to the NHS.
Beyond efficiency concerns, there are other reasons why administrators may
wish to divert patients with low severity emergency health needs from EDs to WiCs
and other low acuity facilities. Crowding at EDs can reduce the quality of care at
EDs and is associated with increased mortality and an increased number of ser-
ious incidents (College of Emergency Medicine, 2014). Spikes in attendances at
EDs — particularly common during winters — can further compound this conges-
tion. Crowding can also leave patients dissatisfied and jeopardise the fulfillment of
highly politicised nationally set waiting time targets. Finally, high volumes of ad-
5See for example the evidence of John Appleby, Chief Economist of the King’s Fund, to the Health
Committee “Until 2003/4, statistics on A&E attendances included major A&E units only. But around
this time more, smaller units including walk-in centres and minor injuries units were introduced
with the intention of diverting less serious emergency cases away from the larger, more expensive
A&E departments” (House of Commons Health Committee, 2013, p. 11).
6“Millions should not be in A&E”, Sky News interview with Professor Keith Willett, national dir-
ector for Acute Episodes of Care, 7 September 2013. http://news.sky.com/story/1138301/
millions-should-not-be-in-a-and-e-exclusive
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Figure 1.2: Outcomes of ED attendances, 2009-2011
Notes: Based on HES data for all Emergency Department attendances in the period 2008q2 through
2012q3. Admitted patients are defined as those with HES Attendance Disposal field value of 01.
Untreated defined as those with HES A&E Treatment fields that all take the value of 99 or missing.
missions through EDs can also have knock-on effects on planned care by taking up
beds, forcing the cancellation of planned operations, and in extreme cases even caus-
ing hospitals to shut down whole parts of elective services (Health Service Journal,
2013; Royal College of Surgeons, 2013).
For these reasons, and especially when finances are tight, policy-makers may be
concerned to understand the extent to which WiCs (and other Type 3 units) divert
patients away from EDs.7 There is little systematic data on activity at individual
WiCs, but surveys suggest that they have proved popular, especially for the young,
women, and lower social groups, with between 12 and 60 thousand patients attend-
ing each centre each year (Monitor, 2014). Anecdotally it appears that many new
centres were initially oversubscribed and had to expand capacity or close at cer-
tain times to cope with unanticipated levels of demand. Figure 1.3 shows trends in
attendances at Accident and Emergency Departments by Type weighted by popu-
lation since 2004/5, a period roughly coinciding with the growth in WiCs. The dark
grey line shows an upward trend in attendances at Type 3 units in the period and
is consistent with aggregate growth in WiC activity. The figure also shows that at-
tendances at Type 1 and 2 emergency units (light blue line and light grey line) have
remained fairly flat throughout the period so that overall A&E attendances (dark
blue line) have risen in step with Type 3 growth.
Basing inferences on the aggregate trends in A&E attendances depicted in Fig-
ure 1.3 is tricky since these trends could plausibly result from different underlying
market equilibria that are observationally equivalent in what effectively amounts
to a demand/supply identification issue. The top left part of Figure 1.4 illustrates
7A related question is whether access to GP services drives ED outcomes. See for example Cowl-
ing et al. (2013) for recent evidence.
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Figure 1.3: Attendances per thousand population by Type, 2004/5 to 2012/13
Notes: Source: HSCIC
that with inelastic but exogenously shifting demand for emergency care, an out-
ward shift in emergency care supply brought about by new WiCs brings emergency
care closer to some patients and reduces the time and money costs of patient attend-
ances from P0 to P1. Because demand is fixed at the level of the vertical demand
curve, WiC activity directly substitutes for ED activity and every attendance at a
WiC means one less attendance at an ED. Under such conditions, the aggregate
trends in Figure 1.3 might be explained by an unrelated exogenous outward shift
in demand that might result from - say - an aging population or increased patient
expectations, as shown in the top right part of the figure.
On the other hand, the bottom panel in the Figure illustrates with elastic but
fixed demand for emergency services, by reducing the costs for patients to access
emergency care services the opening of new WiCs may have attracted new patients
that otherwise would not have sought emergency care. Here, the local supply shift
in emergency care results in a move along the demand curve. Some policy-makers
have likened this to the ’fundamental law of congestion’ (Duranton & Turner, 2011)
where opening more roads can create more traffic.8 Building on this interpretation,
others have argued that meeting this demand, unmet at the previously prevailing
prices, may actually be of low priority to the NHS (despite the value to consumers
of these services implied by their use) . This might be the case if the newly satis-
fied demand is of low clinical value (the ”worried well”) or if much of the induced
demand is actually patients seeking a second opinion to other advice received, for
example from a GP, rather than representing any widening of access.
In practice it is clear that WiCs, or other Type 3 units, will not always provide a
perfect substitute for attendances at hospital emergency facilities, not least because
8http://www.gponline.com/gp-contract-not-blame-a-e-pressure-nhs-leaders-say/
article/1183473
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Figure 1.4: Alternative explanations for observed attendance patterns
Notes: Top half of figure shows the situation with inelastic demand. A outward shift in supply
caused by new WiCs initially reduces the cost of patient attendance from P0 to P1 (LHS) but an
exogenous demand shift leads to new equilibrium quantity and prices of Q1 and P2 (RHS). The
same outcome can come about with elastic demand, shown in the bottom half of the figure.
they are not open at all times like EDs, and because they are unequipped to deal with
the most serious cases such as major trauma, heart attacks or strokes. Additionally,
patients are not always responsible for the choice of location of their emergency at-
tendance. Certainly, patients conveyed to emergency facilities in ambulances have
little input into the destination of their journey. In many other cases, patients are re-
ferred to emergency facilities (e.g. a GP) and although there is no obligation to com-
ply it seems unlikely that many patients will ignore such a recommendation. Even
when they are able to make an active choice, incomplete information may mean pa-
tients attend EDs even when WiCs provide the same service at a lower price, either
because patients are unable to assess the level of severity of their condition (Jack-
son et al., 2005) and are risk averse, or because of incomplete information about the
availability of services. This is consistent with suggestions that patients confused
with the array of emergency services may ’default’ to EDs (NHS England, 2013).
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Table 1.1: Types of Walk-in Centres in England
Type of Walk-in Centre Location Total
At hospital ED Away from ED
Nurse-led 12 71 83
GP-led 16 129 145
-Darzi (wave 3) 13 122 135
-Commuter (wave 2) 0 6 6
-Other 3 7 10
Total 28 200 228
1.3 Data
1.3.1 Walk-in Centres
To undertake the following empirical work a database containing information on the
full population of all 228 Walk-in Centres in England was created from information
contained in a recent report issued by Monitor, a Non-Departmental Public Body re-
sponsible for regulating the hospital sector in England. This report provided a list of
open and closed walk-in centres as at early 2014 along with an address including full
postcode for each site. WiC opening and closing dates were then matched into this
data using datasets available from the Organisation Data Service (ODS) provided
by the Health and Social Care Information Centre (HSCIC). Basic checks revealed
that given information was often inaccurate, so dates were individually verified by
desk research (e.g. by checking websites for the organisation itself, contemporary
press reports, and policy documents available online).
With no single recognised definition of a walk-in service and no central data-
base, determining additional pieces of information about individual WiCs — open-
ing hours, numbers of medical practitioners, details of contracts etc — proved chal-
lenging. The full postcode was used to geocode the location of each centre using the
postcode centroid given in the 2013 Postcode Directory available from the Office of
National Statistics. By spatially matching information about the location of hospit-
als, WiCs were then grouped into those co-located with EDs and those located away
from EDs. Further desk based research also enabled classification of facilities into
groups corresponding to three waves of walk-in centres commissioned under dif-
ferent policy initiatives referred to above. This is potentially helpful because some
policy initiatives set out criteria for the specification of the new services, so that
these WiCs might reasonably be expected to share some common characteristics.
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Figure 1.1 shows the overall count of open centres for each quarter in the period
1999-2014, illustrating the sharp increase in WiCs in 2008-2010 and the subsequent
decline as more centres began to close. Figure 1.5 shows the distribution of open
and closed WiCs as at 1 December 2002 (LHS), at 1 September 2008 (centre), and
at 1 January 2012 (RHS). These maps illustrate that the earliest centres were mainly
clustered in the North West and London with subsequent centres opening in the
North East and the Midlands. The third wave of WiCs then brought centres to a
much wider range of locations, including those outside the main urban areas in
England. Table 1.1 reports counts of WiCs by type, classifying each centre according
to whether it is co-located with an ED at a hospital, whether it is led by GPs or
nurses, and the wave under which the centre was commissioned.
1.3.2 Accident and Emergency
Accident and Emergency data is drawn from two main sources: the Quarterly Mon-
itoring of Accident and Emergency (QMAE) dataset published by NHS England,
and Hospital Episode Statistics (HES) records provided by HSCIC.
QMAE is the official source of information on A&E activity. It is generally con-
sidered to be the most comprehensive and reliable source of aggregate information
on emergency activity and is used to check compliance with waiting times targets.
QMAE holds quarterly counts of total emergency attendances at NHS and non-NHS
providers, and the breakdown of attendances at Type 1 units and other units (Figure
1.3).9 QMAE data is recorded at the provider, rather than the site, level. For most
providers this is inconsequential since there is only one site, but some NHS Trusts
have multiple emergency care sites (which may be a mix of Type 1, 2 & 3 units) so
where this is the case the split of attendances across sites cannot usually be observed.
Nevertheless, a panel of Type 1 attendances for NHS Trusts can be constructed for
the period 2004q2 to 2011q3. A number of NHS Trust mergers have taken place in
this time; to account for this I group together earlier data for NHS Trusts which will
eventually merge in order to create a balanced panel of 146 NHS Trusts over this
period.
The second data source, the HES A&E dataset, comprises detailed records of
individual attendances at emergency care units, including the patient’s residential
location (Lower Super Output Area (LSOA)), the patient’s registered GP practice,
the type of unit (Type 1, Type 2, Type 3), and the time of the attendance.10 It is also
9The other category includes Type 2 and Type 3 attendances, no split is available. Unit Types
can be distinguished in this data from 2003/4 which sets the lower bound on the time-frame of my
analysis.
10LSOAs are an administrative geography built up from Output Areas. There are 32,844 LSOAs in
England with a mean population of 1,630.
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Figure 1.6: Proportion of QMAE A&E attends in HES
possible to identify how patients ended up at the facility, e.g whether they were con-
veyed in an ambulance or referred by a GP, and what happened to the patient at the
facility e.g. whether they received treatment and/or were admitted. While the HES
A&E dataset constitutes a rich source of information, it is apparent that not all pro-
viders submit data, and for those that do some data fields are not reliably coded.11
Figure 1.6 highlights the coverage issue by contrasting total attendance counts for
England for quarters in the period 2008q2 to 2012q2 in the two data sources. HES
coverage begins at around 70% of the QMAE total and climbs by roughly 10% over
the period. Closer inspection reveals that coverage of attendances at NHS Trusts
is very high and broadly stable, while coverage of attendances at providers other
than NHS Trusts — including Primary Care Trust (PCTs), community hospitals, and
WiCs — is very low. Crucially, almost all WiCs do not provide data to the HES data-
set, effectively making it impossible to analyse WiC activity changes using the HES
data and imposing an important constraint on this research.
As EDs are exclusively run by NHS Trusts, I focus on activity at Type 1 units to
mitigate this problem. Even then, data issues cannot be entirely avoided because
the field indicating the unit type in HES was only introduced in 2008/9, with less
than 50% of records in this first year of data having a valid code recorded. While
by 2011/12 more than 95% of fields are coded with a valid code, it is not possible
to determine whether increases in Type 1 attends at a given provider will represent
genuine attendance growth or simply more complete recording of activity. I address
these problem in two ways: first, I drop quarter-location cells that have fewer than
50 attendances.12 Second, I clean the the HES Type field based on the QMAE data
11This reflects that HES A&E data was until 2012/13 published as experimental statistics. Accord-
ing to HSCIC, it remains a developing data set which has a number of continuing issues regarding
quality and coverage of certain key fields.
12This effectively drops a large part of my sample. My expectation is that this should help me
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Figure 1.7: HES data before and after cleaning
Notes: Cleaning based on reassigning TYPE based on QMAE provider-quarter cells
0
1
2
3
4
2008q3 2009q3 2010q3 2011q3 2012q3 2008q3 2009q3 2010q3 2011q3 2012q3
Before clean Post clean
All attends Type 1 Uncoded
M
illi
on
s
which tells me which provider by quarter cells should only contain Type 1 attends
and which should contain only non-type 1 attends. Using this information I as-
sign type to 6.2 million attends where the type field is uncoded, denoting this the
‘cleaned’ HES data.13 Figure 1.7 shows the extent to which these operations reduce
the number of uncoded cells in the data. Because a large proportion of attends in
financial year 2008/9 remain uncoded even after cleaning, I then additionally drop
attends in these quarters.
Once the data has been cleaned, I remove duplicates and create several ED out-
come variables for quarter-LSOA cells using fields relating to the method of arrival,
the time of arrival, and the care received as part of the visit. I also combine this with
demographic data for LSOAs published by the Office for National Statistics (ONS),
interpolating mid-year estimates of population by age group to the quarterly level.
to address data quality issues rather than pick up effects unique to larger spatial units. I adopt
alternative specifications that entail no drops to provide reassurance on this point.
13To check robustness, in a second step I additionally reassign type for cells that do have a type
given, but where it is inconsistent with the QMAE data for that provider in that quarter. I denote the
result of this second step the ’reassigned’ HES data. When type implied by the data sources clash, it
is uncertain where the mistake lies, so my main estimates remain based on the cleaned data.
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1.4 Empirical approach
1.4.1 General spatial approach
My data constitutes quarterly series of ED outcomes at the NHS Trust and the LSOA
administrative geography and a database of WiCs including opening and closing
dates. In this section, I describe the approach I take to combine these data and my
attempts to formulate a research design intended to permit a causal interpretation
of resulting estimates. My general approach amounts to a fixed effect panel research
design that compares changes in ED outcomes to changes in the local availability of
WiCs, taking the general form:
ln EDit = β ·WIC TREATMENTit + x′it · γ + f (i, t) + eit (1.1)
Where the dependent variable is the log count of ED attendances or admissions
in quarter t, the principal variable of interest is WIC TREATMENT — a measure of
walk-in centre accessibility that relies on spatial proximity described further below,
x is a vector of time varying controls, and f(i,t) are fixed effects which allow for
unobserved time and place variation. I run various versions of this model distin-
guishable by the cross sectional identifier (and geographical fixed effect) i and the
dependent variable. To illustrate how this plays out in practice, consider the effect of
a newly opened WiC in a town. With the QMAE data, I can examine the effect of the
WiC on the number of people attending the local ED in the town (the i’s are spatially
proximate EDs). With the HES data I can explore the effect of the newly opened WiC
on attendances at EDs but restricting attention to people living in close proximity to
the WiC (the i’s are spatially proximate LSOAs), providing a more precise analysis
of spatial effects of the new centres.
To specify WIC TREATMENT, I design a treatment intensity measure based on the
counts of WiCs open and accessible from a given location: (WICS OPEN, WICS ACCESSIBLE).
I have little data on the levels of service at individual WiCs (e.g. opening hours,
numbers of medical practitioners) so define WICS OPEN as the count of WiCs that
were open in the previous period (t-1) and that are not closed in the current period
(t). I use such an approach because new WiCs may take some time to bed down,
and because in a small number of cases I may have the contract award date rather
than open date. In any case, exact timing is not critical since estimation is based on a
time-demeaned approach that effectively compares some kind of average outcome
across periods before and after WiC changes (Gibbons, 2014).
Because the spatial scale of impacts of WiCs is uncertain and with no exogen-
ous restriction of who can use WiCs, I rely on a spatial strategy that counts the
number of WiCs within distance buffers centred on the cross sectional identifier to
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define WICS ACCESSIBLE. These buffers allow me to construct treatment intens-
ity as a non-parametric function of distance to WiCs (Gibbons et al., 2011; Faggio,
2014). In the aggregate model they are centred on the spatial co-ordinates of each
ED (since I cannot observe patients’ locations with this data) and in the local models
the centroid of each LSOA. It seems likely that the spatial bounds of WiC impacts
will differ in urban and rural places, for example according to the availability of
alternative types of health care (such as EDs and GPs). To allow for this, I adopt
distance buffers that vary across space according to estimates of typical distances
travelled to access emergency care in each location. These buffers vary at the Travel
to Work Area (TTWA) level and are generated from the distribution of distances
patients travel to attend emergency health care facilities.14
Specifically, I define three distance bands based on typical travel distances in the
TTWA: the lower quartile distance travelled (p25), the median (p50), and the upper
quartile (p75), constructing buffers in a discrete way such that each WiC falls into
only one distance band for each unit of observation. To allow for different effects
for WiCs co-located at EDs, I create a separate treatment for all WiCs at EDs within
the median distance travelled i.e. within the first two buffers. This gives me four
buffers in total, and the following estimated equation:
ln EDit = β1 WiCs
p25
it + β2 WiCs
p50
it + β3 WiCs
p75
it + β4 WiCs
ED
it + x
′
itγ + f (i, t) + eit
(1.2)
This set up is designed to partial out unobserved spatial and time varying het-
erogeneity f(i,t). By including cross-sectional fixed effects I remove any fixed factors
at the level of the provider (aggregate model) or LSOA (local models). These par-
tial out many potential time-invariant effects and should be particularly powerful
at the local level in terms of dealing with relatively slow-changing or fixed charac-
teristics of small areas such as the structure of the local health economy. Second,
by including quarterly dummies I eliminate any common time effects such as gen-
eral trends towards greater emergency care usage, national policy changes, as well
as seasonal patterns in health care need and nation-wide peaks in health care need
such as might occur with the outbreaks of viruses. To control for additional time
varying unobservables I also include separate year dummies for WiCs in each dis-
14These are based on distances patients travel to attend EDs in the HES data 2008/9 to 2012/13.
This is driven by practical considerations (WiC attendances are not recorded in HES) but the use
of ED visits should ameliorate concerns about the endogeneity of resulting buffers. I approximate
patient starting location as registered GP practice and attendance location as the closest ED (relevant
where an NHS Trust has more than one ED); I remove extreme journey lengths which I define as the
top 5% longest trips and irregular trips which I define as ones where fewer than 100 attendees from
a specific GP visit the ED during the entire period. I also create buffers that vary at the LA and PCT
level and report results in robustness checks along with results for buffers based on fixed distances
based on averages from the raw data. In all but the last case results are materially unchanged. More
details in the Appendix.
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tance band and for ED WiCs.
In some specifications I include three further groups of control variables. Quarter
dummies interacted with Government Office Region dummies account for any re-
gional trends, soaking up a wide range of unobserved effects that have the potential
to bias results. Second, in LSOA models I include counts of LSOA population in
five age bands (aged less than 10, aged 10-19, aged 20-49, aged 50-69, aged 70+).
These controls, interpolated from annual estimates, take account of overall changes
in LSOA populations as well as demographic changes which could be important de-
terminants of health care need. Finally, in some LSOA specifications (chiefly where I
examine ED outcomes during the hours that WiCs are open), I also include the (log)
LSOA attendance or admission rate per 1,000 population for activity taking place
in hours when WiCs are closed, accounting for potential unobserved trends that are
affecting ED outcomes both during the day and night at the LSOA level.
1.4.2 Endogenous placement of centres
A key methodological challenge, common to almost any policy evaluation, is that
non-random incidence of policy treatment creates difficulties in determining what
would have happened in the absence of an intervention.15 Proximity to WiCs from
any given location is the result of a series of decisions made by health administrat-
ors, for example where and when to open a new centre or whether to close an exist-
ing one. While it is possible to gain some insight into how such decisions are taken,
in general this is a black box and the suspicion must be that the local availability
of services may be correlated with unobserved underlying drivers of ED outcomes
which cannot be controlled for. In this context, it might be reasonable to expect
that WiCs are targeted towards places that are experiencing increasing ED attend-
ances or admissions, to places that are expected to have increasing ED attendances
or admissions in the future, or places that have factors that are correlated with these
phenomena. As such any association between WiC availability and ED outcomes
would likely be biased towards finding that WiCs are associated with worsening
ED outcomes, for example more ill health, more ED attendances, or more ED ad-
missions.
Specifications that rely on different samples are used to explore such issues. In
the most simple approach I use a panel approach that compares all places regard-
less of their proximity to to a WiC. Here there is little provision for the possibil-
ity that WiCs are systematically targeted towards places except to the extent that
15See Gibbons et al. (2014) for a discussion. In addition, I focus on places rather than people.
As noted in Faggio (2014) it is typically harder to find a good control group for places rather than
people and by focusing on places inevitably creates uncertainties since people can move in response
to policy changes i.e. they can spatially sort in a non-random way.
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Table 1.2: Walk-in Centre openings and closings, sample variation by data source
QMAE (2004q3 - 2011q2) HES (2008q2 - 2012q3)
Opened Closed Opened Closed
Type of Walk-in Centre ED Non ED ED Non ED ED Non ED ED Non ED
Nurse-led 4 37 2 10 0 11 6 14
GP-led 16 127 2 11 15 122 2 15
-Darzi 13 121 1 6 13 121 1 9
-Commuter 0 6 0 5 0 0 0 6
-Other 3 0 1 0 2 1 1 0
Total 20 164 4 21 15 133 8 29
I can control for these differences using the controls detailed above (‘selection on
observables’). Subsequent specifications use difference-in-difference strategies that
counter endogenous location by looking only at places that already have a WiC, did
so in the past, or will do so in the future. Estimates are based on localised changes
in ED attendances in places close to walk-in centres when the availability of walk-
in services changes, against a control group provided by other places that similarly
have (or had, or will have) walk-in centres close by, but where the availability of
walk-in services does not change at that particular time.
Because the HES data only runs from 2008/9, in the small area models from
which I generate my baseline results, WiC impacts must necessarily be estimated
largely off changes in the availability of the third wave WiCs known as Darzi centres
(see Table 1.2). These centres were commissioned under a policy initiative which
prescribed criteria for facility location and the specification of services, and can be
distinguished from other WiCs as they offer a registered GP service as well as walk-
in services. The exact timing of individual centres openings for these WiCs was
largely determined by administrative factors. Because the identifying assumptions
are that the factors driving the placement of any given WiC should be common to
the placement of all WiCs (i.e. common trends), and that the timing of the treatment
is not related to underlying factors that drive outcomes, a strategy that relies on
making comparisons only between places with a wave 3 centre arguably provides
the most comprehensive attempt to address endogenous placement concerns. For
these models the control group is composed of areas in close proximity to WiCs
opened only after 2008q2.
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Table 1.3: Descriptive statistics
Mean S.D Min Max
Panel A: NHS Trust Model
Log Emergency Department attends 10.01 0.42 8.91 11.29
Emergency Department WiCs within p0-p50 buffer 0.14 0.36 0 2
Other WiCs within p0-p25 buffer 0.22 0.45 0 2
Other WiCs within p25-p50 buffer 0.27 0.52 0 3
Other WiCs within p50-p75 buffer 0.41 0.78 0 6
Observations 3,660
Panel B: Lower Super Output Area (LSOA) Model
Log Emergency Department attends (All Hours) 4.89 0.30 4.00 7.53
Log ED attends, during WiC open times (WiC Hours) 4.53 0.32 0.69 7.12
Log ED attends, Self referred (Self Ref) 4.01 0.34 0 6.19
Log ED attends, Referred or conveyed (Other) 3.53 0.50 0 6.77
Emergency Department WiCs within p0-p50 buffer 0.05 0.23 0 1
Other WiCs within p0-p25 buffer 0.28 0.50 0 5
Other WiCs within p25-p50 buffer 0.33 0.53 0 3
Other WiCs within p50-p75 buffer 0.73 0.94 0 8
Observations 128,147
1.5 Results
Descriptive statistics in Table 1.3 are provided for the (log) number of overall at-
tendances at EDs and the counts of WiCs in distance bands for each of the panels.
This Table refers to information used in the main models i.e. only including those
observations that were included in the sample, excluding duplicates, observations
with incomplete data or with low counts of attends.
1.5.1 Walk-in Centres and Emergency Department attendances
Given that a key objective of urgent care centres in general and the NHS WiC pro-
gramme in particular is to divert patients from EDs, I initially explore the effect of
WiCs on ED attendances.
Table 1.4 reports the provider-based model which provides a first pass. The de-
pendent variable is quarterly counts of ED attendances at NHS Trusts 2004q2 to
2011q3 and the treatment measure counts WiCs in distance bands centred on the
EDs. Three specifications are reported. In each case standard errors are clustered
at the NHS Trust level and all specifications include quarter dummies and year-
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Table 1.4: Walk-in Centres and Emergency Department attendances, NHS Trusts
(1) (2) (3)
Fixed Effect Diff-in-Diff Diff-in-Diff
WiCs at Emergency Departments -0.0338∗∗ -0.0691∗∗∗ -0.0692∗∗∗
(0.0171) (0.0263) (0.0254)
WiC within p0-p25 -0.0089 -0.0076 -0.0113
(0.0161) (0.0163) (0.0154)
WiC within p25-p50 0.0004 0.0028 -0.0008
(0.0244) (0.0247) (0.0239)
WiC within p50-p75 -0.0128 -0.0120 -0.0102
(0.0136) (0.0136) (0.0151)
Year-by-Region FX X
Observations 4290 3660 3660
R-squared 0.949 0.943 0.946
Notes: Column (1) is a panel type analysis of 146 NHS Trusts. Columns (2) and (3) are difference-
in-difference models with the sample defined by all 123 NHS Trusts with at least one ED within p75
travel distance from at least one of the 209 WiCs opened or closed at some point in the period 2004Q2
2011Q3. Dependent variables are log of ED attends. All regressions include quarter dummies and
year-by-distance band dummies. Standard errors are clustered at the NHS Trust level.*** p < 0.01, **
p <0.05, * p < 0.1
by-distance band dummies, with the final column additionally including year-by-
region dummies to account for unobserved regional trends. The first column re-
ports the results of a time-demeaned panel that includes all 146 NHS Trusts that
have a hospital with a Type 1 facility with columns 2 and 3 reporting difference-
in-difference models (where the sample is defined as the 123 NHS Trusts that have
at least one Emergency Department within the third quartile (p75) travel distance
from at least one of the 209 Walk-in Centres that were opened or closed at some
point in the panel time-frame). Looking across the columns, these results suggest
that once the endogenous location of WiCs is taken into account, WiCs co-located at
Emergency Departments appear to have a more economically and statistically signi-
ficant impact on attendances at associated EDs, with the point estimates suggesting
an effect of around 7%. For all other WiCs – i.e. those located away from EDs – no
statistically significant effect is detected.
Table 1.5 reports similar analysis but using Lower Super Output Areas (LSOAs)
as the cross-sectional identifier. All columns relate counts of ED attendances in
each LSOA to WiC entry and exit, with the counts of attendances derived from the
cleaned HES data for 2009q2 to 2012q2.16 Relative to the provider based analysis,
these permit a much finer consideration of the location of patients relative to WiC
16I provide robustness checks to provide assurance that data cleaning is not driving results. This
includes the final two columns of Table 1.7 below and Table 1.11 in the Appendix.
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services, providing more observations and greater variation on which to base estim-
ates.17 Specifications are grouped into sets of three. Columns (1)-(3) are fixed effect
models using the whole sample of LSOAs while (4)-(6) & (7)-(9) are difference-in-
difference models where the sample is restricted to those LSOAs that are within the
third quartile distance of an ED that opened or closed after 2008q1 for the reasons
given above. The counts in columns (1)-(3) and (4)-(6) include attendance at EDs at
any time while for the reasons set out below counts in columns (7)-(9) comprise only
those visits that take place in normal WiC operating hours (8am to 8pm). I progress-
ively add more controls in each set of three specifications - the first includes only
quarter dummies and year-by-distance band, the second adds quarter-by-region
dummies, and the third adds the natural log of the out of hours (OOH) attendance
rate per 1,000 population in the LSOA as well as a set of population controls (LSOA
population aged less than 10, aged 10-19, aged 20-49, aged 50-69, aged 70+).
17All further models are based on LSOAs. While subsequent specifications differ along at least one
dimension, in all cases standard errors are clustered at the Middle Super Output Area (MSOA) level.
MSOAs are a higher level of administrative geography built up from LSOAs. There are roughly 7,000
MSOAs in England which house populations of between 5,000 and 15,000.
42
Ta
bl
e
1.
5:
W
al
k-
in
C
en
tr
es
an
d
Em
er
ge
nc
y
D
ep
ar
tm
en
ta
tt
en
da
nc
es
,L
SO
A
s
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
(9
)
FE
FE
FE
D
D
D
D
D
D
D
D
D
D
D
D
A
ll
H
ou
rs
A
ll
H
ou
rs
A
ll
H
ou
rs
A
ll
H
ou
rs
A
ll
H
ou
rs
A
ll
H
ou
rs
W
iC
H
ou
rs
W
iC
H
ou
rs
W
iC
H
ou
rs
ED
W
IC
s
-0
.0
13
8∗
-0
.0
19
2∗
∗∗
-0
.0
22
9∗
∗∗
-0
.0
19
5∗
∗
-0
.0
30
4∗
∗∗
-0
.0
31
6∗
∗∗
-0
.0
29
4∗
∗∗
-0
.0
47
2∗
∗∗
-0
.0
49
6∗
∗∗
(0
.0
07
1)
(0
.0
07
1)
(0
.0
05
5)
(0
.0
08
6)
(0
.0
08
6)
(0
.0
06
0)
(0
.0
08
6)
(0
.0
09
3)
(0
.0
08
8)
p0
-p
25
W
IC
s
-0
.0
11
7∗
∗∗
-0
.0
15
6∗
∗∗
-0
.0
18
4∗
∗∗
-0
.0
22
1∗
∗∗
-0
.0
24
9∗
∗∗
-0
.0
24
3∗
∗∗
-0
.0
33
8∗
∗∗
-0
.0
36
8∗
∗∗
-0
.0
37
1∗
∗∗
(0
.0
03
9)
(0
.0
03
8)
(0
.0
02
9)
(0
.0
04
8)
(0
.0
04
8)
(0
.0
03
5)
(0
.0
05
5)
(0
.0
05
5)
(0
.0
05
3)
p2
5-
p5
0
W
IC
s
-0
.0
00
3
-0
.0
04
9
-0
.0
05
4∗
∗
-0
.0
08
5∗
∗
-0
.0
12
9∗
∗∗
-0
.0
11
0∗
∗∗
-0
.0
10
4∗
∗
-0
.0
16
1∗
∗∗
-0
.0
15
9∗
∗∗
(0
.0
03
2)
(0
.0
03
2)
(0
.0
02
4)
(0
.0
03
9)
(0
.0
03
9)
(0
.0
02
8)
(0
.0
04
5)
(0
.0
04
5)
(0
.0
04
2)
p5
0-
p7
5
W
IC
s
0.
00
60
∗∗
0.
00
10
0.
00
06
0.
00
59
∗∗
0.
00
05
0.
00
02
0.
00
72
∗∗
-0
.0
00
3
-0
.0
00
5
(0
.0
02
5)
(0
.0
02
4)
(0
.0
01
8)
(0
.0
02
7)
(0
.0
02
7)
(0
.0
01
9)
(0
.0
03
1)
(0
.0
03
0)
(0
.0
02
9)
O
O
H
A
tt
en
d
R
at
e
0.
35
41
∗∗
∗
0.
38
64
∗∗
∗
0.
08
75
∗∗
∗
(0
.0
04
2)
(0
.0
06
0)
(0
.0
16
9)
Q
-b
y-
R
eg
io
n
FX
X
X
X
X
X
X
Po
pn
A
ge
Ba
nd
s
X
X
X
N
20
39
44
20
39
44
20
39
44
12
81
47
12
81
47
12
81
47
12
81
47
12
81
47
12
81
47
r2
0.
85
6
0.
85
7
0.
90
9
0.
85
1
0.
85
2
0.
91
1
0.
77
8
0.
78
3
0.
78
6
N
ot
es
:
Fo
r
al
lc
ol
um
ns
qu
ar
te
r-
LS
O
A
ce
lls
w
it
h
fe
w
er
th
an
50
at
te
nd
s
ar
e
dr
op
pe
d.
C
ol
um
ns
(1
)-
(3
)
ar
e
fix
ed
ef
fe
ct
s
m
od
el
th
at
in
cl
ud
e
al
l2
1,
76
6
re
m
ai
ni
ng
LS
O
A
s.
C
ol
um
ns
(4
)-
(9
)a
re
di
ff
er
en
ce
-i
n-
di
ff
er
en
ce
m
od
el
s
th
at
re
st
ri
ct
th
e
sa
m
pl
e
to
al
l1
2,
91
1
LS
O
A
s
w
it
hi
n
p7
5
tr
av
el
di
st
an
ce
fr
om
a
W
iC
op
en
ed
or
cl
os
ed
af
te
r
20
08
q1
.
A
ll
H
ou
rs
in
cl
ud
e
at
te
nd
s
ta
ki
ng
pl
ac
e
at
an
y
ti
m
e,
W
iC
H
ou
rs
on
ly
be
tw
ee
n
8a
m
an
d
8p
m
.
D
ep
en
de
nt
va
ri
ab
le
s
ar
e
in
lo
gs
an
d
co
ns
tr
uc
te
d
us
in
g
cl
ea
ne
d
ED
at
te
nd
s.
A
ll
re
gr
es
si
on
s
in
cl
ud
e
qu
ar
te
r
du
m
m
ie
s
an
d
ye
ar
-b
y-
di
st
an
ce
ba
nd
du
m
m
ie
s.
St
an
da
rd
er
ro
rs
cl
us
te
re
d
at
th
e
M
SO
A
le
ve
l:
**
*
p
<
0.
01
,*
*
p
<
0.
05
,*
p
<
0.
1
43
Comparing the last two sets of columns against the first set, findings broadly
mirror the NHS Trust model, and are consistent with targeted locations experiencing
increasing attendances prior to the policy intervention. Three further broad findings
emerge from this Table that provide support for the idea that WiCs have a signific-
ant bearing on attendance volumes at EDs. Firstly, looking across the specifications,
the majority of coefficients are of the expected direction and are significant at the
1% level. Although quantitative effects grows stronger when controlling for unob-
served regional trends and weaken slightly with the introduction of the additional
controls, the overall picture is qualitatively unchanged with the addition of the new
controls. This holds in spite of a mechanical correlation in columns (3) & (6) that
arises because the OOH ED attendance rate is correlated with the dependent vari-
able. Secondly, looking down each column in turn, it appears that ED WiCs bring
about larger reductions in ED attendance volumes than for those outside EDs. For
these latter WICs, proximity matters and works in a predictable way – the strongest
impacts are evident in the closest LSOAs with effects roughly halving in the next
buffer and tailing off to nothing in LSOAs beyond the median TTWA travel dis-
tance. Finally, the magnitude of coefficients grow when only considering the subset
of attendances that occur during WiC opening hours (columns (7)-(9)) than for at-
tendances at any time (columns (4)-(6)). In other words impacts at EDs are more
evident during WiC opening hours, as one would expect.
The point estimates from these models can be used to roughly estimate the abso-
lute effects of WiCs, and the extent to which WiCs divert patients from EDs or meet
new demand. The mean number of ED attendances for LSOA-quarter cells in my
main sample is 140. To get a feel for the overall effect, I apply the reductions implied
by the point estimates for each buffer to this figure and then gross up by an estimate
of the number of LSOAs it applies to. The average WiC in my data has 50 LSOAs in
the first distance buffer, 50 more in the second, and a further 100 in the third. Using
the estimates in column (6) I estimate that an average ED WiC reduces quarterly ED
attendances by 442 ( = 0.0316 * 140 * 100) and the average WiC located elsewhere by
247 ( = 0.0243 * 140 *50 + 0.0110 * 140 * 50). On the basis that the average WiC has
roughly 20,000 annual attendances, this implies that around 9% of patients visiting
an ED WiC and around 5% of those visiting a WiC elsewhere were diverted away
from attending an ED.18
As WiCs cannot divert patients when they are closed, more meaningful estimates
of the relevant average effects are arguably derived from column (9). Table 1.6 uses
the point estimates and the upper and lower bounds of the 95% confidence interval
18This is illustrative. Monitor (2014) reports that 70% of WiCs surveyed provide between 20,000
and 45,000 walk-in appointments per year but that attendances anticipated in commissioning con-
tracts were typically in the range of 12,000 to 24,000 attendances.
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Table 1.6: Diversion from EDs, WiC open hours
(1) (2) (3)
95% C.I (-) Point Estimate 95% C.I (+) LSOAs
ED WICs -0.0668 -0.0496 -0.0323 100
p0-p25 WICs -0.0473 -0.0371 -0.0267 50
p25-p50 WICs -0.0241 -0.0159 -0.0076 50
p50-p75 WICs N/A N/A N/A 100
ED WiC Annual Diversion 3714 2728 1809
ED WiC Diversion Rate 19% 14% 9%
Other WiC Annual Diversion 1999 1484 960
Other WiC Diversion Rate 10% 7% 5%
to repeat the calculations above. As this table shows these estimates imply that
the average number of patients diverted from attending an ED each year lie in the
range 3,700 to 1,800 for ED WiCs and 960 - 2,000 for other WiCs. Using the same WiC
attendance figure as above, these results would imply a diversion rate of between 10
and 20% for ED WiCs and 5 and 10% for other WiCs. Put another way, these rough
calculations suggest that on average between 1 in 5 and 1 in 10 patients seen at ED
WiCs and between 1 in 10 and 1 in 20 patients seen at other WiCs were diverted
from attending an ED.
1.5.2 Attendances by patient arrival method
In the next table (Table 1.7) I report results that exploit information contained in
HES about how the patient came to be at the ED. Specifically, I distinguish between
patients that are recorded as self-referring to the ED and that do not arrive in an
ambulance (Self Ref) and those patients that were either referred to the ED from
another source — most commonly a GP — or were conveyed to the ED in an ambu-
lance (Other). At face value, these latter patients had little choice in which facility
they would attend. In column (1) I report the same specification as the final column
of Table 1.5 for illustration i.e. using WiC hours only and the full set of controls. Re-
peating this specification for the two different patient groups separately in columns
(2) and (3) suggests the impact of WiCs on self-referring patients is much sharper
than for other patients. In fact, barring some slight noise, there is no significant
effect evident for the other group. This group represents roughly half of all attend-
ances, so it makes sense that the magnitude of the overall effect is roughly half the
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Table 1.7: WiCs and ED attendances, by arrival method
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Baseline Self Ref Other Self/All Self-Other
ED WICs -0.0496∗∗∗ -0.0826∗∗∗ -0.0001 -0.0371∗∗∗ -0.1299∗∗∗
(0.0088) (0.0115) (0.0139) (0.0061) (0.0259)
p0-p25 WICs -0.0371∗∗∗ -0.0580∗∗∗ 0.0026 -0.0191∗∗∗ -0.0853∗∗∗
(0.0053) (0.0070) (0.0067) (0.0025) (0.0124)
p25-p50 WICs -0.0159∗∗∗ -0.0295∗∗∗ 0.0096∗ -0.0123∗∗∗ -0.0560∗∗∗
(0.0042) (0.0056) (0.0054) (0.0023) (0.0107)
p50-p75 WICs -0.0005 -0.0024 0.0039 -0.0044∗∗ -0.0204∗∗
(0.0029) (0.0041) (0.0040) (0.0017) (0.0081)
OOH Attend Rate 0.0875∗∗∗ 0.0452∗∗ 0.1396∗∗∗
(0.0169) (0.0184) (0.0161)
Q-by-Region FX X X X X X
Popn Age Bands X X X X X
N 128147 128147 128147 296422 296422
r2 0.786 0.719 0.809 0.512 0.562
Notes: All columns are difference-in-difference models with the sample defined as before. Dependent
variables are constructed using cleaned ED attends taking place between 8am and 8pm. Dependent
variables are in logs except column (4) which is a ratio of two levels. Self Ref counts self referred pa-
tients not arriving by ambulance. Other counts attends for those patients that arrived by ambulance
or that were referred from another source. Counts are of attends taking place between 8am and 8pm
only. All regressions include quarter dummies and year-by-distance band dummies. Standard errors
clustered at the MSOA level: *** p < 0.01, ** p <0.05, * p < 0.1
effect on the self-referred patient group reported in column (3).
One possible explanation for these contrasting results could be that the self-
referred group of patients have less severe health needs and as such are able to
attend lower acuity facilities more readily. This finds some support in the data since
only 12% of the self referred group are admitted following their attendance com-
pared to more than 40% of the other group. However, of the non-admitted patients
roughly 30% for both groups leave the ED without any kind of treatment. This could
suggest that medical practitioners such as GPs and ambulance staff are unwilling or
unable to refer or convey patients with less severe health needs to WiCs rather than
the ED. Whatever the reason for this discrepancy, it is clear that if the other group
responded to WiCs in the same way as the self-referring group, the effect of WiCs
on diverting patients could potentially be larger by up to a factor of around 2.
The final two columns of Table 1.7 utilise the Self and Other patient groups in
a way to support the estimates in the preceding Tables. In particular, they are de-
signed to allay any concerns that sample restrictions adopted to address deficiencies
in the HES data are driving the overall patterns I find. In earlier results, LSOA-
quarter cells with less than 50 attends were dropped. This was justified in order
to avoid problems where organisations begin to report data which could appear as
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a spurious increase in attendances, as well as to avoid problems inherent in using
count data. An alternative to dropping such cells is to retain these them and instead
to control for changes in reporting patterns. To do so I use dependent variables that
combine information about attendances in Self Ref and Other groups. The rationale
here is that changes in reporting should affect both of these equally sized groups
more or less symmetrically. More generally, differencing between choice and non
choice attends controls for any unobserved LSOA quarter factors that affect attend-
ances by both groups equally and so provides a powerful check on earlier results.
Two specifications are reported in Table 1.7. In column (4) I use the ratio of
Self Ref to All attendances and in column (5) the difference between the logarithm
of Self Ref and Other attendances. As Other attendances appear to be uncorrelated
with WiCs, the estimated effects should be driven by the effects of WiCs on Self Ref
counts. In both cases the pattern of effects is as found in earlier Tables, providing
some reassurance that these overall effects are robust to using the whole sample of
LSOAs.
1.5.3 Heterogeneous effects
The models in this subsection explores whether different WiCs might have hetero-
geneous effects depending on their specific settings, with a focus on whether and
how the availability of other health care services locally might condition impacts. I
do so by interacting the counts of WICs in distance buffers by time-invariant vari-
ables that indicate (a) where the WiC is the only WiC in the TTWA (Isolated) and (b)
where WiCs are located in areas with relatively few GPs (UnderDr). I proxy for the
latter by using areas that were eligible for additional GP surgeries under the EAPC
policy which sought to address inequality issues in access to primary care by setting
up around 100 new GP surgeries in the most under-doctored areas in England.
Results from the interaction models are reported in Table 1.8. As previously,
column (1) of this Table reports the same specification as the final column of Table
1.5 for reference. Looking across the Table it is clear that the interactions are gener-
ally significant and imply results that are intuitively appealing. Column (2) indicates
that where a WiC is the only one serving a population its effects on ED attendances
are quantitatively larger for more far flung patients, and estimates from column (3)
that in areas with the lowest GPs per population WiC effects are materially larger
across all distance buffers. These estimates are consistent with WiCs having greater
effects on ED attendances where there are fewer health care substitutes available,
and suggest that policies that target new services to such areas could be more effect-
ive in reducing pressures on hospital emergency services.
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Table 1.8: WiCs and ED attendances, treatment heterogeneity
(1) (2) (3)
Baseline Isolated UnderDr
ED WICs -0.0496∗∗∗ -0.0496∗∗∗ -0.0484∗∗∗
(0.0088) (0.0088) (0.0087)
p0-p25 WICs -0.0371∗∗∗ -0.0356∗∗∗ -0.0288∗∗∗
(0.0053) (0.0062) (0.0054)
p25*interact -0.0055 -0.0307∗∗∗
(0.0075) (0.0088)
p25-p50 WICs -0.0159∗∗∗ -0.0125∗∗∗ -0.0115∗∗
(0.0042) (0.0046) (0.0047)
p50*interact -0.0227∗∗∗ -0.0172∗∗
(0.0070) (0.0072)
p50-p75 WICs -0.0005 0.0008 0.0043
(0.0029) (0.0032) (0.0033)
p75*interact -0.0093∗ -0.0251∗∗∗
(0.0049) (0.0051)
OOH Attend Rate 0.0875∗∗∗ 0.0875∗∗∗ 0.0871∗∗∗
(0.0169) (0.0169) (0.0169)
Q-by-Region FX X X X
Popn Age Bands X X X
N 128147 128147 128147
r2 0.786 0.786 0.787
Notes: All columns are difference-in-difference models with the sample defined as before. Depend-
ent variables are in logs and constructed using cleaned ED attends taking place between 8am and
8pm. Interactions are binary variables taking the value of 1 if the LSOA is in a TTWA with a single
WiC (column (2)) or if the LSOA is in a PCT eligible for additional GP practices under the EAPC
policy (column (3)). All regressions include quarter dummies and year-by-distance band dummies.
Standard errors clustered at the MSOA level: *** p < 0.01, ** p <0.05, * p < 0.1
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Table 1.9: WiCs and ED admissions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All Hours All Hours All Hours WiC Hours WiC Hours WiC Hours
ED WICs -0.0103 -0.0162∗ -0.0126∗ -0.0125 -0.0198∗∗ -0.0234∗∗
(0.0088) (0.0088) (0.0065) (0.0100) (0.0099) (0.0100)
p0-p25 WICs 0.0002 -0.0020 -0.0016 -0.0015 -0.0058 -0.0053
(0.0050) (0.0050) (0.0040) (0.0060) (0.0060) (0.0061)
p25-p50 WICs -0.0025 -0.0053 -0.0054∗ -0.0058 -0.0106∗∗ -0.0098∗∗
(0.0038) (0.0039) (0.0032) (0.0047) (0.0048) (0.0048)
p50-p75 WICs -0.0020 -0.0050∗ -0.0051∗∗ -0.0041 -0.0090∗∗∗ -0.0088∗∗∗
(0.0025) (0.0026) (0.0021) (0.0029) (0.0031) (0.0031)
OOH Admit Rate 0.2764∗∗∗ -0.0457∗∗∗
(0.0025) (0.0039)
Q-by-Region FX X X X X
Popn Age Bands X X
N 120393 120393 120393 120393 120393 120393
r2 0.651 0.653 0.754 0.557 0.559 0.562
Notes: All columns are difference-in-difference models with the sample defined by all 13,607 LSOAs
within p75 travel distance from a WiC opened or closed after 2008q1, dropping quarter-LSOA cells
with fewer than 25 attends. Dependent variables are in logs and constructed using cleaned ED ad-
missions taking place between 8am and 8pm. All regressions include quarter dummies and year-by-
distance band dummies. Standard errors clustered at the MSOA level: *** p < 0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <
0.1
1.5.4 Admissions
My fourth set of results relates to the effects of WiCs on ED admissions and is re-
ported in Table 1.9. This repeats the analysis of Table 1.5 but replaces the dependent
variable with counts of admissions rather than attendances. Again, the first three
columns use counts at any time while the final three use counts only in the hours of
8am - 8pm. Looking across the Table, it is apparent that the pattern of estimates is
less clear down rows, less stable across columns, and coefficient estimates are less
economically and statistically significant than for the attendance based models. This
is unsurprising – WiCs have no facility to admit patients and were not designed to
reduce the number of emergency admissions at hospitals per se, so there is less of
a direct link between the availability of walk-in services and ED admissions than
for ED attendances. However, significant coefficients for some variables provides
some support that WiCs may have modest effects in bringing down the number
emergency admissions. This is further supported by the increase in economic and
statistical significance when contrasting admissions at any time (columns (1)-(3))
and admissions in WiC operating hours (columns (4)-(6)).
The scale of the impact of WICs outside EDs on admissions via EDs is relatively
small with significant estimates suggesting effects of the order 0.5-1%. Unexpec-
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tedly, the effects do not exhibit the clear spatial pattern evident for ED attendances
although this may reflect imprecision of estimates for different buffers and it is diffi-
cult to rule out that the coefficients are not the same across buffers. ED based WiCs
consistently display parameter estimates that are larger than those for other WiCs.
One possible explanation for the larger estimates for ED WiC effects may follow
from hospital administrators responses to managing performance against nation-
ally set waiting time targets that aim to ensure a high proportion of patients are seen
within four hours of arriving at an emergency care facility. This target provides in-
centives for hospitals to admit patients who are close to breaching the target (since
an admission signals the end of the patient’s attendance in the ED). It is possible that
the increased capacity associated with a new co-located WiC may reduce the need
for managers to make such decisions in order to stay within the target.
1.5.5 Disentangling the effects of WiC and GP practices
As a final extension I aim to disentangle whether the effects evident in earlier res-
ults are the outcome of changes in the availability of walk-in services or primary
care services. This is worthwhile as the majority of results have necessarily been
estimated on a subset of WiCs that opened since 2008/9. These WiCs may not be
representative of WiCs in general as by definition many of these centres (so-called
Darzi centres) must comprise both a WiC and a regular GP practice. As such, and
given little systematic evidence of the effects of GP access on ED attendances, it is
unclear whether any earlier findings are driven by the walk-in service or simply the
improved access to GP services. I attempt to disentangle these effects by examining
the impact of new GP surgeries that opened under the EAPC policy programme.
As described above, around 100 new GP practices were opened under this policy
in areas of the country that had the lowest concentration of GPs. Using informa-
tion provided by NHS England, I am able to identify 98 EAPC practices that were
opened on or after 1st April 2008.
In Table 1.10 I repeat the regressions in columns (1) and (3) of Table 1.5 and of
Table 1.9 but using these GP practices rather than WiCs to construct treatment meas-
ures. I am unable to include regional trends in these regressions since I do not have
enough variation to separately identify these from the changes in GP accessibility
driven by this policy. Notwithstanding, these results suggest that GP practices may
have small effects on ED attendances but these effects are restricted to LSOAs in the
closest proximity to the new practices. The estimates suggest that less than a quarter
of the overall effect of the Darzi WiCs is due to the impact of improving access to
traditional GP services.19 Although estimated effects on ED admissions are stable
19To facilitate a direct comparison I base this comparison on the estimates for WiCs in EAPC areas
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Table 1.10: New GP practices and ED attendances and admissions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Attend Attend Admit Admit
p0-p25 EAPCs -0.0148∗∗∗ -0.0138∗∗∗ -0.0083 -0.0084
(0.0050) (0.0047) (0.0063) (0.0064)
p25-p50 EAPCs -0.0005 0.0008 -0.0043 -0.0031
(0.0045) (0.0041) (0.0052) (0.0053)
p50-p75 EAPCs -0.0007 -0.0012 0.0002 0.0016
(0.0031) (0.0029) (0.0036) (0.0036)
OOH Attend Rate 0.1488∗∗∗
(0.0096)
OOH Admit Rate -0.0216∗∗∗
(0.0045)
Q-by-Region FX
Popn Age Bands X X
N 71154 71154 70279 70279
r2 0.810 0.819 0.574 0.576
Notes: Samples and dependent variables defined as in earlier Tables. Treatment intensity constructed
using GP practices opened under the Equitable Access to Primary Care (EAPC) policy. All regres-
sions include quarter dummies and year-by-distance band dummies. Standard errors clustered at
the MSOA level: *** p < 0.01, ** p <0.05, * p < 0.1
and intuitively signed making them seem plausible, they are too economically small
to detect statistical significance.
1.6 Discussion and conclusions
This research has attempted to evaluate the impacts of NHS Walk-in Centres on
attendances and admissions at hospital Emergency Departments with a specific fo-
cus on the extent to which these facilities divert patients away from EDs or attract
new patients. There are several inherent problems in undertaking such research, not
least there is no single comprehensive dataset on emergency patient activity, nor a
single database on the population of WiCs. Beyond these data issues, interpreting
any estimated effects as causal impacts must be approached cautiously since the
availability of walk-in services from a given location is the outcome of a series of
decisions made by health administrators about the opening, placement and closing
of such facilities, and as such could be endogenous to ED outcomes.
In order to circumvent these problems, I adopted a research design that focused
primarily on comparing ED outcomes for populations living in small areas lying
close to at least one of a wave of centres that was introduced from 2009/10. This
strategy relies on the staggered introduction of the new facilities driven by admin-
shown in column (3) of Table 1.8.
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istrative constraints on the deployment of the new services to facilitate a causal in-
terpretation.
Across all local models I consistently find the availability of walk-in services to
have a significant effects on reducing overall volumes of attendances at Emergency
Departments. Findings also suggest that WiC impacts are driven by diverting those
patients who are recorded as having made the decision about where to attend an
emergency care facility on their own, being neither referred nor arriving in an am-
bulance. In contrast, the local availability of WiCs seems to have had no effect on
volumes of attendances at EDs that result from a referral or that arrive by ambu-
lance. The reasons for the zero effect for these patients is unclear. It may be that
these patients require the kind of services that an ED can provide but a WiC cannot,
but may also suggest an unwillingness of other health professionals to refer (or in
the case of ambulances, bring) patients to WiCs rather than EDs.
A range of further results suggest that characteristics of WiCs may be important
conditioning factors in determining the extent to which they divert patients from
EDs. Centres based at hospitals next to EDs result in more pronounced falls in ED
attendances than those located away from hospitals. This is perhaps unsurprising
because at least some hospitals rely on a triage system at the front door where nurses
direct patients either to the ED or to the WiC. For facilities away from hospitals, dis-
tance appears to matter with the strongest impacts evident for groups of patients
living closest to the centres. Results are also consistent with more pronounced im-
pacts in more isolated areas and in areas where the availability of GPs is lowest.
Estimating effects only during WiC opening hours, my findings imply that the
average number of patients diverted from attending an ED each year lie in the range
1,800-3,700 for ED WiCs and 960-2,000 for other WiCs. Using an estimate of average
annual attendances at WICs, results imply a diversion rate of between 10 and 20%
for ED WiCs and 5 and 10% for other WiCs. Put another way, this implies between
1 in 5 and 1 in 10 patients seen at ED WiCs and between 1 in 10 and 1 in 20 patients
seen at other WiCs being diverted from attending an ED. It should be noted that
these results are rough calculations based on a coarse average WiC attendance figure
and cannot fully account for capacity issues at WiCs, so should be interpreted with
caution. However, they do seem plausible given in surveys around a quarter of
patients attending a WiC state that they would have attended an ED in the absence
of the walk-in facility.
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1.7 Appendix
This Appendix provides robustness checks on the results presented in the body of
the paper.
Table 1.11 evaluates the sensitivity of results to different data cleaning opera-
tions. For each pair of columns the left-hand column includes quarter dummies,
year-by-distance band dummies, and quarter-by-region dummies with the right-
hand column adding including the additional controls used in the main results.
The first two columns use the raw data extracted from HES. The subsequent two
columns include results for counts of attends at EDs that have been cleaned, i.e. by
dropping observations before 2009q2 and also reassigning type for fields where the
type field is blank by reference to the QMAE data. The final two columns report
results where counts have gone through the more stringent data process that reas-
signs type where QMAE suggests the type field may have been incorrectly coded.
Looking across the Table, it is clear that the use of the cleaned and reassigned data
gives rise to a more coherent pattern of the effects of WiCs over the raw data since
more proximate LSOAs are more affected by the availability of WiC services. It is
comforting that the two cleaning processes produce similar outcomes, although the
strength of coefficients is lower when using the reassigned data. This finding is con-
sistent across later findings but for simplicity in the main body of the paper I present
only models based on the more conservative cleaning procedure.
A further robustness check explores alternative specifications for the distance
buffers, using fixed distance buffers and buffers based on the distribution of travel
distances aggregated to PCTs and LAs rather than TTWAs. As shown in Table 1.12
results are not materially changed by changing the construction of distance buffers
except where a fixed distance is used. The results in this case show positive effects
of WiCs at greater distances. This likely reflects that travel distances are higher for
cities than in the other models presented here. For patients living at these longer
distances, there is likely little real prospect of using WiCs at such distances.
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Table 1.11: WiCs and ED attendances, data cleaning robustness
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Raw Raw Cleaned Cleaned Reassign Reassign
ED WICs 0.4885∗∗∗ 0.4893∗∗∗ -0.0304∗∗∗ -0.0316∗∗∗ -0.0263∗∗∗ -0.0272∗∗∗
(0.1142) (0.1148) (0.0086) (0.0060) (0.0088) (0.0061)
p0-p25 WICs -0.1304∗∗∗ -0.1305∗∗∗ -0.0249∗∗∗ -0.0243∗∗∗ -0.0190∗∗∗ -0.0184∗∗∗
(0.0302) (0.0301) (0.0048) (0.0035) (0.0048) (0.0035)
p25-p50 WICs -0.0607∗∗ -0.0572∗∗ -0.0129∗∗∗ -0.0110∗∗∗ -0.0097∗∗ -0.0077∗∗∗
(0.0262) (0.0260) (0.0039) (0.0028) (0.0039) (0.0028)
p50-p75 WICs 0.0054 0.0063 0.0005 0.0002 0.0002 -0.0000
(0.0137) (0.0135) (0.0027) (0.0019) (0.0026) (0.0019)
OOH Attend Rate 0.3569∗∗∗ 0.3864∗∗∗ 0.3836∗∗∗
(0.0094) (0.0060) (0.0060)
Q-by-Region FX X X X X X X
Popn Age Bands X X X
N 128096 128096 128147 128147 128147 128147
r2 0.633 0.647 0.852 0.911 0.851 0.908
Notes: All columns are difference-in-difference models with the sample defined by all 12,911 LSOAs
within p75 travel distance from a WiC opened or closed after 2008q1, dropping quarter-LSOA cells
with fewer than 50 attends. Dependent variables are logs of attend counts at any time. Columns
(1)(2) use raw counts; (3)-(4) use counts where type has been cleaned; (5)-(6) counts where types
have been reassigned based on QMAE data. All regressions include quarter dummies and year-by-
distance band dummies. Standard errors clustered at the MSOA level: *** p < 0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <
0.1
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Table 1.12: WiCs and ED attendances, buffer construction robustness
(1) (2) (3) (4)
TTWA PCT LA Fixed
ED WICs -0.0496∗∗∗ -0.0490∗∗∗ -0.0487∗∗∗ -0.0286∗∗∗
(0.0088) (0.0080) (0.0084) (0.0062)
p0-p25 WICs -0.0371∗∗∗ -0.0351∗∗∗ -0.0338∗∗∗ -0.0150∗∗∗
(0.0053) (0.0054) (0.0052) (0.0034)
p25-p50 WICs -0.0159∗∗∗ -0.0189∗∗∗ -0.0204∗∗ 0.0136∗∗∗
(0.0042) (0.0046) (0.0043) (0.0024)
p50-p75 WICs -0.0005 0.0008 -0.0014 0.0047∗∗∗
(0.0029) (0.0030) (0.0033) (0.0017)
OOH Attend Rate 0.0875∗∗∗ 0.0764∗∗∗ 0.0841∗∗∗ 0.0865∗∗∗
(0.0169) (0.0176) (0.0179) (0.0141)
Q-by-Region FX X X X X
Popn Age Bands X X X X
N 128147 123471 117160 153913
r2 0.786 0.783 0.785 0.791
Notes: All columns are difference-in-difference models with the sample defined by all LSOAs within
p75 travel distance from a WiC opened or closed after 2008q1, dropping quarter-LSOA cells with
fewer than 50 attends. Dependent variables are logs of attend counts taking place between 8am and
8pm. Column (1) is the baseline specification where buffers can vary at the TTWA level. Columns (2)
& (3) buffers vary at the PCT and LA levels respectively. In column (4) distance buffers are set at the
levels of the national average. All regressions include quarter dummies and year-by-distance band
dummies. Standard errors clustered at the MSOA level: *** p < 0.01, ** p <0.05, * p < 0.1
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Chapter 2
Taking Care of the Budget?
Practice-level Outcomes during
Commissioning Reforms in England
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2.1 Introduction
In the tax-funded English National Health Service the distinction between organisa-
tions that plan and buy (“commissioners”) and those that sell services (“providers”)
dates back to the NHS and Community Care Act of 1990 which first split the func-
tions and in effect created a quasi-market in the NHS. Commissioners plan, pur-
chase, and performance manage services on behalf of their resident populations
drawing on local health budgets allocated against local population characteristics.1
Providers constitute a diverse array of primary, secondary, and community health
service providers that contract with one or more commissioners to run facilities and
clinics or otherwise provide health services.
General Practitioners (GPs) play a role on both sides of the NHS market. As
private sector providers, GP practices contract with commissioners to provide primary
care services, but they also perform a gatekeeping role also found in many US health
maintenance organizations (HMOs) and in health systems in Continental Europe.
The gatekeeper function means a patient’s ability to access planned tests and treat-
ments at hospitals and other NHS providers can usually only follow a referral from
a GP. As such the GP has a “double” agency role (Ellis & McGuire, 1986; Blomqvist,
1991), acting for the patient in choosing the clinically most appropriate course of ac-
tion, and an agent for commissioners and ultimately the funders of care in allocating
scare resources. A third set of internal agency relationships — analogous to those
found in other markets — is introduced as GPs organise themselves into practices
and into wider medical groups (Gaynor, 1994).
Until the Health & Social Care Act 2012 commissioning in the English NHS was
performed by groups of administrators organised into 151 geographically defined
Primary Care Trusts (PCTs). The reforms enacted in 2012 led to the abolition of PCTs
and passed commissioning responsibilities — and budgets — to groups of local GP
practices bound together into new statutory bodies called Clinical Commissioning
Groups (CCGs).2 Despite potential to address important research questions, for ex-
ample about the effect of incentives on GPs and the tension between agency rela-
tionships in health care, to date academics have offered little analysis of this major
institutional reorganisation of the English healthcare system.
In this paper, I exploit the transitional phase of these reforms to investigate
1Weighted capitation has been used to allocate NHS resources since the 1970s (Department of
Health, 2011b). Recent formula include separate components for primary care services, primary
care prescribing, and Hospital and Community Health Services. To give a sense of scale, in 2012
the overall primary care services budget was approx £8 billion; primary care prescribing approx £8
billion; and for Hospital and Community Health Services approx £80 billion.
2Through their membership of CCGs, GPs obtained two additional duties under the auspices 2012
Act: commissioning secondary and community care services for resident populations, and a duty to
assist in improving the quality of primary care.
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whether vesting budgets with family doctors impacted on a range of practice-level
outcomes. I examine two sets of outcomes: the first set act as indicators of GPs
focusing on reducing costs, the second as indicators for GPs focusing on care qual-
ity. The cost saving outcomes centre on GP prescribing decisions or referrals to
secondary care, which together account for roughly a quarter of NHS costs: (i) the
per patient cost of all medicines and appliances prescribed at the practice; (ii) the
volume of referrals to secondary care (for all types of planned medical treatments)
per 1000 patients; and (iii) the proportion of patients referred to hospital that are
discharged at the first outpatient appointment.3 My principal care quality measure
— potentially avoidable hospitalisations per 1000 patients — relies on the idea that
admitting patients to hospitals with some presenting conditions could have been
avoided by appropriate primary care, for example by preventing the onset of a dis-
ease by vaccination, or by managing a chronic condition such as diabetes effectively.
Patient satisfaction with primary care, obtained from survey data, is used to explore
a second dimension of primary care quality.
This empirical focus on cost saving and care quality outcomes reflects a tension at
the heart of the 2012 reforms. In making GPs commissioners, policy-makers sought
to harness GPs’ expertise and knowledge of their patients to realise technical and
allocative efficiencies, for example in designing services around local preferences,
moving care outside hospitals, and reducing information asymmetry in contract ne-
gotiations with hospitals (Ham, 2010; Timmins, 2012). They also sought to incentiv-
ise GPs as gatekeepers to achieve cost efficiencies in their own decisions. Evidence
from an earlier NHS policy — GP fundholding — in the 1990s suggests that giving
GP gatekeepers hard budgets can lead GPs to reduce referrals (Dusheiko et al., 2006)
and prescribing costs (Goodwin, 1998)4, while related evidence for the US finds that
gatekeepers in HMOs reduce costs in response to financial incentives (Gaynor et al.,
2004).
However, the experience of GP fundholding also suggests that GPs may respond
to financial incentives in holding budgets in opportunistic ways for their own finan-
cial gain (Croxson et al., 2001). Moreover, the evidence on care quality is sparse and
largely inconclusive. Fundholders’ patients benefited from relatively shorter wait-
ing times (Dusheiko et al., 2004; Propper et al., 2002), but cross-sectional evidence
suggests that they were less satisfied in general, and particularly with accessibility
3There is evidence that commissioners view this as an indicator of inefficient referrals, and bench-
mark practices on this measure with a view to reducing costs. This suggests this is a valid indicator
of GP focus on making cost savings.
4There are some important differences with the more recent reforms e.g. GPs volunteered to be-
come fundholders, they held individual budgets and could negotiate prices with hospitals. Under
current arrangements, primary care drugs and most hospital treatment prices are set nationally im-
plying that volumes are central to containing costs, budgets are group based and participation is
mandatory for all practices.
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of services (Dusheiko et al., 2007). Perhaps with this in mind, the architects of the
2012 reforms designed structures to provide CCG level group incentives that bite
on both cost and quality performance and introduced a range of other safeguards.5
Nevertheless, concerns that GPs could manipulate new powers for their own ends
were raised throughout the legislative process, and resurfaced with recent evidence
that the new GP groups have awarded contracts worth £2.4 billion to organisations
in which GPs sitting on commissioning group boards have a financial interest (Iac-
obucci, 2015).
Identifying the effects of the reforms on cost and quality outcomes is challenging,
in part because GPs took on commissioning within a wider set of reforms. To mitig-
ate this, I focus on outcomes during the transitional phase of the reforms, after they
were announced but before they became fully operational on 1 April 2013. This
helps to disentangle commissioning changes from other elements of the reforms
since during this time GPs were taking up new commissioning duties while other
changes were yet to take hold, but at the cost that only short-term effects can be
estimated. These are not necessarily informative about longer term impacts of the
reforms; an important caveat to findings.
A further complication is that the reforms required all GP practices to join a Clin-
ical Commissioning Group (which effectively became membership organisations for
local GP practices), meaning all GPs legally became commissioners at the same time.
To estimate effects, I exploit that some GPs actively participated in fulfilling new
commissioning duties during the transition by becoming members of CCG gov-
erning bodies.6 Estimates are based on comparing changes in outcomes for these
practices against a control group using difference-in-difference techniques.
This method relies on an assumption of parallel trends, in this case that outcomes
in practices with governing body GPs would have evolved in an identical manner
to my control group absent the reforms. Mindful of the threats to identification due
to self-selection onto governing bodies, I examine pre-reform trends in outcomes
at practices which host governing body GPs and those that do not, allowing me
to isolate outcomes where the assumption plausibly holds. Further, I construct a
control group made up of practices who hosted a governing body GP outside the
treatment window, demonstrating these practices are well matched on pre-reform
characteristics. Notwithstanding, the estimation strategy implies a further import-
ant caveat to findings since I can only estimate differential impacts - to the extent
5These incentive schemes are outlined below. Note that the reforms left the remuneration sys-
tem and incentive structures faced by individual practices as providers of primary care essentially
unchanged.
6Under the reforms, CCGs were required to create a governing body with at least one GP leading
the CCG as either the Accountable Officer or Chair. In practice, most CCGs went well beyond this
minimum and in fact around half of all governing board members are GPs (Iacobucci, 2012).
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that all practices changed behaviour during the reforms, I underestimate effects.7
Bearing in mind these caveats, results suggest that practices taking on budget
responsibilities during the transition engaged in more cost saving behaviour relat-
ive to control groups. These findings are robust to controlling for a range of practice
and patient characteristics and unobserved factors. The most consistent set of results
imply spending on drugs per patient fell by between 0.6 and 1.2 % relative to other
practices. Results also suggest that these practices reduced the proportion of pa-
tients who were referred to secondary care but then discharged at the first appoint-
ment by 1%. These results are consistent with the proposition that GPs at practices
with governing body members engaged in relatively more cost saving behaviour.
At the same time, the results on quality are consistent with a relative deteriora-
tion of care quality outcomes at these same practices. While results are imprecisely
estimated, they are consistent across specifications and suggest that the proportion
of patients admitted to hospitals with conditions that could have been treated in
primary care rose by between 1.3 and 3% relative to the control group. Findings
based on patient survey data are also consistent with a small relative deterioration
in patient satisfaction at these practices. In the final section I discuss possible mech-
anisms that could account for these results, including the effects of financial incent-
ives, the salience of allocative efficiency issues, or the distraction of doctors from
patient care.
2.2 The 2012 Act and commissioning reforms
The Health and Social Care Act 2012 introduced major structural changes in the
NHS, and were described by then NHS Chief Executive Sir David Nicholson as
being so big that “you could probably see them from space”. Summaries consistently
place commissioning reform top of the changes introduced by the Act (see for ex-
ample Ham et al. (2015)) although the reforms actually constitute a much wider set
of changes. The Nuffield Trust describe these as: (a) giving groups of GP practices
and other professionals ’real’ budgets to buy care on behalf of their local communit-
ies; (b) shifting many of the responsibilities historically located in the Department
of Health to NHS England, a new, politically independent body; (c) the creation of a
health specific economic regulator with a mandate to guard against anti-competitive
practices; and (d) the intention to move all NHS hospital Trusts to foundation trust
status (semi-autonomous organisational similar to mutual organisations).8
7Estimating long term effects would require data which is not currently available to this re-
searcher. Estimating overall effects of the reforms would require a different identification strategy.
8This is adapted from the summary of the reforms on the Nuffield
Trust website: http://www.nuffieldtrust.org.uk/our-work/projects/
coalition-governments-health-and-social-care-reforms
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Figure 2.1: Commissioning reform transition
Figure 2.1 sets out a timeline of the reforms, with some key milestones along
the top of the arrow. The May 2010 election that led to a hung parliament and the
formation of the Conservative and Liberal Democrat coalition is taken to constitute
the start of the reform period.9 Key reform principles were set out in a White Paper
in July 2010 and an implementation plan in December 2010 (Department of Health,
2010a,b). After a lengthy legislative process, including a pause to conduct an exten-
ded consultation, the Health and Social Care Act was enacted in March 2012. The
majority of changes set out in the legislation formally began on 1 April 2013, includ-
ing formal transfer of commissioning responsibilities to CCGs, full establishment of
the new economic regulator, the new executive agency NHS England, and Public
Health England (a new body for public health).
Despite this, the evidence suggests that many GPs were actively involved in
commissioning well before 1 April 2013. This stands in contrast to the changes to the
provider side of the market which have been slow to take hold. The captions under-
neath the arrow in figure 2.1 highlight the evolution of GP commissioning groups
during the transition. Invitations to become pathfinder GP commissioning groups
(initially known as GP consortia) were issued in October 2010. These developed
rapidly such that half the population was covered by a GP consortia by February
2011, 88% by April 2011 (Department of Health, 2011a), and 97% by July 2011.10
Pathfinder consortia had evolved to 211 Clinical Commissioning Groups (CCGs) by
2013. All CCGs were subjected to an authorisation process in the latter stages of the
transition with the first of the 4 authorisation waves taking place in October 2012.
While not fully responsible for commissioning services until April 2013, CCGs
9Timmins (2012) provides a lively account of the origins of the reform legislation. During their
time in opposition the Conservative party, led by shadow Health Secretary Andrew Lansley, had for-
mulated plans for GP commissioning and revealed the core ideas before the election (see for example
Timmins (2012) page 22-25, and the Conservative “White paper” in June 2007 (Conservative Party,
2007)). However, the scale and detail of the reforms were not widely understood. For example, the
idea that all GP practices might be required to be involved in commissioning was mooted in August
2009, although Lansley states this was only finally decided “in late May or early June” 2010 (Timmins
(2012) page 33).
10Guardian article “Time for the NHS to act after pause, says Andrew Lansley”’ 8
July 2011 http://www.theguardian.com/healthcare-network/2011/jul/08/
time-for-nhs-to-act-after-pause-andrew-lansley. The sixth and final wave of
pathfinder organisations was announced in October 2011.
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were acting as shadow commissioners during the transition, taking over from the
outgoing commissioning bodies, PCTs, which were rationalised into clusters from
June 2011 and then abolished in April 2013.11 CCGs began to take on legally deleg-
ated authority for commissioning and associated budgets from Primary Care Trusts
as early as January 2011 (Department of Health, 2010c) and by November 2011
held half of commissioning budgets (Department of Health, 2011c). During this
time, CCGs were expected to be involved in contract negotiations with hospitals
and other providers, and to be taking on responsibility for delivering savings under
QIPP, a national efficiency programme (for example through prescribing and refer-
ral management schemes) (Department of Health, 2010c). More than half of GPs
surveyed in July 2011 stated their consortia had factored in QIPP savings into plans
for 2011/12 “a great deal” or “a fair amount” (KPMG/IpsosMori, 2011). By March
2012 CCGs had been allocated full shadow budgets, were “increasingly taking on
day-to-day commissioning responsibilities”, held 59% of commissioning budgets,
and were preparing to take full responsibility for the 2013/14 planning round (NHS
England, 2012).
Although all practices became part of a CCG, around a sixth of practices were
actively participating in commissioning through one of their GPs holding a position
on the CCG Board governing body. Governing bodies could be formed with lay
members and clinicians with some flexibility, although guidance required a practi-
cing GP to hold at least one of the two main leadership roles of Accountable Officer
or Chair. Leaders could be elected or appointed, but had to demonstrate support
from members of the CCG.12 While difficult to establish precisely when individual
GPs joined governing bodies, GPs were already moving into shadow consortia by
December 2010 (Department of Health, 2010c) and by early 2012, 645 GPs held pos-
itions on 100 CCGs providing information, suggesting an average of between 6 and
7 GPs per CCG (Iacobucci, 2012). In many cases it appears GPs were appointed to
positions in early to mid-2011, a finding consistent with 38% of GPs surveyed in July
2011 stating they were personally involved in commissioning “a great deal” or “a
fair amount” (KPMG/IpsosMori, 2011).13
11Despite this, funding for services continued to be allocated to PCT throughout the transition.
12Legislation and guidance covers a number of governance arrangements including a constitution,
register of interests and governing body (NHS Commissioning Board, 2012b,a).
13In Stoke for example, the GP chair and six GP leads were appointed in January 2011.
See http://www.gponline.com/consortia-stoke-on-trent-gps-progress/article/
1068733. I discuss how I deal with uncertainty over timing of GP participation in commissioning
in the empirical section.
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2.2.1 GP incentives under the 2012 reforms
Making GPs commissioners and giving them budgets gives rise to potential con-
flicts of interests because GPs can both “make” and — as part of a CCG — “buy”
services. Outside of their practices many GPs also run additional community and
primary care services (for example out of hours GP services) but as commissioners
in CCGs, GPs also award and manage contracts. The implication is that under the
new commissioning arrangements, GPs could award contract for services to them-
selves (for example see Smith & Thorlby (2010)). A related concern was that conflicts
of interest could arise if GPs could profit from reducing the quality or quantity of
care for their patients below an efficient level, for example prescribing less or mak-
ing fewer referrals to hospitals in their gatekeeper role. This would free up funds
for the CCG; if these could be distributed to GPs or invested in new services run by
GPs, then GPs might benefit by reducing care quantity or quality. Moreover, since
commissioning budgets are large compared to other services – a 1% surplus in these
budgets is roughly 8% of primary care budget – savings would lead to scope for
substantial gains.14
The reforms sought a balance between encouraging GPs to engage in cost sav-
ing and quality enhancing activity while safeguarding against such opportunistic
behaviour. Although CCGs would (largely) control how savings on commission-
ing budgets could be spent, they could not simply be distributed to practices but
had to be reinvested in services. Guidance ensures that individuals commencing
a position on a CCG governing body must declare relevant financial interests, e.g.
holding shares in a company providing health care, and must leave board discus-
sions relating to these interests.15 To protect quality, a quality bonus (up to £5 per
patient, roughly 3.5% of the GP budget) can be distributed to practices for improv-
ing services if the CCG meets quality targets across specified domains, albeit is only
achieved if the CCG is in financial surplus. Critically for this research, although the
quality bonus did not begin until 2013, announcements in late 2010 indicated CCGs
would inherit legacy financial position of PCTs accumulated in 2011/12 & 2012/13
(Department of Health, 2010c). CCGs could draw down any surpluses from this
period after 1 April 2013, giving them incentives to make savings during the trans-
ition.
Aside from these changes, important features of the primary care market remain
unaltered. Patients still choose a single local practice at which to register, access-
14See for example the Channel 4 story on 2 March 2011 http://www.channel4.com/news/
leaked-document-shows-how-doctors-can-profit-from-nhs-reform.
15Additional safeguards included not passing full responsibility for primary care commissioning
to CCGs (these remained with the central body NHS England, although are now being passed to
CCG), statutory duties for CCGs regarding patient care, oversight by central bodies, including a
body with a specific remit to prevent anti-competitive behaviour.
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ing (publicly funded) health care services is through a consultation with a GP or
via emergency care services. GP gatekeepers continue to organise themselves into
private practices competing with other local practices for patients, and continue to
be paid according to the characteristics of their registered population, retaining any
surpluses after incurring costs for patient care. Capitation means that the level of
referrals and prescribing does not affect individual practice profits directly. In sec-
ondary care, prices for hospital treatments continue to be nationally fixed so that
GPs (and CCGs) margins of adjustment are on reducing volumes, and the reforms
coincided with no major changes in hospitals e.g. closures or new openings.
2.3 Empirical analysis
Evaluating the quantitative impacts of the reforms is complicated by a number of
factors, not least that all GPs became obliged to participate in commissioning ser-
vices, and because a range of other system changes were made alongside commis-
sioning reforms. I circumvent these problems as far as I am able by focusing on the
transitional phase of the reforms and by exploiting variation in the degree to which
GPs participated with the new commissioning responsibilities.
Specifically, my empirical strategy centres on practice level difference-in-difference
regression analysis comparing changes in outcomes in practices most strongly asso-
ciated with the commissioning reforms (the “treatment”) before and after the ini-
tiation of the reforms (the “policy off/on” periods) relative to changes in the out-
comes in a control group of practices. The treatment and outcome measures and
strategies for construction of control groups are described further below. Based on
the information captured in Figure 2.1, for the quantitative analysis I take the May
2010 election that resulted in a hung parliament to be the end of the control period.
The tightness of the election and the fact that plans for health reform were not well
understood make it unlikely that GP would have taken any actions in anticipation
of the reforms prior to this point. Although the reform legislation was not enacted
until March 2012, I use April 2011 as the start of the policy on period. By this point
the vast majority of consortia had been formed, many GPs were actively involved
in new commissioning duties, and had incentives to make cost savings. To mitigate
risk from potential confounders, I use the narrowest window possible, using finan-
cial year 2009/10 as my control period, and financial years 2011/12-2012/13 as the
policy on period.
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2.3.1 Treatment and outcome measures
Since all GP practices joined a CCG on 1 April 2013, I rely on a treatment intensity in-
dicator that captures the degree to which practices actively participated in commis-
sioning duties during the transition. This entails separating GP practices into three
groups based on the participation of individual GPs on CCG governing bodies dur-
ing and after the transition. Allocation of practices into groups rests on a database
that combines information about CCG governing body membership (obtained un-
der Freedom of Information (FOI) requests, CCG Board documents, and local press
reports) with GP employment histories since 1 April 2009 obtained from the NHS
Information Centre. Since CCGs were unable to provide data on the dates GPs star-
ted on governing bodies if these were before 1 April 2013, I make the assumption
that governing body GPs had begun by 1 April 2011, an assumption supported by
the evidence described above.16 Full details of the construction of the underlying
database are described in the Appendix.
The first group — which I call Gov. Body — is composed of 1151 practices where
at least one GP held a position on the CCG governing body during the transition.
To be in this group, I require a governing body GP to be at the practice throughout
the whole of the treatment period, i.e. the GP must remain at the practice and on the
governing body up to 1 April 2013. A Selected Control group contains two subsets of
practices: 140 where a resident GP joined a governing body but only after 1 April
2013; and a smaller subset of 21 that hosted a governing body GP throughout the
control period but not the transition i.e. a governing body GP was at the practice
during 2009/10 but left prior to 1 April 2011. The third group — All Other — is an
unrestricted control group composed of all practices not included in the Gov. Body
group. Note, however, that I drop 227 practices from the analysis altogether, either
because a GP practices in a different CCG to where they act as a Board member (5
practices), because the GP was at the practice or governing body for only part of
the treatment period (109 practices), or because the practice moved to a different
postcode sector during the period (113 practices).
Outcome measures were chosen to represent practice level outcomes over which
GPs can exert some degree of control through patient care decisions and that exhibit
substantial unexplained variation across practices. My main cost-saving measures
are based on prescription costs and referrals to secondary care which collectively
account for a large proportion of health spending (around £25 billion p.a., roughly
a quarter of the NHS budget). My principal quality measures are the rate at which
patients are admitted to hospital in an emergency with conditions that are avoidable
with good primary care, and patient experience measures generated from the GP
16Note that if GPs started later than this results would be attenuated.
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patient survey. I use other emergency admissions (that is admissions which are not
avoidable however good the primary care), and inpatient waiting times as placebo
quality outcomes since these should in theory not change under the commissioning
reforms.
Prescribing costs reflect GP decisions about who should receive medication and
the type of medication to prescribe. Many studies point to substantial clinically un-
warranted variation in practice prescribing. For example the National Audit Office
reported in 2007 that £200 million could be saved on prescribing costs each year
without compromising patient care (National Audit Office, 2007). Further, several
national and local initiatives have attempted to monitor prescribing and drive up
prescribing productivity without compromising patient care e.g. the Better Care,
Better Value indicators of the NHS Institute for Innovation and Improvement, PCT-
led and CCG-led prescribing schemes. Prescription costs per patient are generated
from practice level prescribing data from the HSCIC Information Centre and are
calculated as the total cost of items prescribed divided by patient counts, where
the numerator is the net ingredient costs of all medicines, dressing and appliances
excluding any discounts and container costs.
Two further cost saving indicators centre on GP referrals to secondary care. A
recent report (Imison & Naylor, 2010) found that GPs make around 9 million refer-
rals each year at a cost of roughly £15 billion with evidence of very considerable (up
to ten-fold) variations between GPs and between GP practices. The authors con-
clude that, “The available evidence suggests that not all referrals are necessary in clinical
terms, and a substantial element of referral activity is discretionary and avoidable.” They
go on to describe a variety of NHS referral management initiatives that have been
put in place in a bid to control the cost and efficiency of GP referrals - from clin-
ical guidelines and financial incentives to more drastic measures such as referral
management centres that audit all referrals and can reject those deemed to be inap-
propriate.
The first referral variable used in the empirical work is the raw overall refer-
ral rate: the number of patients referred to hospital for any treatment per 1000 pa-
tients at the practice. This variable is generated at the practice level using data for
first outpatient attendances recorded in the Hospital Episode Statistics (HES) data-
base, counting only referrals from GPs matching a practice code in my dataset. The
second variable is the proportion of first hospital outpatient attendances that resul-
ted in the patient being discharged. When a patient is discharged at the first hospital
appointment, the hospital doctor sees no need for further hospital treatment and on
the basis it may be the GP’s referral was not necessary in clinical terms. Whether this
is true or not is not central to my interpretation of this as a cost-saving indicator:
there is evidence that some CCGs use this metric to audit or benchmark practices
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with a view to reducing costs,17 so it follows that a reduction in this measure can be
interpreted as GPs increasing focus on making cost reductions in their referrals.
My main indicator of quality and patient outcomes is based on the rate of poten-
tially avoidable hospitalisations (PAH).18 Since the 1990s, avoidable hospitalisations
have been interpreted as measuring aspects of primary care including overall sys-
tem performance (e.g. Thygesen et al. (2015), OECD (2012)); quality of diagnosis
and chronic disease management (e.g. Starfield et al. (2005)), continuity of care (e.g.
Cheng et al. (2010), Nyweide et al. (2013)), or the accessibility of primary care (e.g.
Basu & Friedman (2001), Rosano et al. (2013), Weissman et al. (1992)). I build on
a recent study, Harrison et al. (2014), that uses this outcome measure in a study of
physician incentives in an NHS context.
The rationale for this quality measure is that admitting patients with some present-
ing conditions to a hospital setting could have been avoided by appropriate primary
care, either by preventing the onset of avoidable disease (e.g. vaccine-preventable
conditions), managing an acute illness (e.g. dehydration), or managing a chronic
condition effectively (e.g. diabetes) (Busby et al., 2015). Although in come cases, the
admission may not reflect a failure on behalf of a primary care – for example the
patient may have chosen not to visit her GP – variation over time at the same prac-
tice, controlling for patient characteristics should capture some aspects of quality.19
With no universal definition of which hospital admissions are avoidable I follow
Purdy et al. (2009) using ICD-10 codes for a set of 19 presenting conditions (using
the wider set of diagnosis codes these authors describe). I generate practice level
counts of avoidable and unavoidable emergency admissions, first dropping duplic-
ate records from the HES data and excluding transfers before collapsing the data to
practice level.20
17Board documents from Hull CCG, Stafford and Surrounds CCG,Western Cheshire CCG, War-
rington CCG, and West Kent CCG.
18Throughout this paper I refer to such admissions as avoidable hospitalisations. Terminology
varies. The conditions are sometimes collectively known as Ambulatory Care Sensitive Conditions
(ACSCs), with resulting admissions being variously described as potentially avoidable hospitalisa-
tions, preventable admissions, or admissions for avoidable hospital conditions (AHCs).
19Weissman et al. (1992) state that “... some hospital admissions, such as those for immunizable condi-
tions, are almost always avoidable. Even a single case may be cause for concern. However, for most AHCs,
being avoidable is a matter of degree. Because treatment of patients with chronic conditions such as asthma or
congestive heart failure is complex, monitoring AHCs may be most useful when their rates deviate substan-
tially from some prescribed norm.”
20Ansari et al. (2012) provide a slightly different way to define ACSCs on the basis of ICD-10
diagnosis codes of admitted patients. I prefer the Purdy et al. (2009) definition for this analysis as it
is derived from NHS practices. The full set of ICD-10 codes is in the Appendix. Note that I do not
count avoidable admissions for dental problems as in the NHS these are not the responsibility of GPs.
In generating measures, I retain emergency admissions by keeping HES data records with admimeth
codes 21: via A&E; 22: via GP; 23 via Bed Bureau; 24: via OP clinic; and then drop transfers which I
define as those with admisorc code 51,52 or 53.
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2.3.2 Control groups
Given that I use a difference-in-difference approach to estimate effects of the re-
forms, it is critical that outcomes in the treatment group of practices should be ex-
pected to evolve in a way that is identical to the control group, however defined,
in the absence of treatment. However, because GPs self-select onto CCG governing
bodies, it may be that either the governing body GPs and/or the practices at which
they operate could be systematically different to other practices – for example, GPs
could have different levels or skills, experience or have different practice styles, and
their practices could cater for a different mix of patients. In this section, I assess the
validity of the two control groups of practices described above – the unrestricted set
(All Other) and the restricted set (Select Control) – by comparing pre-treatment trends
in outcomes and examining pre-treatment characteristics across the three groups.
I begin with visual inspection of trends before and after the announcement of
the reform, shown in Figures 2.2-2.4. In all plots the x-axis records the time while
the y-axis shows the evolution in the outcome variable for two distinct groups of
practices: those where at least one GP held a position on the governing body of the
local commissioning group (dashed blue line) during the transition and those with
no GP representative on the local Board. To construct indicators, outcomes are first
normalised by practice list size for each practice in each period and then collapsed
over the two groups weighting by list size.21
Each figure contains three plots: the top half of the figure shows the raw average
for reference while the two figures below smooth the data separately on either side
of April 2010 which is the last month before the Coalition government took office.
The bottom left figure uses a locally weighted regression (Lowess) using a band-
width of 80% of the observations on either side of the break, while the bottom right
figure smooth the data using local polynomials of degree 4. For the polynomials,
an Epanechnikov kernal function is used and the bandwidths (displayed under the
Figure) are selected automatically by STATA’s rule of thumb bandwidth estimator.
Figure 2.2 maps out the progression of monthly prescription costs per patient for
treated and non-treated GP practices. All plots within this figure suggest that both
sets of practices followed highly similar trends prior to the formation of the coali-
tion. It is difficult to distinguish a pattern in the raw data, but when looking at the
smoothed data, a slight gap between the groups emerges following the announce-
ment of the reforms then appears to close, at least in part, by the end of 2012/13.
The pattern suggests that the treated practices reduced relative prescription costs
per patients initially although perhaps only on a temporary basis.
Figure 2.3 charts the quarterly progression of avoidable hospitalisations per pa-
21For these figures, I use only those practices which have data in each and every period to avoid
outcomes being skewed by attrition and new joiners.
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Figure 2.2: Drug expenditure per patient
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tient for treated and non-treated GP practices. All plots within this figure again
suggest that all practices were on highly similar trends prior to the formation of
the coalition. A slight divergence in trends appears for this variable following the
announcement of the reforms. The pattern suggests that a greater proportion of pa-
tients at treated practices were avoidably admitted to hospital following the reforms
and that this increases over time.
Figure 2.4 charts the quarterly progression of referral per 1000 patients for treated
and non-treated GP practices. In contrast to previous figures, all plots within this
figure suggest that treated and non-treated practices may have been on diverging
trends prior to the formation of the coalition: the referral rate in the treated prac-
tices was increasing at a materially faster rate than in other practices. While there
is some suggestion that this phenomenon reverses following the commencement of
the reforms, it highlights that application of difference-in-difference techniques us-
ing an unrestricted control group may be problematic because post reform outcomes
for non-treated practices will not necessarily provide a good counterfactual for the
treated group of practices.
Table 2.1 reports mean pre-transition practice level characteristics (for 2009/10)
for three groups of practices. The third and sixth columns report difference in mean
tests to assess whether the treatment group differ along observable dimensions to
the potential control groups. Results highlight significant differences between gov-
erning body practices and the unrestricted control group: governing body practices
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Figure 2.3: Avoidable hospitalisations per 1000 patients
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Figure 2.4: Referrals per 1000 patients
48
50
52
54
2008q3 2009q3 2010q3 2011q3 2012q3
Gov. Body All Other
Raw
49
50
51
52
53
2008q3 2009q3 2010q3 2011q3 2012q3
Lowess
48
49
50
51
52
53
2008q3 2009q3 2010q3 2011q3 2012q3
Local Polynomial
Lowess bandwidth = 0.8              Local polynomial: Epanechnikov kernal, bandwidth = 2.11
73
Table 2.1: Balancing pre-transition practice characteristics
(1) (2) (4) (5)
Variable Gov Body All Other (1)-(2) Gov Body Select Control (4)-(5)
Observations 1151 6185 1151 161
Patient count 9,402.01 6,499.81 -2,902.20∗∗∗ 9,402.01 9,543.63 141.62
GP count 6.14 4.19 -1.95∗∗∗ 6.14 6.50 0.37
% Aged 65+ 15.78 15.36 -0.42∗ 15.78 16.06 0.28
% Ethn. White 0.88 0.85 -0.03∗∗∗ 0.88 0.90 0.02
% Unemployed 0.04 0.05 0.01∗∗∗ 0.04 0.04 -0.00
% Male 0.42 0.43 0.01∗∗∗ 0.42 0.42 -0.00
% CHD 3.51 3.46 -0.05 3.51 3.56 0.05
% Stroke or TIA 1.71 1.60 -0.11∗∗∗ 1.71 1.77 0.06
% Hypertension 13.24 13.24 0.00 13.24 13.54 0.31
% Diabetes 4.13 4.20 0.07∗ 4.13 4.01 -0.12
% COPD 1.58 1.57 -0.01 1.58 1.57 -0.01
% Epilepsy 0.61 0.59 -0.01∗ 0.61 0.60 -0.01
% Hypothyroidism 2.86 2.80 -0.06∗ 2.86 2.88 0.01
% Cancer 1.30 1.23 -0.07∗∗∗ 1.30 1.36 0.06
% Mental Health 0.76 0.77 0.01 0.76 0.75 -0.01
% Heart Failure 0.75 0.72 -0.03∗∗ 0.75 0.77 0.02
% Palliative 0.11 0.11 -0.01∗ 0.11 0.11 -0.00
% Dementia 0.46 0.42 -0.04∗∗∗ 0.46 0.47 0.01
% Kidney Disease 3.36 3.10 -0.26∗∗∗ 3.36 3.48 0.12
% Atrial Fibr. 1.39 1.28 -0.10∗∗∗ 1.39 1.43 0.04
% Obesity 8.17 8.47 0.30∗∗ 8.17 8.28 0.11
% Learning Diff. 0.31 0.30 -0.01 0.31 0.31 -0.00
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the practice level. *** p < 0.01, ** p <0.05, * p < 0.1. Based
on a balanced panel of practices with data for quarters in 2009/10, 2011/12 and 2012/13; Practices
with less than 1000 patients, moving postcode district, and with a governing body GP for part of the
treatment period have been dropped.
are considerably larger, having on average 2 more GPs and 3,000 more patients, and
have a greater share of white, and a marginally smaller share of male and unem-
ployed patients. There are also several significant differences in the proportions of
patients with specific health conditions which suggest that governing body prac-
tices have sicker patients. In contrast, the restricted control group of practices ap-
pear well matched to the treated group, with no significant differences along all the
observed dimensions. These similarities in observed pre-transition characteristics
suggest this latter subset of practices may provide a good control group.
Table 2.2 evaluates whether there are significant differences in trends in the out-
comes in governing body practices and the restricted control groups in the pre-
reform period (quarters in 2009/10) by regressions using a sample including only
these two groups. I proceed by regressing each of the outcome variables described
above in turn on a time trend and a time trend interacted with an indicator for
Gov.Body, including only practice fixed effects in the top panel and adding patient
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Table 2.2: Pre-treatment trends, governing body and restricted control groups
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Prescribing Referral Referred but PAH rate Other NE Avg. inpatient
cost pp rate discharged % rate Wait
trend 0.0053∗∗∗ -0.0402∗∗∗ 0.1815 0.0380∗∗∗ -0.0017 0.0279∗∗∗
(0.0017) (0.0118) (0.1969) (0.0073) (0.0049) (0.0036)
Gov.Body × trend 0.0004 0.0218∗ -0.1141 0.0077 0.0000 -0.0015
(0.0018) (0.0121) (0.2058) (0.0078) (0.0052) (0.0038)
Practice FX X X X X X X
Observations 5248 5248 5248 5248 5248 5248
R-squared 0.977 0.935 0.902 0.933 0.904 0.791
trend 0.0038∗ -0.0365∗∗∗ 0.2059 0.0418∗∗∗ -0.0099∗ 0.0286∗∗∗
(0.0021) (0.0117) (0.2134) (0.0092) (0.0060) (0.0043)
Gov.Body × trend 0.0006 0.0227∗ -0.1140 0.0083 0.0012 -0.0012
(0.0018) (0.0121) (0.2058) (0.0078) (0.0050) (0.0038)
Practice FX X X X X X X
Additional controls X X X X X X
Observations 5248 5248 5248 5248 5248 5248
R-squared 0.978 0.936 0.913 0.933 0.905 0.793
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the practice level. *** p < 0.01, ** p <0.05, * p < 0.1. Additional
controls are GPs per 1000 patients, share patients aged 65 + and proportions of patients registered as
having each of 16 health conditions.
and practice controls in the lower panel. The interaction term indicates whether
there are significant differences in pre-treatment trends conditional on the controls
included. None of the coefficients is significant, again with the exception of the
referral rate where the trend is significantly less negative in the group of practices
which became represented on governing bodies during the transition. This provides
further support for the use of this control group.
2.3.3 Model specification
I adopt a standard practice level difference in difference approach, exploiting the
panel dimension of the data (Baum-Snow & Ferreira, 2015):
ypt = β.GBp.post + γ′.controlspt + φp + φt + ept
Where the dependent variable ypt is the natural log of outcome variable y at GP
practice p in quarter t. The treatment variable GBp is an indicator variable denoting
GP practice participation in new commissioning responsibilities, which is proxied
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by governing body membership during the transition as described above. This is
interacted with a dummy variable post that takes the value of 1 for quarters from
2011/12 onwards but is zero otherwise. All regressions include GP practice fixed
effects φp to remove time invariant unobservable factors, and quarter dummies φt.
With this strategy the separate elements GBp and post are subsumed within these
fixed effects so do not appear in the estimated equation. The coefficient on the in-
teraction β is the difference in difference coefficient denoting the average changes in
outcomes during the transition for practices represented on a CCG governing body
relative to the control group of practices. I run regressions of this form on two sets
of specifications distinguishable by practices constituting the control group. In the
first the control group is made up of all practices, while in the second it is restricted
to practices that host a governing body GP but only at a time outside the treatment
window.
Note that using the within practice estimator should help with uncertainty over
timing of effects, arising either because GP behavioural responses to new commis-
sioning responsibilities may take time or because any GPs actually joined governing
bodies later than I assume. Any inaccuracies in this regard will however attenuate
results. This strategy also implies that I eliminate time invariant practice unobserv-
ables from the estimation. This is potentially important since research suggests time-
invariant physician factors (e.g. practice style, heterogeneous preferences, gender
etc) are important factors in explaining variation in treatments patients receive (Liu
& Ma, 2013). Including quarter fixed effects eliminates national time trends in out-
comes and should also partial out other national effects that may arise e.g. due to
other aspects of the reforms.
It remains possible that unobserved factors correlated with GPs decisions to join
governing bodies could affect outcomes. To assess this I include a range of time
varying controls and fixed effects in supplementary specifications beyond the min-
imal one described above. Patient and practice characteristics are captured by the
number of GPs per 1000 patients at the practice; and the proportions of patients re-
gistered as having each of 16 health conditions (e.g. Coronary Heart Disease (CHD),
Hypertension, Diabetes, COPD, Dementia, Obesity, Mental Health).22 To account
for further unobserved heterogeneity, for example changes in socio-economic con-
ditions, the funding environment, and locally-led healthcare policies (e.g. availab-
ility of services), I interact region, PCT, and/or CCG dummies with quarter fixed
effects. These additional specification help to evaluate the extent to which threats to
identification, for example patient sorting between practices in response to changes
in GP behaviour, may be driving results.
22Practice level counts of patients with these health conditions are only available annually. To
construct quarterly counts, I interpolate from the annual data.
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Table 2.3: Descriptive statistics
count mean sd min max
Prescribing cost per patient 88032 37.69 9.37 0.89 259.47
Referrals per 1000 patients 88032 50.72 20.84 0.31 201.78
% of referrals discharged at 1st appointment 88032 28.79 10.45 0.00 100.00
Avoidable Hospitalisation per 1000 patients 88032 5.85 2.41 0.09 36.40
Other emergency admissions per 1000 patients 88032 15.84 4.95 0.89 93.95
Average inpatient waiting time (days) 88032 43.67 7.76 0.00 122.02
GPs/1000 patients 88032 0.69 0.30 0.09 7.33
% Aged 65+ 88032 15.93 5.71 0.00 48.12
% CHD 88032 3.43 1.17 0.00 10.19
% Stroke or TIA 88032 1.67 0.64 0.00 6.45
% Hypertension 88032 13.62 3.48 0.06 37.52
% Diabetes 88032 4.54 1.24 0.00 15.06
% COPD 88032 1.67 0.84 0.00 8.16
% Epilepsy 88032 0.61 0.21 0.05 3.85
% Hypothyroidism 88032 2.99 0.97 0.06 8.24
% Cancer 88032 1.53 0.63 0.00 5.32
% Mental Health 88032 0.81 0.39 0.00 11.90
% Heart Failure 88032 0.72 0.32 0.00 3.89
% Palliative 88032 0.17 0.18 0.00 3.37
% Dementia 88032 0.47 0.35 0.00 9.38
% Kidney Disease 88032 3.28 1.74 0.00 18.11
% Atrial Fibr. 88032 1.38 0.61 0.00 5.20
% Obesity 88032 8.80 3.00 0.35 41.54
% Learning Diff. 88032 0.34 0.24 0.00 5.11
Notes: Based on a balanced panel of practices with data for quarters in 2009/10, 2011/12 and 2012/13;
Practices with less than 1000 patients, moving postcode district, and with a governing body GP for
part of the treatment period have been dropped.
2.4 Results
Results are based on a balanced panel of GP practices for quarters in financial years
2009/10, 2011/12 and 2013/14. As noted above, sample restrictions include drop-
ping practices which have a GP on a governing body in a different CCG, that had a
GP on a governing body for part of the treatment period, and practices that moved
to a different postcode district during the sample period. I also drop a small num-
ber of practices with less than 1000 patients such that I restrict attention to a total
of 7,236 practices in England. Table 2.3 presents summary statistics for the three
outcome and control variables. The outcome variables presented in this table are
normalised by counts of patients at practices in each quarter (in the regressions I
take the natural log of these values). The table shows that on average there is one
GP per every 1400 patients at the practices in my sample period, and around 15%
of patients are of retirement age. The most common health conditions patients are
registered for are Hypertension, Obesity, and Diabetes; the least common (with a
mean practice value of less than 1%) are Palliative care, Dementia, Epilepsy, Learn-
ing Difficulties, and Mental Health.
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2.4.1 Unrestricted control group
This section reports results from using a difference-in-difference approach using the
relatively unrestricted control group represented by the practices in the All Other
group. The unconditional graphical evidence above is consistent with parallel pre-
treatment trends for prescription cost per patient and the avoidable hospitalisation
rate but not for the referral rate. On the basis of these trends, Table 4.5 reports res-
ults only for the first two outcomes: prescription costs per patient in columns (1)-(4)
and the avoidable hospitalisation rate in (5)-(8). For each outcome the first column
reports findings using only practice fixed effects and quarter dummies. Each sub-
sequent column progressively adds to this minimal set of controls: in the second
column I add region-quarter effects (which also correspond to Strategic Health Au-
thorities which are coterminous), in the third I add GPs per 1000 patients and patient
controls, and in the final column I introduce PCT-quarter and CCG-quarter effects.
As with all subsequent regressions, I cluster standard errors at the GP practice level
to account for arbitrary correlation in errors over time.
For both outcome measures results are reasonably stable across specifications.
Although there is a clear change in the coefficient on the difference-in-difference in-
teraction for prescribing costs when the practice and patient controls are introduced
it is not statistically significant. Interpreting on the basis of columns (4) and (8),
these results are consistent with practices with governing body GPs reducing costs
but lowering quality during the transitional phase of the reform relative to other
practices. The effects are small - prescribing costs per patient are 0.5% lower while
the avoidable hospitalisation rate increases by around 1.3%. The coefficients on con-
trol variables are mostly consistent with intuition. An increasing share of elderly pa-
tients is associated with both increased spending on drugs and a greater proportion
of avoidable hospitalisations. The disease prevalence measures are generally intu-
itive, but throw up some unexpected results such as the sign on the share of cancer
patient coefficients in the prescribing regressions. It could well be that correlations
between conditions could account for these effects. Finally, the positive association
between the GP patient ratio and the avoidable hospitalisation rate is unexpected,
and could perhaps reflect issues with continuity of care.
2.4.2 Restricted control group
I now turn to regressions using the control group composed of practices in the Se-
lect Control group which have pre-treatment characteristics and trends in outcomes
(with the exception of the referral rate) that are statistically indistinguishable from
the treated group. I report three sets of results: Tables 2.5 and 2.6 report results for
different outcome variables relating to cost and quality respectively while in Table
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Table 2.4: Unrestricted difference-in-difference approach
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Log prescribing costs per patient Log avoidable admission (PAH) rate
Gov.Body × post -0.0084∗∗∗ -0.0081∗∗∗ -0.0059∗∗∗ -0.0057∗∗∗ 0.0125∗ 0.0147∗∗ 0.0133∗ 0.0135∗∗
(0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0022) (0.0022) (0.0075) (0.0073) (0.0073) (0.0061)
GPs/1000 patients 0.0114 0.0084 0.0200∗ 0.0222∗∗
(0.0144) (0.0135) (0.0105) (0.0097)
% Aged 65+ 0.0197∗∗∗ 0.0189∗∗∗ 0.0197∗∗∗ 0.0162∗∗∗
(0.0014) (0.0015) (0.0031) (0.0030)
% CHD 0.0124∗∗ 0.0148∗∗∗ 0.0122 0.0173
(0.0052) (0.0052) (0.0116) (0.0106)
% Stroke or TIA 0.0238∗∗∗ 0.0209∗∗∗ -0.0019 -0.0009
(0.0061) (0.0060) (0.0168) (0.0147)
% Hypertension 0.0034∗∗ 0.0028∗∗ 0.0037 0.0020
(0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0035) (0.0031)
% Diabetes 0.0273∗∗∗ 0.0272∗∗∗ 0.0096 0.0038
(0.0032) (0.0034) (0.0076) (0.0070)
% COPD 0.0133∗∗∗ 0.0134∗∗∗ 0.0227∗∗ 0.0304∗∗∗
(0.0039) (0.0038) (0.0103) (0.0090)
% Epilepsy 0.0376∗∗ 0.0367∗∗ 0.0233 0.0271
(0.0157) (0.0153) (0.0332) (0.0290)
% Hypothyroidism 0.0034 0.0009 -0.0447∗∗∗ -0.0070
(0.0040) (0.0041) (0.0099) (0.0096)
% Cancer -0.0212∗∗∗ -0.0177∗∗∗ 0.0516∗∗∗ 0.0179∗
(0.0046) (0.0046) (0.0114) (0.0098)
% Mental Health 0.0345∗∗∗ 0.0263∗∗ 0.0473∗∗ 0.0480∗∗∗
(0.0133) (0.0117) (0.0211) (0.0153)
% Heart Failure -0.0073 -0.0138∗∗ -0.0392∗∗ -0.0261∗
(0.0065) (0.0065) (0.0171) (0.0153)
% Palliative 0.0013 -0.0034 0.0181 -0.0061
(0.0051) (0.0056) (0.0162) (0.0126)
% Dementia 0.0212∗∗∗ 0.0255∗∗∗ 0.0549∗∗∗ 0.0396∗∗∗
(0.0068) (0.0069) (0.0177) (0.0148)
% Kidney Disease -0.0032∗∗ -0.0032∗∗ -0.0052∗ -0.0005
(0.0013) (0.0014) (0.0027) (0.0026)
% Atrial Fibr. -0.0135∗∗ -0.0122∗ 0.0470∗∗∗ 0.0426∗∗∗
(0.0067) (0.0066) (0.0169) (0.0148)
% Obesity 0.0007 0.0003 -0.0014 -0.0001
(0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0015) (0.0014)
% Learning Diff. 0.0053 0.0060 0.0070 0.0011
(0.0088) (0.0085) (0.0231) (0.0217)
Practice FX X X X X X X X X
Quarter FX X X
Region-Quarter FX X X X X X X
PCT-Quarter FX X X
CCG-Quarter FX X X
Observations 88032 88032 88032 88032 88032 88032 88032 88032
R-squared 0.942 0.943 0.948 0.952 0.728 0.733 0.735 0.770
Notes: Standard errors in brackets, clustered at the practice level. *** p < 0.01, ** p <0.05, * p < 0.1
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2.7 I report further result on quality from specifications that use patient experience
ratings from the GP patient survey as outcomes measures.
The columns in Tables 2.5 and 2.6 correspond to the first three specifications in
Table 4.5; the final specification is dropped because there are fewer observations
with the control group employed here. As before, standard errors are clustered at
the practice level. The panels in each Table each correspond to a different outcome
measure. I suppress the coefficients on controls for space reasons, highlighting the
set of controls at the bottom of the Tables.
Looking along the rows findings seem to be reasonable consistent across spe-
cifications when using the restricted control group. The results in Table 2.5 illustrate
that the coefficients on the difference-in-difference estimate for prescribing costs is
larger than previously, roughly double in magnitude. The previous evidence shows
that pre reform trends in the referral rate were non-parallel. For completeness, I re-
port this in panel B but in any case the coefficient cannot be distinguished from zero
(despite being consistently negative). In the panel beneath the dependent variable
is the proportion of referrals that ended in a discharge at the first appointment (note
that the dependent variable is scaled to be in the range 0 to 100). Because this is used
as an indicator of clinically unnecessary referral activity by some CCGs, it follows
that a reduction in this metric can be interpreted as a focus on reducing costs. The
coefficient of interest stable and weakly significant in the three specifications and
suggests governing body practices reduced the proportion of referrals that ended at
the first outpatient appointment by 1%.
The results in Table 2.6 implies that the effect of governing body membership on
the avoidable hospitalisaiton rate is again larger than previously, also by a factor of
around 2. The results in panel D are weakly significant. In panel E I tweak the set
up so that the sample only includes 2009/10 and 2012/13 (and hence the treatment
period is solely quarters in 2012/13). Here the coefficients become larger and more
precisely estimated which is consistent with the effect being greater in this latter
financial year of the reforms.
The final two panels in this Table are included as placebo checks. In the first I take
the rate at which patients are admitted to hospitals in emergencies with conditions
that are not deemed to be avoidable with primary care. The coefficients are close
to zero and not significant. In the final panel I use the average inpatient waiting
(the time between the decision to admit and the admission). I use this rather than
the outpatient waiting time (the time between the GP referral and a patient seeing a
consultant for an outpatient appointment) as it seems unlikely this could influenced
by GPs. Again, the coefficients are small and not significant.
My final set of results in Table 2.7 looks more at a different aspect of quality
by focusing on patient experience, using an identical practice level set-up (with the
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restricted control group) as previously but now using data for the second quarter of
2010, 2012, and 2013 — corresponding to the June 2010, 2012 and 2013 NHS Patient
Surveys. I extracted data for responses to 8 questions that are consistent between
these surveys regarding overall satisfaction (would you recommend the practice?),
waiting times (are you satisfied with opening hours?), confidence in the GP, and
ratings of the GP on 5 different dimensions. Since the weighting system changed
during this time, I use the unweighted responses to questions and include socio-
economic and demographic controls and the survey response rate on the right hand
as controls (share unemployed, share aged 65+, share ethnicity white, share male).
In the first column, I use the PAH rate as the outcome in this set up which in-
cludes a smaller number of quarters and a greater range of controls as a further
check on the robustness of the result. The results demonstrate that the effect remains
of the same magnitude and is still weakly significant. The coefficients on the inter-
actions of interest are not significant for the majority of outcomes, indicating that
becoming part of a CCG governing body has had no effect on patients’ overall satis-
faction, confidence in their GP, or satisfaction with opening. However, the findings
in this table do suggest that GPs at treated practices were perceived to be signific-
antly less good at listening to their patients and explaining tests and treatments to
them. While I have no evidence of pre-treatment trends for these outcomes, they are
consistent with falling quality in treated practices in the transition.
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2.4.3 Quantitative interpretation
In this section I quantify the financial costs or savings associated with the findings
for prescribing and avoidable hospitalisations. It is important to reiterate that these
are not intended to describe the overall costs or savings from the reforms since they
describe outcomes of governing body practices relative to other practices during the
transition. Further, I make no attempt to quantify a range of other costs and bene-
fits, e.g. any saving or costs from changed referral behaviour, patient satisfaction,
or indeed any wider costs associated with hospital admission (for example on the
health and productivity of individuals, or on crowding at hospitals).
Based on the dataset described above there are 1,150 governing body practices,
on average with 9400 patients which means roughly 10.8 million patients are re-
gistered at a practice represented on a CCG Board during the transition. The mean
quarterly cost of prescriptions per patient is roughly £38 per patient. Using the coef-
ficient in Table 2.5 of -0.0123 implies that a saving of 47p (= £38 * 0.0123) per patient
per quarter was saved in 2011/12 and 2012/13 relative to other practices, implying
an overall saving on drugs of £40.6 million. Alternatively, using the coefficients in
Table 4.5 would imply a saving of around half this amount, so that I estimate the
savings in prescribing costs from practices are between £20 and 40 million over the
two years.
The mean number of avoidable hospitalisation per 1000 patients per quarter is
5.9, so with 9400 patients each governing body practices has on average 55.5 avoid-
able admissions each quarter. Using the coefficient in Table 2.6 of 0.0303 implies an
additional 1.7 in each practice each quarter, implying an additional 15,640 avoidable
admissions across the 8 quarters. Tian et al. (2012) estimate the average cost of an
avoidable admission to be £1,750 so this equates to a cost of roughly £27.4 million.
The same calculation using the coefficient in Table 4.5 of 0.0135 implies additional
financial costs of £12.1 million over the same period.
2.5 Discussion
The findings above suggest that — at least in the short-term — the effect of giv-
ing GPs budgets led GPs to engage in more cost saving behaviour but also led to
reductions in the quality of care relative to other practices. In this section, I dis-
cuss possible mechanisms that may account for these effects in the context of the
literature, although as with related research (e.g. Gaynor et al. (2004)) I am unable
to directly relate changes in outcomes to particular channels so this is essentially
speculative. Note that all these theoretical mechanisms are consistent with the relat-
ive effects described above being driven by changes in the behaviour of governing
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body GP members while the behaviour of other GPs remains unchanged, rather
than vice-versa.
A broad literature, including research on GP fundholding cited earlier, suggests
that physician gatekeepers do respond to financial incentives. In the Appendix I
sketch a simple two period model of GP behaviour under group based financial
incentives that suggests if governing body GPs are able to appropriate resources
from budget savings, they may be incentivised to reduce the level of their care to
make savings. In contrast, other GPs (i.e. those not on governing bodies) have no
incentive to change care levels, and maintain care at the original level. Of course ap-
propriation relies on some mechanism for GPs on governing bodies to benefit from
making budgetary savings. CCGs have awarded more than 400 contracts worth
upwards of £2.4bn to organisations in which GP board members have a financial
interest (Iacobucci, 2015), which could be one such channel.
A second possibility is that participation on a governing body makes allocat-
ive efficiency issues more salient to GPs. Recognising the role of medical ethics in
determining professional norms in healthcare, models of GP behaviour often incor-
porate altruistic regard for patient’s health or welfare into GP utility (Arrow, 1963;
McGuire, 2000; Rebitzer & Taylor, 2011; Clemens & Gottlieb, 2014). Some research-
ers also posit that doctors’ choices may reflect regard to the allocation of scarce re-
sources between competing needs (Ellis & McGuire, 1986; Blomqvist, 1991; Chandra
& Skinner, 2012). In a controlled experiment analysing tradeoffs in physician de-
cisions, Kesternich et al. (2015) find that efficiency concerns influence choices even
when medical ethics are made salient to medical decision-makers. These authors ar-
gue that in reality costs to society are often not salient to physicians when deciding
how to treat a patient. It seems plausible that direct budgetary oversight does just
this.
Finally, the results on quality outcomes may reflect that the reforms distracted
from patient care, a view expressed by the King’s fund (Ham et al., 2015). Devel-
oping CCGs and taking on new commissioning duties during the transitional phase
of the reform required time and effort on the part of the GPs involved. Practices
were reimbursed for the time spent by GPs on commissioning duties, but it is un-
certain how they adapted to provide patient care e.g. by sharing workload between
remaining doctors, taking on new permanent staff, or by employing locums.
2.6 Conclusions
In this paper, I provide quantitative analysis of health care reforms that took place
in England in the period 2010 to 2013. The central feature of the reforms was to
pass responsibility for commissioning services and associated budgets to groups of
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GPs. I aim to to generate insights about the effects of this change on practice level
outcomes, distinguishing between outcomes that indicate a focus on saving costs,
and those that indicate a focus on care quality.
The empirical work applies difference-in-difference techniques to practices with
plausibly similar pre-treatment trends. Two caveats are that the findings are gener-
ated from the transitional phase of the reforms so by definition impacts estimated
are short term and may or may not be a guide to the longer term impacts of the
reforms i.e. no attempt is made to capture potential costs or benefits that may arise
slowly e.g. through service redesign. Secondly, estimates are generated by com-
paring GP practices most closely associated with the reforms with other practices.
However, all GP practices in my sample became commissioners so this relative effect
may not be representative of the overall short term effect.
Notwithstanding these caveats, findings suggest that practices most actively en-
gaged with new responsibilities changed behaviour relative to other GPs in ways
consistent with taking cost saving steps: prescribing a lower average value of drugs
to each patient, and by reducing the proportion of referrals that were discharged
at the first outpatient attendance. On the other hand, findings are also consistent
with these same practices reducing the relative quality of care: having a greater
proportion of patients avoidably admitted to hospital in an emergency, and falling
patient satisfaction. The results on quality are only weakly significant, but consist-
ent across a variety of specifications and are supported by placebo tests on related
outcomes. I explore a number of explanations for these results, including that the
reforms incentivised doctors to reduce quality in order to save cash or that they
simply distracted those doctors most closely involved.
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2.7 Appendix
2.7.1 Construction of Governing Body treatment measures
The treatment measure is a time invariant GP practice level categorical variable,
GBp which takes value 1 if the CCG has a GP on the governing body during the
transition or 0 otherwise. I additionally construct a control group of practices that
host a GP governing body member, but only outside the treatment window. Gener-
ating these variables at the practice level is challenging because of data constraints
and is further complicated by a number of factors including GPs joining and leav-
ing Board positions, and moving between practices. Constructing the indicators
involved several steps: compiling a dataset linking individual GPs to CCG Board
positions; linking GP employment histories since 1 April 2009 to the dataset; and fi-
nally, excluding a small number of practices from the sample, for the reasons set out
below. There is no central and comprehensive database of CCG Board members so
at all stages information is verified across different sources where possible, although
in and some places a degree of judgment was required.
For the first step, I requested the names, practices details, and Board membership
details of all current and past GP members of CCG Boards via Freedom of Inform-
ation (FOI) requests. Around half of the 211 CCGs returned useful information.
The resulting GP practitioner dataset was reviewed against Governing Body details
in CCG annual reports (largely for 2013/14), harvesting new data to fill gaps and
correct transcription errors where necessary. A significant limitation is that the in-
formation provided (FOI requests) or reported (annual reports) usually dates only
from the establishment of CCGs as legal entities (April 2013). The upshot is that
commencement dates for Board positions are commonly recorded as 1 Apr2013. In
the empirical work that follows, my “treatment” on period is the start of 2011/12
and I proceed as if governing body members had taken up their positions by that
point. The assumption is based on information described in the paper e.g. the fifth
wave of pathfinder GP consortia was formed in July 2011, covering some 97% of the
population; news reports about individual CCG governing bodies and GP particip-
ation etc. The result of this first stage is a database of 1,629 GPs with indicators for
GPs who held positions on the governing body throughout the transition (Current
board) or held positions on CCG governing bodies but outside the treatment window
of 1 April 2011 to 1 April 2013 (Future board).
To construct GP practice level treatment measures from this GP practitioner level
data, I next create job histories back to q1 2009/10 for individual GPs by matching
the GP name to data held by the Organisation Data Service of the NHS Informa-
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tion Centre (file: egpcur23), using secondary sources where necessary to facilitate
a match. I match GPs to practices and assign the individual GP indicator variable
Current board or Future board to the practice. Note that I allow indicator variable to
be assigned to multiple practices for the small number of GPs in the database re-
gistered to work at two practices (13 GPs) during the timeframe of investigation,
and that there are around 50 practices which are associated with more than one GP
in the database.
In a final step I exclude around 100 GP practices from the analysis: practices
where the GP governing body member practices in a different CCG to where they act
as a Board member; practices where a governing body GP left the practice before the
end of Q4 2012/13; and practices where a GP played a role in the initial phases of the
reform but did not ultimately become part of the governing body in place on 1 April
2013. This latter group is identifiable from information sources including (i) CCG
annual reports and other Board documents (ii) responses to earlier FOI requests for
details of clinical leads at CCGs during the transition (iii) letters from CCG leaders
to national newspapers (iv) data released by NHS England.
2.7.2 ICD-10 codes used to calculate avoidable hospitalisations
The Table below reproduces the ICD-10 codes in Purdy et al. (2009) Table3 (wider
set of diagnosis codes) but excluding dental problems. These are the ICD–10 codes
used in this paper to define potentially avoidable hospitalisations.
23See <www.systems.hscic.gov.uk/data/ods/datadownloads/gppractice>
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Table 2.8: ICD-10 codes used to define potentially avoidable hospitalisations
Condition ICD–10 codes
Angina I20, I24.0 I24.8 I24.9 I25 R072 R073 R074 Z034 Z035
Asthma J45 J46
Cellulitis L03 L04 L08.0 L08.8 L08.9 L88 L98.0 I891 L010 L011
L020 to L024 L028 L029
Congestive heart failure I11.0 I50 J81 I130 I255
Convulsions and epilepsy G40 G41 R56 O15 G253 R568
Chronic obstructive pulmonary disease J20 J41 J42 J43 J47 J44 J40X
Dehydration and gastroenteritis E86 K52.2 K52.8 K52.9 A020 A04 A059 A072 A080
A081 A083 A084 A085 A09 K520 K521
Diabetes complications E10.0–E10.8 E11.0–E11.8 E12.0–E12.8 E13.0–E13.8
E14.0–E14.8 E139 E149
Ear, nose and throat infections H66 H67 J02 J03 J06 J31.2 J040
Gangrene R02
Hypertension I10 I11.9
Influenza and pneumonia J10 J11 J13 J14 J15.3 J15.4 J15.7 J15.9 J16.8 J18.1 J18
J189 J120 J121 J122 J128 J129 J160 A481 A70x
Iron–deficiency anaemia D50.1 D50.8 D50.9 D460 D461 D463 D464 D510–
D513 D518 D520 D521 D528 D529 D531 D571 D580
D581 D590–D592 D599 D601 D608 D609 D610 D611
D640 to D644 D648
Nutritional deficiency E40 E41 E42 E43 E55.0 E64.3
Other vaccine–preventable diseases A35 A36 A37 A80 B05 B06 B16.1 B16.9 B18.0 B18.1
B26 G00.0 M01.4
Pelvic inflammatory disease N70 N73 N74
Perforated/bleeding ulcer K25.0–K25.2 K25.4–K25.6 K26.0–K26.2 K26.4–K26.6
K27.0–K27.2 K27.4–K27.6 K280–282 K284–K286
K920 K921 K922 K20x K210 K219 K221 K226
Pyelonephritis N10 N11 N12 N13.6 N300 N390 N159c N308 N309
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2.7.3 A simple model of GP behaviour under CCG group incent-
ives
To consider the effects of the reforms introducing financial incentives, I sketch a
simple numerical two period model in which group incentives are activated only
in the second period. Following Rebitzer & Taylor (2011) I assume GPs follow pro-
fessional norms such that they incur disutility when service level m (in £) is below
some “ideal” level of care mB which together with wages determines GP j’s utility.
In the first period, GPs have the common following utility:
uj = wj︸︷︷︸
wages
+ f (mj −mjB)︸ ︷︷ ︸
professional norms
Following the reforms (period 2), CCGs become responsible for design of local
services & staying within budget. I assume that membership of a CCGs now provides
an additional source of utility to all n member practices via a group financial incent-
ive where savings in practice patient care budgets Bj are shared equally between
practices:24
uj = wj︸︷︷︸
wages
+ f (mj −mjB)︸ ︷︷ ︸
professional norms
+
1
n
[
n
∑
j=1
(Bj −mj)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
group incentive
I consider a simple numerical example with two GPs. GPs choose a level of care
mj ∈ (0, 1) where 0 indicates patients receive a low level of care (e.g referrals and
prescriptions) and 1 a high level. Further I assume that the budget Bj = mB = 1; &
that f (mj −mB) = −0.5(mj −mB)2.
The payoff matrix for period 1 is shown below. Here, both GPs have a dominant
strategy to play high. In other words, prior to the reforms, both GPs provide a high
level of care because they have a no incentive to make savings on care budgets and
because they wish to avoid the utility penalty from providing a low level of care.
GP 1
m1 = 0 m1 = 1
2
m2 =
0
w− 0.5
w− 0.5
w
w− 0.5
G
P m2 =
1
w− 0.5
w
w
w
24This is not permissible under the reforms. However, it might also be the case if, for example,
savings on commissioning budgets were reinvested in primary care services and all GPs in the CCG
collectively own these.
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I now consider the effects of the reforms in period 2. The payoff matrix below
shows GP utility in period 2 in which the reforms allow for the equal distribution
of savings in practice budgets to member practices. Here, there is no dominant
strategy; each GP has no unilateral incentive to start playing low but if the GPs can
coordinate to both play low, GP utility is maximised.
GP 1
m1 = 0 m1 = 1
2
m2 =
0
w + 0.5
w + 0.5
w + 0.5
w
G
P m2 =
1
w
w + 0.5
w
w
This simple model illustrates the potential conflict of interest if GPs can appro-
priate savings from reduced patient care, but is not able to explain the divergence
between CCG governing body practices and other practices observed in the data. I
next consider a second scenario for period 2 in which GP 1 sits on a CCG governing
body while GP 2 does not. I make the strong assumption that GP 1 can appropriate
savings from patient care budgets, such that it wholly benefits GP 1. Now, following
the reforms, GP 2 has a dominant strategy of playing high & GP 1 has a dominant
strategy of playing low.
Gov. Body GP
m1 = 0 m1 = 1
G
P m2 =
0
w + 1.5
w− 0.5
w + 1
w− 0.5
O
th
er
m2 =
1
w + 0.5
w
w
w
Note that this scenario implies that in period 1 both GPs provide a high level of
care, but that in period 2 the governing body GP changes strategy to provide a lower
level of care while the other GP maintains care at the higher level i.e. the change in
relative care level following the reforms is driven by a change in the governing body
GP’s behaviour rather than vice-versa.
These models are not intended to be realistic and make very strong assumptions
about how savings in commissioning budgets can be appropriated, but are useful
in illustrating why governing body GPs may have stronger incentives to make cost
saving measures than other GPs and hence to explain the observed patterns in the
data.
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Chapter 3
The Time Value of Housing: Historical
Evidence on Discount Rates
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3.1 Introduction
The shape of discount rate functions — or the term structure of discount rates —
has provoked considerable research interest across a number of fields. In this pa-
per we exploit residential leasehold tenure in England and Wales to investigate the
shape of the discount rate schedule in housing markets, complementing a recent lit-
erature that uses features of property tenure to estimate market discount rates over
long horizons (Wong et al., 2008; Gautier & van Vuuren, 2014; Giglio et al., 2015a,b).
The intuition for why leasehold prices may contain information on discount rates
is straightforward. Consider two identical properties, one sold with a fixed term
99-year lease and the other with a 999-year lease.1 Absent any other contractual dif-
ferences between the two tenure arrangements, the gap between the two sale prices
must reflect the value of ownership for 900 years, discounted 99 years from now.
However, a potential hurdle is that institutional arrangements generally give
leaseholders rights over leased property assets at the end of the lease term. For
example, reforms in 1993 gave many leaseholders in England and Wales the right
to extend their leases or to purchase them outright, at a price agreed with the land-
lord or decided by a tribunal (if the two parties fail to reach a compromise). This
option is regarded as valuable, especially for short lease properties, and is exercised
for most leases well before the term runs down. A further complication arises in
this setting is that following the 1993 legislation, a number of real estate companies
began to publish and promote graphs purporting to show the relationship between
lease length and sales price. These graphs have subsequently become the received
wisdom for valuers (and tribunals) in determining the premium of a lease extension
and since surveyors use this estimated premium to value leasehold properties, it
follows that they likely influence leasehold prices.
To ensure findings are not driven by these potentially confounding factors, we
compile and refine a unique historical dataset of property sales from before the 1993
Act, taking advantage of a geographical setting—Prime Central London, the highly
urbanised core of London covering Mayfair, Chelsea and Kensington—in which
leaseholds account for four fifths of sales. Our dataset gives us a large volume
of leasehold sales of varying length in a relatively small spatial area, which were
neither influenced by the rights associated with the 1993 legislation nor potential
anchoring of leasehold prices from subsequent graphs. We establish three central
findings about discount rates in housing markets from this historical dataset. The
first is that, conditional on controls, residential properties with leases in the range of
1 to 99 years trade at prices that look reasonably close to those predicted by exponen-
tial discounting. Further findings come from a more precise approach that evaluates
1Terms of these lengths are commonly granted on new leases in England and Wales.
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the discount rate at every integer in the 1 to 99 year lease range. This exercise allows
us to show firstly that the schedule of housing market discount rates over 100 years
is declining; and secondly that housing market discount rates at around 100 years
are relatively low at around 3.5% in our setting.
Interpreting estimates of lease length on prices as implied housing market dis-
count rates relies on the internal validity of the empirical work. We take a number
of steps to ensure we obtain clean estimates. Our baseline specification uses street
fixed effects and a large number of property characteristics extracted from property
sales brochures to disentangle the effect of lease length from other neighborhood
and property characteristics. We control for the condition of the property to re-
flect that a rental externality (Henderson & Ioannides, 1983) may reduce incentives
to maintain properties held on short leases. By only comparing leaseholds with
other leaseholds we can rule out the influence of unobserved differences between
(and selection into) leasehold and freehold properties, and in restricting attention to
hard-to-redevelop flats we control for potential differences in the value of a redevel-
opment option (Capozza & Sick, 1991). We also take account of residual contractual
differences between leases, carefully separating out those sold with a share in the
freehold and controlling for rents paid to the freeholder (so-called ground rents)
where these are significant. Our setting is one in which very few buyers require
mortgage finance so this is also unlikely to be driving results.
Since our baseline approach essentially relies on selection on observables, we un-
dertake a number of auxiliary regressions that demonstrate that: (a) conditional on
our controls there is no relationship between rental value and lease length for prop-
erties in our sample and (b) that the relationship uncovered is insensitive to changes
in sample and specifications, including those that (i) use minimal controls, (ii) use
within building variation, (iii) use different time periods or geographies, or (iv) that
rely on different estimation methods. These results lead us to conclude that omitted
variables, for example omitted structural building characteristics or contractual fea-
tures, are unlikely to be behind our main results. Furthermore, Giglio et al. (2015a)
provide a number of pieces of analysis that support a discount rate interpretation
of our findings, for example by demonstrating that buyers of leaseholds are not ob-
servably different to buyers of freeholds (i.e. no market segmentation); that time on
the market does not vary by lease length; and that initial lease term appears not to
be associated with more restrictive leasehold covenants.
Our contribution to the literature is defined by the three main findings described
above. The first finding is to demonstrate that as a first approximation, the effect of
lease term on sales prices in the range 1 to 99 years is reasonably close to the effect
predicted by exponential discounting. This is important because it shows in a clear
and simple way that textbook discounting “works” in the housing market. Because
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housing represents a large component of household assets (at around 40%) and con-
sumption expenditure (around 20%), the implication is that a simple discounting
model is able to describe a large proportion of household activity. The corollary is
that our findings suggest sophisticated pricing behaviour by buyers and sellers in
the London residential market; in Galton (1907)’s terminology, the “wisdom of the
crowd” appears to be strong.
The findings that housing market discounting schedules are declining and low
around 100 years supplement recent estimates from the literature. Wong et al. (2008)
examine the Hong Kong leasehold market, providing results consistent with a de-
clining long-term discount rate while Gautier & van Vuuren (2014) find evidence of
present bias in their study of land-lease rents in Amsterdam. In a study developed
independently from our own, Giglio et al. (2015a) use freehold and leasehold prop-
erties in the UK and Singapore to estimate very low discount rates (around 2.5%) at
horizons beyond 100 years. In a follow-up paper, Giglio et al. (2015b), conclude that
these low long term rates can only be reconciled with much higher average returns
in real estate markets (around 6% by their estimates) by a declining schedule of dis-
count rates. Calibrating the asset pricing model of Lettau & Wachter (2007) with
these and other parameter inputs, these authors generate a term structure of hous-
ing market discount rates that fall from around 18% for one year leases to around
4% for 100 year leases, broadly matching their long term estimates.
Our contribution lies both in the use of historic data and in our focus on the first
100 years of lease term. For the reasons set out above, the historic data might be con-
sidered superior for making discount rate inferences compared to the Giglio et al.
(2015a) dataset which uses current (2004-2013) transactions since it allows us to ab-
stract from potentially confounding factors associated with leasehold extension and
enfranchisement rights.2 In this sense the findings from the respective papers are
not directly comparable. Importantly, the results we generate are largely consistent
with the low long term rates found in that paper: specifically we find that discount
rates implied by leaseholds approaching 100 years are around 3.5% in the historic
context. 3
A further benefit of the historic dataset is that it gives us substantial variation
from which we can estimate the effect of lease length on sales prices right across
2In addition, and following discussions with the Land Registry, the source of the Giglio et al.
(2015a) dataset, we have reservations about whether their dataset adequately captures leaseholds
sold with a share in the freehold. In our Prime Central London dataset, these accounted for 25% of
flat sales in 2002 but 50% of flat sales in 2012.
3These estimates are based on long term rental growth rate of 0.6%. It is unclear whether the
change in the implied discount rate we observe in the two periods is driven by changes in economic
conditions, from institutional reforms in 1993 or other factors. We see this as an avenue for future
research.
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the 1-99 year range.4 This allows us to generate for the first time direct evidence
on the shape of the schedule of housing market discount rates in the first 100 years,
bridging the Giglio et al. (2015a) results with the existing empirical literature more
directly than the calibration exercise in Giglio et al. (2015b). In contrast to this calib-
ration, we find evidence that discount rates in the historic context do not appear to
fall dramatically over the first 100 years of lease term, but rather fall more modestly
from around 6.5% to around 3.5% by 100 years. The decline appears to be non-linear,
with discount rates falling between 1 and 20 years, then flattening until around 60
years before declining again.
A legitimate question is whether discount rates uncovered in housing markets
are relevant to policy makers. For most policy settings, costs and benefits accrue
in close proximity, but in others such as pension financing, infrastructure invest-
ments, and environmental regulation, benefits materialise only in the far-off future.
Debates following the Stern review (Stern et al., 2006; Weitzman, 2007; Nordhaus,
2007) demonstrate that in such cases assumptions about the level of the discount
rate can be paramount in deciding the optimal policy response. As with Giglio et al.
(2015a) we see the long-term discount rates we uncover from risky housing assets as
potentially providing useful evidence on the upper bound of the appropriate long
term rate of social discount.
Besides their level, policy-makers evidently disagree over the appropriate shape
of social discounting schedules. Some authorities, notably the Office of Budgetary
Management (OBM) in the United States, guide policy-makers to use a constant
discount rate across all time horizons, while others including in the UK, France,
Norway and Denmark have adopted policy rates that fall over the time horizon. De-
clining policy rate schedules are usually underpinned by uncertainty: for example,
in reviewing the selection of social discount rates for policy settings, Cropper et al.
(2014) illustrate how uncertainty about future consumption can lead to precaution-
ary behaviour and generate declining risk free rates.
Whether the term structure of housing market discount rates can be usefully de-
ployed in such debates is unclear. Giglio et al. (2015b) interpret declining discount
rates implied by leasehold markets as reflecting risk at different maturities rather
than alternative explanations (such as a declining risk-free rate).5 The intuition un-
derlying their preferred asset pricing model implies that short leases are relatively
more risky because a negative shock to rents is followed by mean reversion, but
short maturity assets will not benefit from this reversal. However, some puzzles
4With no extension rights before 1993, we find a greater proportion of short leases in the historic
data. The historic data may also be important for the 0-99 year range because the value of the option
to extend a lease is likely to be highest for shorter leases.
5In a recent study of equity market, van Binsbergen et al. (2012) also find that short-term dividends
have a higher risk premium than long-term dividends.
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remain which could open the door to other interpretations. Firstly, the intuitive ra-
tionale for a declining term structure of risk premia neglects the option to extend a
lease that was granted by the 1993 Act. This right allows leaseholders with short
leases to negate the risk associated with mean reversion. Further, the term structure
of discount rates we uncover is clearly incongruous with the particular calibration
of the Lettau & Wachter (2007) asset pricing model provided by Giglio et al. (2015b).
We see these questions as providing avenues for future research.
Aside from these academic implications, our results are materially relevant to
individuals in England and Wales who own or are contemplating buying a lease.6
As we explain elsewhere in the paper, under UK legislation the relationship between
lease length and sales price net of the value of the option to extend is a component of
the statutory premium to extend a lease.7 In the last section of this paper, we show
how our findings contrast with conventional practitioner wisdom in this area and
lead us to believe that leaseholders commonly overpay for extensions.8
3.2 Institutional framework
3.2.1 Residential leasehold in England and Wales
In England and Wales as many as 1 million houses and 2 million flats are owned
under long leases, 40% of recent new build properties are leased, and leaseholds ac-
count for around a quarter of residential sales.9 Leaseholds proliferate where popu-
lations are most concentrated—they account for around half of the sales in London
and over four fifths of sales in Prime Central London (Figure 3.1).
Leasehold ownership is an alternative way to hold residential property outside
the more widely studied home-ownership and rental forms of tenure (Henderson &
Ioannides, 1983).10 Conceptualizing tenure forms as distinct bundles of use, transfer,
6In another recent contribution, Badarinza & Ramadorai (2014) examine some 450 decisions by
the UK First-Tier Tribunal—previously known as the Leasehold Valuation Tribunal (LVT)— to settle
disputes over the valuation of lease extensions and enfranchisements. Interestingly, these authors
contend that the discount rates implicitly adopted by tribunals are high and actually increasing with
lease length.
7This led to results from an earlier version of this paper being brought to the First Tier Tribunal
in March 2013 in the case known as Kosta v The Trustees of the Phillimore Estates, in which one of the
authors acted as expert witness. Kosta was the first UK leasehold enfranchisement case applying
econometric analysis on a large sample of properties.
8More details are included in our working paper, Bracke et al. (2014).
9DCLG Table FA1221 (S108): Household type by tenure, 2011-12; housing stock estimates from
https://www.gov.uk/government/policies/helping-people-to-buy-a-home.
10A full account of the history of residential leasehold and its evolution lies outside the scope of
this work. Interested readers are referred to McDonald (1969) who describes the origins of residen-
tial leasehold ownership in the granting of land, or ground, leases in feudal England. Under such
arrangements, tenants would develop leased land, often to agreed parameters, and use it for the term
of the lease with the land and buildings reverting to the land owner thereafter. McDonald (1969) sug-
101
Figure 3.1: Fraction of leasehold and freehold sales, Land Registry 2013
Notes: The Land Registry contains all residential property sales in England and Wales since
1995. The dataset is available at http://www.landregistry.gov.uk/market-trend-data/
public-data. The public version of the dataset only contains an indicator variable which labels
properties as freeholds or leaseholds. For the main analysis of this paper, we use proprietary data
from real estate agencies in Central London.
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and contracting rights and obligations (Besley & Ghatak, 2009), the fundamental
characteristic of leasehold ownership is that it grants the purchaser of the lease–
the lessee or leaseholder – use rights for a long but finite period, commonly 99 or
125 years, known as the term of the lease. As such it lies between freehold home
ownership (indefinite use rights) and renting (use rights for a short fixed period).
As with freehold owners, leaseholders can gift or sell the asset (transfer rights) and
mortgage or rent the property (contract rights).11 Existing leasehold interests can
then be bought and sold on the open market. When such a trade takes place, the
buyer inherits the existing lease agreement in full, including the duration of the
remaining use rights of the contract. This is known as the unexpired term of the
lease and is simply the original term reduced by the elapsed time since the lease
was granted.
In contrast to freehold ownership, leasehold ownership implies multiple interests
in the same real estate asset since the seller of the leasehold – the lessor or free-
holder – retains an interest in the asset beyond the initial sale.12 Land rents, known
gests several reasons why this arrangement may have evolved, for example to enable management
of the large fixed costs of providing services such as drainage, sea-defences, street lighting, and road
construction.
11Although normally the leaseholder cannot assign or sublet without the freeholder’s approval.
12This interest – usually thought of as corresponding to the ownership of the ground beneath the
real estate asset which has been leased – is known as the freehold interest, and can also be traded in
secondary markets. Note the distinction between a freehold interest in a real estate asset and freehold
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as ground rents, are typically paid annually in accordance with a payment sched-
ule agreed at the start of the lease and represent an income to lessors rather than a
payment for services.13 Failure to pay ground rents in accordance with the lease can
result in forfeiture of the lease, although in practice this is rare. Lessors also com-
monly retain the right to veto redevelopment or alteration to the property by the
leaseholder during the term of the lease. If a leaseholder does wish to redevelop,
the freeholder will demand a premium which is subject to negotiation between the
parties.
Nearly all flats in England and Wales are owned under leasehold contracts.14
This ownership structure provides a way to share costs for public goods when
a single building houses more than one dwelling. For example, there may be a
shared staircase or garden, and in large purpose built flats a lift and perhaps even
a porter. In some cases the individual leaseholders collectively own the freehold
interest while in other cases it is owned by a third party. The former is known as
owning a leasehold with a share in the freehold. It effectively allows owners to ex-
tend their leases indefinitely and is therefore analogous to freehold ownership of
houses in terms of the use rights it grants.15
The institutional framework around the right to extend or purchase a lease out-
right is an important consideration in our analysis. Prior to 1993, most leaseholders
in England and Wales had no rights over leased property assets at the end of the
lease term such that the land and all buildings would revert to the lessor. The only
option open to leaseholders who wished to retain ownership was to negotiate a
new lease with the lessor, either before an existing lease expired or at the end of the
lease term. Major changes to the institutional framework surrounding leaseholds
occurred in 1993. These changes - described in detail in the Appendix - granted
widespread rights for leaseholds to extend their leases or to purchase them out-
right, at a price agreed with the landlord or decided by a tribunal. This option
is regarded as valuable, especially for short lease properties, and is exercised for
ownership of an asset. The former implies that there is a lease over the property and there being two
or more interests. The latter implies a single interest.
13In some cases ground rents are of a nominal amount, known as a peppercorn ground rent, or
a fixed rent with no review. More often, ground rent payments are subject to review in intervals
of 5, 10, 15, 21 or 25 years. The lease sets out how the ground rent is reviewed at the review date
but according to Savills (2012) it is common for ground rents to either double, to increase by a fixed
amount, to be rebased against the retail price index (RPI), or to be rebased against a percentage of
the capital value of the underlying property at such times.
14A few flats are in fact held freehold, rather than share of freehold. These freehold flats will
usually be the flat where the freeholder lives. They could have the right to receive ground rents from
other leases in the building and, as described below, a stake in the residual interest as with other
freehold interests.
15The owner of the freehold interest for flats usually provides management and maintenance ser-
vices to the building on behalf of the leaseholder(s), recovering costs through a fee known as a service
charge. This applies regardless of whether the block is owned leasehold or share of freehold.
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most leases well before the term runs down. Additionally, following the 1993 Act
a number of companies began to publish graphs purporting to show the relation-
ship between lease length and sales price. These graphs have subsequently become
the received wisdom for surveyors in valuing leasehold dwellings and plausibly an-
chor expectations about leasehold prices. Both these issues could mean that prices
of leasehold sales after 1993 are less informative about discount rates. Compiling
the historical dataset we describe in the next section permits us to sidestep issues
relating to enfranshisement that could confound discount rate interpretations based
on later sales.
3.3 Data
3.3.1 Context and data sources
To undertake the empirical analysis we first create a dataset of transactions in the
Prime Central London area for the period 1987 to 1992.16 We use a definition of
Prime Central London provided by real estate agents operating in the London mar-
ket, including properties that belong to the following postcode districts: SW1, SW3,
SW5, SW7, SW10, W1, W2, W8, W11, W14.17 In this highly urbanised setting, more
than 85% of homes transacted are leaseholds. This in part reflects that a large pro-
portion of the Prime Central London market has for 300 years been owned by a small
number of private land-owners – including the Grosvenor, Cadogan, de Walden,
Portman, Crown, Ilchester, and Phillimore Estates. These estates historically made
extensive use of the leasehold tenure system to develop land in this area, maintain-
ing some degree of control over the development of the built environment.
Our primary source of data is Lonres.com, a subscription service for real estate
agents and surveyors working in the Prime Central London (PCL) area. Sales in-
formation in the Lonres sample is provided by individual agents connected to the
Lonres network and collated into a database. Many of the major agencies operat-
ing in the PCL market are in the Lonres database, including Savills, Knight Frank,
and John D Wood & Co. Because the database provides only a limited number of
data fields, we extract and merge in additional property attributes from the original
PDF sales brochures. In addition to the Lonres.com historical archives, we obtained
access to the internal records of John D Wood & Co. (JDW), a real estate agency op-
erating in the Prime Central London area. Sale prices in the JDW sample, which
16Individual sale data before 1987 are extremely sparse in our data and therefore of little use for
econometric analysis.
17Postcode districts correspond to the first half of British postcodes and, in London, they typically
include 10,000–20,000 separate addresses.
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also starts in 1987, have been verified by agents.18 To obtain a clean dataset we drop
suspected duplicate sales where the address is the same and a second sales occurs
within 90 days, and data points where street or leasehold information is missing.
Because we use a street-fixed effect strategy, all transactions on streets with just one
property in the dataset are also dropped.
We abstract from the right to extend leases through sample restrictions. Chiefly
this is achieved by excluding sales that occurred after the Leasehold Reform Act of
1993. We also exclude 1992 sales since 1992 was an election year and both main
parties were proposing leasehold reform. By doing so, we minimise concerns that
leasehold prices in our data are influenced by the expectation of a reform.19 Fol-
lowing the earlier 1967 Act, some low-value leasehold houses had already become
enfranchisable, i.e. the leaseholder had the right to purchase the freehold of the
property in exchange for a premium. Whether a house was enfranchisable or not
depended on its rateable value. This is unobserved in our data so we obtained this
information from the relevant local authorities, identifying a list of houses which
were enfranchisable at the time and further exclude them from our sample.20 Taken
together these restrictions give us confidence that we can avoid potentially con-
founding effects of rights to extend on the leasehold prices in our data.
3.3.2 Descriptive statistics
Table 3.1 describes the final dataset of 8,184 unique sales records, splitting the data
into categories based on the type of dwelling (flats and houses) and data source
(Lonres and JDW records). More than half the data points are leaseholds with less
than 100 years unexpired term. Figure 3.2 shows the distribution of lease lengths
in the sample: there are many data points for leases with 55–65 years left, for 85–
100 years left, and between 120 and 125 years; there is a group of sales with leases
between 950 and 999 years. The third column of Table 3.1 includes freehold houses
and share of freehold flats. Although share of freehold flats have a lease term, it is
critical to put them together with freehold properties since their purchase includes
a share of the freehold value of the building and, with it, the right to extend one’s
lease indefinitely.21 Figure 3.3 shows the location of sales in the dataset and Figure
3.4 shows how observations in the dataset are spread across the different quarters
18These prices are likely to be correctly measured because agencies’ commissions depend on them.
19As a robustness check, we also ran the analysis including 1992 sales. Results were materially
unchanged.
20Rather than dropping enfranchisable houses, as a robustness check we also run the analysis
including them but assigning them a dummy. This had no material effect on results.
21Leasehold term for these properties tend to be long. In our dataset, more than a third of share
of freehold flats have a lease term longer than 945 years. As we argue later a failure to account for
these share of freehold properties could result in spurious conclusions about the implied value of
lease term.
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Table 3.1: Data points
Notes: Lonres.com is our main data source. Real estate agency John D Wood & Co. provided addi-
tional data for this paper. The table shows the number of sales in our dataset which belong to the
following categories: leaseholds with unexpired term below 100 years, leaseholds with unexpired
term above 100 years, and freeholds (including flats sold with a share of freehold). The average
unexpired term for leasehold flats with more than 100 years to expiry is 307, whereas the median
unexpired term is 124.
Number of Number of Number of Total
leaseholds leaseholds freeholds or data points
< 100 years ≥100 years share of F/H in sample
Lonres.com records
Houses 525 9 1,109 1,643
Flats 3,353 906 236 4,495
John D Wood & Co. records
Houses 116 2 888 1,006
Flats 605 428 7 1,040
Total 4,599 1,345 2,240 8,184
between 1987 and 1991.
All sale prices reported in the John D Wood & Co. archive are verified exchange
prices. By contrast, only around 15% of Lonres data points have been verified
against other data sources. When the price is non-verified, the figure may coin-
cide with the original asking price. Non-verified properties are equally found, in
roughly the same proportion, both among freehold and leasehold properties,22 and
our hedonic regression contains a variable that flags non-verified properties.23
Table 3.2 contains the descriptive statistics for all variables. Those that were im-
mediately available from the original data tables include: HOUSE (whether the prop-
erty is a house, as opposed to a flat), BEDROOMS (entered as a categorical variable),
SALE QUARTER, STREET (entered as fixed effect), FLOOR LEVEL , VERIFIED (for sales
in the Lonres dataset, this variable indicates whether the sale price has been veri-
fied), MAISONETTE (indicates multi-level apartments), ONEROUS GROUND RENT
22In other words, if leasehold properties are equally likely to have a non-verified price than free-
hold properties, the analysis should be unaffected. In Lonres records, the percentage of non-verified
prices among leasehold properties with terms lower than 100 years is 88.09%. The percentage of
non-verified prices among freehold properties and leasehold properties with a term of 100 years or
more is 84.29%. The average discount between asking and final price (for properties with verified
prices) is 4.85% for leasehold properties with terms shorter than 100 years and 4.01% for freehold
properties and leasehold properties with terms of 100 years or longer. We also checked that, in the
Lonres database, the percentage of non-verified properties stays roughly the same across leasehold
of different lengths.
23Among verified sales in Lonres.com, the average difference between the asking price and the
verified price is 4.48%. We also ran our analysis only on verified properties and got similar estimates
from the ones presented in this paper, albeit with a much smaller number of observations.
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Table 3.2: Descriptive statistics
Notes: The table does not contain information on sale dates (described in Figure 3.4), sale locations
(mapped in Figure 3.3), and lease length (see Figure 3.2). Price and floor area are the only continuous
variables in the analysis; all other property attributes are dummy variables. The John D Wood &
Co. dataset groups together all floors from the third upwards. The Lonres dataset always specifies
the exact floor but I grouped all floors above the fourth together. Floor area is only available for
approximately 2,000 data points (We haven’t found any systematic correlation between the presence
of the floor area variable and other attributes such as location or number of bedrooms).
count mean sd min max
PRICE 8,184 403,140 412,064 25,000 9,000,000
LEASE 8,184 .73 .45 0 1
HOUSE 8,184 .32 .47 0 1
STUDIO 8,184 .031 .17 0 1
1-BEDROOM 8,184 .15 .36 0 1
2-BEDROOM 8,184 .3 .46 0 1
3-BEDROOM 8,184 .23 .42 0 1
4-BEDROOM 8,184 .14 .34 0 1
5-BEDROOM 8,184 .085 .28 0 1
6-BEDROOM 8,184 .056 .23 0 1
7-BEDROOM 8,184 .0088 .093 0 1
8-BEDROOM 8,184 .0037 .06 0 1
9-BEDROOM 8,184 .0012 .035 0 1
10-BEDROOM 8,184 .00086 .029 0 1
11-BEDROOM 8,184 .00037 .019 0 1
PURPOSEBUILT 8,184 .19 .39 0 1
VERIFIED 8,184 .35 .48 0 1
ONEROUSGRRENT 8,184 .1 .3 0 1
FH-FLAT 8,184 .0015 .038 0 1
LWGR-FLOOR 8,178 .11 .31 0 1
GR-FLOOR 8,178 .091 .29 0 1
1ST-FLOOR 8,178 .11 .31 0 1
2ND-FLOOR 8,178 .098 .3 0 1
3RD-FLOOR (LNR) 8,178 .067 .25 0 1
3RDORMORE FLOOR (JDW) 8,178 .032 .18 0 1
4TH-FLOOR (LNR) 8,178 .043 .2 0 1
5THORMORE-FLOOR (LNR) 8,178 .038 .19 0 1
MAISONETTE 8,178 .092 .29 0 1
MEWS 7,476 .046 .21 0 1
DETACHED 7,476 .012 .11 0 1
TWOORMORE-BATHROOM 7,476 .47 .5 0 1
GARDEN 7,476 .24 .43 0 1
BALCONY 7,476 .2 .4 0 1
TERRACE 7,476 .15 .36 0 1
PATIO 7,476 .14 .35 0 1
COMMUNALGARDEN 7,476 .13 .33 0 1
REFURBISHED 7,476 .24 .43 0 1
INNEED 7,476 .078 .27 0 1
SQFT 2,157 1,380 1,229 157 22,000
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Figure 3.2: Leasehold observations by years remaining
Notes: The histogram include all leasehold observations in the sample, counted by length of the
unexpired term. Freehold and share of freehold properties are not included. Bins are 5 years wide.
There are 43 properties spread between 150 and 980 years of remaining term—they are not visualised
in the histogram.
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(we define the ground rent as onerous when it is above 0.1% of the sale price)24, and
FREEHOLD FLAT. All other variables shown were not immediately available from
the data tables so were extracted from unstructured text. Most are self-explanatory;
INNEED indicates the presence, in the property advert, of the key phrase “in need”,
which is often followed by expressions such as “of improvements”, “of refurbish-
ment”, and so on.
3.4 Methodology
This section develops a simple approach to estimate discount rates from sales prices,
relying on the intuition that the gap between the sale prices of the property held
forever and a property leased only for t years should reflect the value of full owner-
ship discounted t years from now. We call this the present value of use rights, i.e. the
present value of consumption and/or investment returns that flow from the asset.
We proceed in two steps: first estimating the discounts associated with leaseholds
of a given length then retrieving the implied discount rates.
Our identifying assumption is that conditional on controls the only source of
discounts are differences in the present value of use rights. Potential confounders
24This threshold (0.1% of the sale value) is commonly used by market practitioners to identify
ground rents that are high enough to impact the transaction price. We experimented with other
thresholds and did not find notable differences in results.
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Figure 3.3: Location of sales
Notes: Addresses in the sample have been geocoded using Google Maps (https://developers.
google.com/maps/documentation/geocoding/) and then mapped with R and the ggmap
package.
Figure 3.4: Number of transactions per quarter
Notes: The pattern in sales well reflects the experience of market practitioners in that period and
is consistent with national and local price indices. 1988 was a boom year, with real estate agents
enjoying “high volumes, high prices, and high commissions”. After that came a fall in the market in
1989, and the number of sales stabilised in 1990-1991.
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include any unobserved factors which drive price differences between properties
that are related to the term of the lease but do not arise simply because of discount-
ing. After outlining our methodology and main results we discuss threats to iden-
tification, paying close attention to findings in the recent literature and outlining
techniques and several auxiliary regressions we undertake to resolve them.
3.4.1 Measuring leasehold discounts
We model the logarithm of the price of a leasehold property, held for t years, as:
p(t) = p(∞) + φ FH + ln f (t), (3.1)
where p(∞) is the log price of a property held forever. The function f (t) repres-
ents the discount associated with a given lease length as opposed to a property held
forever. The dummy FH indicates freehold status and φ represents the price differ-
ence between leaseholds and freeholds that does not depend on the length of the
lease. When the property is a freehold f (t) = 1 and ln f (t) = 0, as with very long
leaseholds.
To model the price of a property held forever we follow the literature on hedonic
regressions (Hill (2013)):
p(∞) = αj + Xβ+ λs, (3.2)
where αj are street fixed effects, X are property attributes, and λs are quarterly dum-
mies denoting the time of the sale (s).25 Our baseline specifications include the full
set of property attributes listed in Table 3.2, with the exception of square footage of
floor area which is available for a subset of data points.
To estimate ln f (t), we employ three methods: (1) leasehold buckets, (2) lease-
hold dummies, and (3) a semiparametric approach based on Yatchew (1997). The
bucket method divides leasehold properties into several large groups according to
their lease length so that price effects can be estimated for each bucket. The dummy
method pushes this further such that each integer value of lease length up to 999
25Repeat sales regressions are an alternative to hedonic models but they require a sample with a
sufficient number of properties which have been sold twice. Since the current sample includes only
the years from 1987 to 1991, the repeat sales regression would only include properties that sold twice
within 5 years. The resulting sample would be small and potentially affected by selection bias, as
property that sold often could be more likely of having been renovated.
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years (the highest in our data) takes a categorical variable:26
ln f (t) =
999
∑
t=1
γt · d(t).
The semiparametric estimation approach described in Yatchew (1997) is reported
in the Appendix as a robustness check. By sorting all the observations in ascending
order with respect to t and differencing them, we take advantage of the fact that
ln f (t′) − ln f (t) tends towards zero. We can then use simple OLS to estimate a
version of equation 3.1 that does not contain f (t). In a second step, we can apply
common non-parametric estimation techniques to retrieve ln f (t) from p˜(t) = pt −
pˆ(∞), where the predicted price of a property held forever (pˆ(∞)) is derived from
the first step described above.
3.4.2 Estimating discount rates
Taking Gordon (1959)’s simple constant discount rate model to equation 3.1 implies
that:27
ln f (t) = ln(1− eRtT). (3.3)
Our aim is to explore whether Rt is constant, i.e. Rt1 = Rt2 = R, or varies over the
time horizon in question.
Prior expectations are that f (t) should satisfy f (0) = 0, f ′(t) > 0 (equivalently
γt+1 ≥ γt), and limx→∞ f (t) = 1 indicating that a zero year lease should have no
market value, that all else equal more years on a lease should make the property
more valuable, and that at some point very long but finite leases should be equi-
valent to infinite leases. In practice, since we estimate the γt’s in an unconstrained
way, these conditions do not always hold and in Figure 3.5 the points are scattered
and some estimates lie above the long-lease line. Before attempting inferences about
26To retrieve the true price discounts in each category the γ coefficients must be exponentiated.
Jensen’s inequality could cause the estimated discount to be larger than the actual discount, because
an average of logarithms is not the same as the logarithm of an average. In practice, the consequences
of Jensen’s inequality are likely to be limited. We confirmed this by running our baseline regression
on simulated data. The impact of Jensen’s inequality on estimates was apparent only at the third or
fourth decimal point.
27If the price of owning the property for one period is P(1), then the price of owning the property
forever is:
P(∞) =
P(1)
R∞
,
where R∞ is the net discount rate applied with an infinite horizon. In turn, R∞ = r∞ − g∞, where r∞
represents the gross discount rate and g∞ the growth rate of P(1) over time. For a property held for t
years, we have that
P(t) = P(∞) (1− eRtt︸ ︷︷ ︸
f (t)
).
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discount rates we therefore fit a local polynomial through the estimated points, fine
tuning the bandwidth of the polynomial within reasonable limits. We then use the
predicted values of the polynomial curves to compute the discount rates at each
point in the term range by solving for each Rt that corresponds to a pair {Rt, t} in
equation 3.3.28
3.5 Results
3.5.1 Leasehold discounts
Table 3.3 shows the output of the hedonic regressions. The first two specifications
use the bucket approach: the first column includes freehold and leasehold prop-
erties whereas the second only includes leaseholds. The third specification is the
baseline specification which focuses only on leasehold flats and adopts the more
granular dummy approach where each lease term integer has its own categorical
variable. Appendix Table 3.4 contains the first stage of the semiparametric approach
alongside other robustness regressions.
Coefficients across the three models verify the price associations for our controls
are generally in line with intuition. Houses command a premium of 20-25% over
flats controlling for other attributes such as bedrooms and street. The coefficient on
INNEED 15-20% implies a discount for properties advertised as “in need of improve-
ment’, an important control if poor maintenance is correlated with lease term. The
(unreported) coefficients on SALEQUARTER together imply a mix-adjusted index of
house prices in Prime Central London. This is increasing in 1987–1989 and decreas-
ing thereafter, a patten consistent with other historical indices such as the Nation-
wide regional house price index for London (see Figure 3.11 in the Appendix). The
R-squared indicates that these models are able to explain approximately 75-85% of
the variation in house prices.
We test whether freehold properties trade at a premium to leasehold properties
in the first model in Table 3.3 by grouping leaseholds into four buckets: below 80
years, between 80 and 99 years, between 100 and 124 years, between 125 and 900
years, and above 900 years.29 All the leasehold categories are significantly different
from the baseline freehold group. Although the significance is only 10% for the two
groups above 124 years, the size of the coefficients is consistent and, if put together,
28This effectively solves for the constant discount rate that is applied to all years of a leasehold of
a given term to make the discount consistent with a long lease.
29Choices over the boundaries for each group are inevitably arbitrary to some extent. Grouping
leaseholds with less than 80 years together follows UK legislation which requires a different compu-
tation for the premium to be paid to enfranchise a lease when the lease reaches 80 years, presumably
because the value of the lease is expected to decline rapidly after that.
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Table 3.3: Hedonic regressions: Leasehold buckets and model with dummies
Notes: The baseline categories are flats, 1-bedroom properties, 1st floor. The first column displays the
results of a regression including both leasehold and freehold properties. The next column refers to a
regression with leasehold properties only. The third model is run on leasehold flats. All models have
street and quarter fixed effects.
(1) (2) (3)
log(PRICE) log(PRICE) log(PRICE)
Baseline: FREEHOLD Baseline: LEASE ≥900 LEASE FLATS
HOUSE 0.255∗∗∗ (0.040) 0.193∗∗∗ (0.061)
STUDIO -0.403∗∗∗ (0.031) -0.409∗∗∗ (0.030) -0.424∗∗∗ (0.033)
2-BEDROOM 0.354∗∗∗ (0.015) 0.337∗∗∗ (0.015) 0.331∗∗∗ (0.013)
3-BEDROOM 0.650∗∗∗ (0.021) 0.620∗∗∗ (0.022) 0.615∗∗∗ (0.022)
4-BEDROOM 0.864∗∗∗ (0.029) 0.878∗∗∗ (0.033) 0.875∗∗∗ (0.032)
5-BEDROOM 1.057∗∗∗ (0.040) 1.079∗∗∗ (0.060) 1.125∗∗∗ (0.067)
6-BEDROOM 1.235∗∗∗ (0.048) 1.168∗∗∗ (0.076) 1.143∗∗∗ (0.104)
7-BEDROOM 1.253∗∗∗ (0.077) 1.175∗∗∗ (0.126) 1.446∗∗∗ (0.194)
8-BEDROOM 1.282∗∗∗ (0.203) 1.013∗∗∗ (0.264) 0.862 (0.550)
9-BEDROOM 1.301∗∗∗ (0.231) 0.987∗∗∗ (0.195)
10-BEDROOM 0.734∗∗∗ (0.198)
11-BEDROOM 1.835∗∗∗ (0.374) 1.471∗∗∗ (0.074)
PURPOSEBUILT -0.004 (0.024) -0.015 (0.026) -0.027 (0.021)
VERIFIED -0.079∗∗∗ (0.013) -0.087∗∗∗ (0.016) -0.102∗∗∗ (0.016)
ONEROUSGRRENT -0.147∗∗∗ (0.027) -0.146∗∗∗ (0.027) -0.115∗∗∗ (0.018)
LWGR-FLOOR -0.119∗∗∗ (0.024) -0.126∗∗∗ (0.024) -0.127∗∗∗ (0.022)
GR-FLOOR -0.032∗ (0.020) -0.035∗ (0.020) -0.020 (0.018)
2ND-FLOOR -0.082∗∗∗ (0.016) -0.080∗∗∗ (0.016) -0.060∗∗∗ (0.015)
3RD-FLOOR (LNR) -0.108∗∗∗ (0.021) -0.107∗∗∗ (0.021) -0.105∗∗∗ (0.020)
3RDORMORE FLOOR (JDW) -0.118∗∗∗ (0.027) -0.111∗∗∗ (0.027) -0.091∗∗∗ (0.027)
4TH-FLOOR (LNR) -0.088∗∗∗ (0.029) -0.088∗∗∗ (0.031) -0.086∗∗∗ (0.026)
5THORMORE-FLOOR (LNR) 0.022 (0.038) 0.022 (0.041) -0.004 (0.032)
MAISONETTE -0.018 (0.022) -0.027 (0.022) -0.019 (0.024)
MEWS 0.097∗∗∗ (0.034) 0.157∗ (0.086)
DETACHED 0.395∗∗∗ (0.122) 0.533∗∗ (0.229)
TWOORMORE-BATHROOM 0.116∗∗∗ (0.013) 0.140∗∗∗ (0.016) 0.130∗∗∗ (0.015)
GARDEN 0.048∗∗∗ (0.014) 0.056∗∗∗ (0.019) 0.086∗∗∗ (0.019)
BALCONY 0.050∗∗∗ (0.012) 0.056∗∗∗ (0.013) 0.083∗∗∗ (0.011)
TERRACE 0.065∗∗∗ (0.014) 0.084∗∗∗ (0.016) 0.080∗∗∗ (0.015)
PATIO -0.031∗∗ (0.014) -0.016 (0.021) -0.012 (0.020)
COMMUNALGARDEN 0.011 (0.018) 0.010 (0.020) 0.005 (0.017)
REFURBISHED 0.031∗∗∗ (0.009) 0.029∗∗∗ (0.011) 0.017 (0.011)
INNEED -0.171∗∗∗ (0.016) -0.189∗∗∗ (0.021) -0.153∗∗∗ (0.018)
FH-FLAT 0.151 (0.117)
LEASE ¡80 -0.195∗∗∗ (0.029) -0.104∗ (0.058)
LEASE [80,100) -0.105∗∗∗ (0.027) -0.023 (0.049)
LEASE [100,125) -0.089∗∗∗ (0.026) -0.013 (0.049)
LEASE [125, 900) -0.066∗ (0.035) 0.025 (0.062)
LEASE ≥900 -0.081∗ (0.048)
Quarter (sale date) X X X
Street X X X
Observations 7476 5570 5164
R squared 0.825 0.784 0.815
Standard errors in parentheses
clustered at the street level∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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this whole group would be significantly different from the freehold baseline, a find-
ing confirmed in unreported results. We interpret this specification as providing
evidence of price differences between freehold and leasehold properties which go
beyond length of use rights (remaining leasehold years).
The second model of the Table, which excludes freehold properties, is designed
to test for price differences between long leasehold properties of different lease
lengths. The baseline in this specification is composed of properties with leases
longer than 900 years. The coefficients for other leasehold categories are not signi-
ficant except for the coefficient on leaseholds with less than 80 years, which is signi-
ficant at the 10% level. These results suggest that in our setting long leaseholds can
not be statistically distinguished from other long leaseholds of a different length.
The third model of Table 3.3 is our baseline specification in which we drop
houses to focus purely on leasehold flats and adopt the leasehold dummy estim-
ation approach. Our main object of interest, the dummy coefficients, are not tabu-
lated but are displayed—exponentiated—in Figure 3.5. These estimates indicate the
discount associated with all leasehold flats of a specific lease length with respect to
leasehold flats with 999 years remaining. The point estimates are shown as dots with
the 95% confidence intervals represented by the bars appearing to vary in line with
the histogram of Figure 3.2, with the smallest errors corresponding to lease groups
computed from more observations. The pattern of points seems to be broadly ex-
ponential in shape, although from around 100 years it is more difficult to discern a
clear shape.
3.5.2 Discount rates
The exponentiated γt coefficients in Figure 3.5 define the shape of f (t) in equation
(3.3) above.30 As expected, the points are slightly scattered so in Figure 3.6 we fit a
local polynomial to these points, weighting by the number of sales at that specific
lease length. The curve is a second-degree local polynomial with a bandwidth of
15 years on both sides and an Epanechnikov weighting scheme. Confidence bands
— computed using bootstrapping — are represented by the gray areas around the
curve. Although the curve is fitted across the whole lease range, we focus on leases
of 1–100 years given our findings in the previous section.
The polynomial fulfills the conditions described above: it is increasing and re-
30The choice of the baseline in the estimation of f (t) could have an impact on coefficients. If, for
some reason, 999-year leases (our baseline leasehold category) were randomly more expensive or
cheaper than other properties, this would affect the estimated discounts.
As a robustness check, we also ran the analysis by using the average price of all leases between
100 and 999 years as the reference price of long leases (p(∞)). Results were substantially unchanged.
In any case, the main goal of this paper is the shape of the discounts, not their actual level. Therefore
the choice of the baseline is not critical to results.
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Figure 3.5: Dummy estimates
Notes: The chart represents the lease length dummy estimates for the model shown in the third
column of Table 3.3. The chart also plot the 95% confidence bands associated with each coefficient.
The dashed horizontal line represents the value of long leases and in this case represents the value
of a 999-year lease.
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Figure 3.6: Smooth f (t) function
Notes: The chart shows the second-degree local polynomial with a 15-year bandwidth on both sides
fitted through the dots displayed in Figure 3.5. The chart focuses on the 1-100 year range. The
dummy estimates are plotted as circles where the size of the circle is proportional to the number of
observations for that specific lease length. The gray bands around them represent 95% confidence
bands.
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Figure 3.7: Implied discount rates
Notes: The chart shows the discount rates implied by the curve fitted in Figure 3.6. The discount
rates implied by the corresponding individual dummy estimates are also plotted. As in Figure 3.6,
the circle size is proportional to the number of observations for that specific lease length.
This Figure represents a leasehold flat v.s. leasehold flat analysis, significantly departing from the
conventional basis for establishing relativity used by market practitioners.
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mains below the line representing the value of 999-year leases (the horizontal line
at 100). The curve provides our first major finding: the pattern of discounts across
lease term, which we refer to as the time value of housing, broadly resembles an expo-
nential curve. In other words the pricing of leaseholds in our sample closely mirrors
predictions from basic finance theory about the pricing of deteriorating assets.
To dig deeper into the shape of the discount rate function, we use the predicted
values of the polynomial curve to compute the discount rate at each point in the
term range by solving for each Rt that corresponds to a pair {Rt, t} in equation 3.3.
The result is shown by the red line in Figure 3.7, which also contains the discounts
derived from the original dummy estimates in blue circles. Overall, these results
indicate that leasehold prices in our setting appear to be consistent with a declin-
ing discount rate schedule. Very short leases imply discount rates of around 5-6%,
whereas long leases, close to 100 years left, imply discount rates close to 3%.
These net discount rates can be used to estimate the gross discount rates pre-
vailing at the time of our analysis (1987-1992). One way of doing so is to add the
long-run rate of real rent growth, as in Giglio et al. (2015a) who take a real rent
growth of 0.62% using the CPI component “actual rents for housing” (series D7CE)
from the UK Office of National Statistics for the period 1996-2012 . This would im-
ply a 0.62% upward shift of the dots in Figure 3.7, meaning discount rates of around
3.5% for leases of around 100 years.
T
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3.6 Threats to validity
The baseline specification in column 3 of Table 3.3 incorporates a number of strategies
to isolate the present value of use rights from other sources of variation. The street
fixed effects partial out granular location-specific effects and help us control for
some unobserved housing attributes, for example where properties on the same
street share the same style and layout. This regression uses the most complete set of
structural dwelling attributes that our historical dataset allows. We control for the
condition of the property to reflect that a rental externality (Henderson & Ioannides,
1983) may reduce incentives to maintain properties held on short leases.31
By only comparing leaseholds with other leaseholds we rule out potentially un-
observed differences between leasehold and freehold properties and related con-
cerns, for example endogenous selection of properties into freehold and leasehold
tenure, buyer preferences for freeholds, or other factors that drive systematic value
differences between the property groups. Remaining observable contractual differ-
ences between leases are accounted for by carefully separating out those leases sold
with a share in the freehold and by controlling for rents paid to the freeholder (so-
called ground rents) where these are significant. Auxiliary analysis in Giglio et al.
(2014) Appendix A.1.7 gives us confidence that additional contract features — such
as restrictive covenants — are unlikely to vary systematically with remaining lease
term. Similarly by comparing flats only with other flats we avoid unobserved dif-
ferences between flats and houses, including corresponding concerns around mar-
ket segmentation and endogenous dwelling structure. Since flats can not usually
be redeveloped to a higher density, restricting attention to these dwellings has the
additional benefit of controlling for potential differences in the value of a redevelop-
ment option which could be correlated with the term of the lease (Capozza & Sick,
1991).32
We aim to further mitigate omitted variable concerns in two supplementary re-
gressions. In the first, we test whether lease length has an effect on rental value
conditional on our set of controls. To do so we match properties in our main spe-
cification to a dataset of property rentals in the period 2004-2014 which restricts the
sample to around 1,000 properties. Figure 3.8 shows that there is no clear relation-
ship between lease length and rental price. We conclude that if rental values are
strongly correlated over time, omitted property characteristics that drive both rents
31It should also be noted that UK leaseholders have an obligation to maintain a property in good
state and that failure to do so might trigger a dilapidation claim from the freeholder or forfeiture.
32The value of a redevelopment option is likely a function of the up-front costs of redevelopment
and the increased rents that will result. With a short lease, the value of the option is low because
there are few periods over which to recover capital costs. Our argument is that if flats cannot be
redeveloped to a higher density then redevelopment gains will be hard to achieve whatever the term
of the lease.
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Figure 3.8: Rents and leasehold term
Notes: The chart shows the effect of unexpired lease term on rents, where rental values are matched
from later data. The underlying regression mirrors our baseline specification column 3 of Table 3.3
but adds the quarter of the rental. As previously, the dots are the point estimates and the whiskers
the 95% confidence interval.
and prices are unlikely to be biasing our results. For the second auxiliary regression,
we repeat our baseline analysis but additionally including building fixed effects.33
Results, displayed in Figure 3.9, demonstrate that our main finding of a declining
discount rate is robust to this demanding specification which controls for all unob-
served variation at the level of the building.
A number of additional regressions reported in the Appendix demonstrate that
our main results are robust to specification and sample changes. These include mod-
els where (i) the dependent variable is price per square foot of usable floor area34; (ii)
we interact street and quarter dummies to allow for street-quarter intercepts, which
amounts to comparing only properties within the same street and sold in the same
quarter;35; (iii) we split the sample into the submarkets of Kensington vs Chelsea;
and (iv) we split the sample into the boom period (1987-1988) vs the bust period
(1990-1991).
A more general question is whether the results we uncover are relevant to policy
settings, or if the discount rates we uncover are driven by horizon-specific features
of housing markets, such as the riskiness of housing, market segmentation by lease
33We define a building fixed effect for all properties that share the same street name and number.
34Square footage of floor area is available for around half of our data points. Examining the dataset
reveals no clear pattern to omission, i.e. expensive and less expensive properties, or big or small
properties, are equally likely to have information recorded.
35In practice, this reduces the effective sample size by a third but results remain the same. This
strategy should also address concerns of spatial autocorrelation, but, in any case we provide an
additional analysis of residuals in (Table 3.5) to confirm that spatial autocorrelation is not an issue in
our data.
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Figure 3.9: Building fixed effects
Notes: The chart shows discount rates implied by a local polynomial fitted through leasehold estim-
ates derived from a model that mirrors column 3 of Table 3.3 but additionally includes building fixed
effects. Discount rates implied by individual dummies are also plotted, with circle size proportional
to the number of observations.
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term, or financing frictions in mortgage markets specific to some parts of the term
range.36 We are unable to fully address this question here although we do note that
we use a local polynomial approach such that estimates of the pattern of discount
rates are made over relatively narrow lease term bandwidths (15 years either side)
and hence rely on a comparison of leases that are reasonably matched in length.
3.7 Conclusion
This paper describes the association between lease length and sales prices of flats
in the London market, using historical data to abstract from the value of the op-
tion to extend the lease, which is unique in the literature. We demonstrate that our
estimates can be used to compute discount rates through application of the simple
Gordon model. First smoothing the data to eliminate noise, our major finding is that
as a first approximation, the pricing of leaseholds over the lease term range in our
data broadly resembles an exponential curve, suggesting sophisticated behavior on
the part of participants in the Central London market, and showing that discounting
“works” in the housing market.
By taking the predicted value of the polynomial we fit through our estimates,
36A high proportion of buyers in this area were not dependent on mortgage financing. Census
data from the website Neighbourhood Statistics (https://neighbourhood.statistics.gov.
uk/dissemination/) shows that in the Prime Central London area in 2001, 66% of homes were
owned outright (without a mortgage), and in 2011, this fraction went up to 70%.
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we are also then able to compute the implied discount rate at each point of the lease
term range of 1-99 years. Results are suggestive of declining discount rates, falling
from around 6.5% for short leases to around 3.5% by around 100 years. This dir-
ect evidence on the shape of the schedule of housing market discount rates bridges
recent findings in Giglio et al. (2015a) of low long term rates with the existing em-
pirical literature.
Finally, our findings are also relevant to current and potential leaseholders in
England and Wales where the relationship between lease length and property value,
assuming no rights to extend a lease, is an important factor in determining the price
required to purchase a lease extension or to enfranchise a leasehold property. Two
of our research findings are conspicuously different to the conventional wisdom
prevailing in this arena. Firstly, Tribunals assume a 1% price difference between a
long leasehold and a freehold whereas our results imply much greater differences.37
Second, the shape of the curves we fit diverges substantially from the curves in
common use by practitioners—see Figure 3.16 in Appendix. The differences evident
between the curves suggest that lease extensions could result in transfers between
leaseholders and freeholders that are out of kilter with unimpeded market values
(Badarinza & Ramadorai, 2014).
37The Upper Tribunal in Erkman v Cadogan 2011 (paragraph 98) wrote: ‘In our opinion the following
range of relativities is appropriate: leases with unexpired terms of 100 to 114 years – 98%; 115 to 129
years – 98.5% and above 130 years – 99%’.
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3.8 Appendix
3.8.1 Rights to extend and enfranchise a lease
Prior to 1967, most leaseholders in England and Wales had no rights over leased
property assets at the end of the lease term such that the land and all buildings
would revert to the lessor. The only option open to leaseholders who wished to
retain ownership was to negotiate a new lease with the lessor, either before an ex-
isting lease expired or at the end of the lease term. A statutory right for residential
leaseholders to extend their leases or to purchase the freehold, a process known as
enfranchisement, was first introduced in legislation in 1967, granting rights to own-
ers of leases on low value houses, defined on the basis of the property’s rateable
value, an assessment of the value of the property made for taxation purposes. In
1993 a subsequent Act widened the scope of rights to cover the vast majority of
houses and flats.
The legislation sets out a method to decide how much a leaseholder needs to
pay to extend the lease or purchase the freehold but leaves the precise parameters
to determine the premium unspecified. In practice premiums are usually negotiated
bilaterally between the leaseholder and the freeholder, often with the benefit of pro-
fessional advice. If the leaseholder and freeholder cannot reach an agreement, the
leaseholder can ‘hold over’ and remain in the property paying a market rent. They
also have the option of bringing a dispute to a statutory tribunal, where a panel of
independent experts hear evidence and decide the premium payable following the
statutory guidelines. 38
One component of the statutory valuation is the ratio of the value of the lease
at its current unexpired term to the value of the property if it were held freehold.
The legislation dictates that this ratio—known as relativity—should be calculated
assuming that the lease interest does not benefit from the right to extend or enfran-
chise, and to disregard any improvements the tenant has made to the property. Out-
side of these assumptions, the legislation offers no guidance on what relativity looks
like, how it should be calculated, and under what circumstances it should vary. As
a result, relativity has been subject to intense debate since rights to enfranchise were
introduced and a number of graphs of relativity have been complied and promoted
by market practitioners. Some of the leading graphs currently in circulation for the
38Although direct data on the size of the market for lease extensions is difficult to come by, the
activity of the Leasehold Advisory Service (LAS), a free advice service for leaseholders, provides an
indirect measure. In 2012/13 LAS received more than 800,000 website visits and fielded more than
40,000 telephone or written queries with the second most common line of inquiry being lease exten-
sion (Leasehold Advisory Service Performance Statistics 2012/13 and Annual Report and Accounts
2012/13).
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Figure 3.10: Practitioner graphs of relativity for Prime Central London
Source: Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors (2009)
Prime Central London (PCL) area are shown in Figure 3.10.39
39Such graphs rely on small and non-randomly selected data samples and enshrine ad hoc adjust-
ments to individual property values based on expert opinion in an attempt to ensure that properties
are comparable. Moreover, decisions taken about the construction of sample, adjustments adopted,
and line fitting methods to draw the graphs are not disclosed, and no information is provided to
evaluate their statistical properties.
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3.8.2 Robustness checks
Figure 3.11: Price index implied by hedonic regression (1990q1 = 100)
Notes: The chart plots the coefficients on quarterly dummies in the first model of Table 3.3, compared
with the Nationwide price index for London. The period that goes from 1987 to 1989 was character-
ised by a boom and then the market stabilised. The price pattern is consistent with the quantity trend
shown in Figure 3.4. The behavior of our index after the boom differs slightly from the one of the
Natiowide index. This may be due to the different coverage of the two indices—Nationwide covers
the whole London area whereas our observations only come from Prime Central London.
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Figure 3.12: Smoothed f (t) function, Kensington vs Chelsea
Notes: Most of the property sales in our dataset are located in an administrative area known as the
Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea (this is the area populated by dots in Figure 3.3). The
charts below replicate Figure 3.6 but only include the sales which have occurred in the Kensington
neighborhood (the first two charts) and the Chelsea neighborhood (the last two charts). The number
of observations per chart clearly diminishes, which makes the fitting curve (especially the local poly-
nomial) less smooth. However, the general shape of the curve is preserved even at a smaller spatial
scale.
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Figure 3.13: Smoothed f (t) function, boom period (1987-1988) vs bust period (1990-1991)
Notes: As the previous figure in this appendix, this figure replicates Figure 3.6, this time comparing
sales which occur in the first two years, 1987–1988 (in the first two charts), with sales which occur
in the last two years of the sample, 1990–1991 (in the last two charts). The 1987–1988 was character-
ised by high sale volumes and growing prices, whereas the 1990–1991 saw flat volumes and prices
(see Figures 3.4 and 3.11). As in the previous figure, the analysis of subsamples does not produce
significantly different results from those shown in the main part of the text and in Figure 3.6.
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Figure 3.14: Results of the semiparametric estimation
Notes: The left-hand side of the Figure represents the curve fitted through the quality adjusted sale
prices obtained in the first stage. (Table 3.4 shows the coefficients from the first stage of the semi-
parametric method, which are similar to the coefficients shown in Table 3.3.) The curve is a second-
degree local polynomial with a bandwidth of 15 years on both sides and an Epanechnikov weighting
scheme. Confidence bands are represented by the gray areas around the curve. The right-hand side
of the figure charts the discount rates implied by the curve. Results are similar to those depicted in
Figure 3.7, which is derived from a standard regression with dummies.
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Table 3.4: Additional hedonic regressions
Notes: The baseline categories are flats, 1-bedroom properties, 1st floor. The first column displays
the results of a regression including quarter-street interactions as fixed effects to allow for specific
local conditions in a given quarter. Since this specification automatically excludes quarter-street
combinations where there are less than two sales, the reported number of observations drops by
approximately 3,000. The second column refers to a regression run on price per square foot. The
number of observations drops substantially because few properties have information on floor area.
Interestingly, when including floor area the premium on houses (as opposed to flats) disappears.
The third model represents the first stage of the Yatchew (1997) approach. The sample for this model
includes only leasehold flats.
(1) (2) (3)
log(PRICE) log(PRICE/SQFT) log(PRICE)
Baseline: FREEHOLD Baseline: FREEHOLD SEMIPARAMETRIC, LEASE FLATS
HOUSE 0.216∗∗∗ (0.053) -0.065 (0.108)
STUDIO -0.420∗∗∗ (0.050) -0.135∗∗ (0.054) -0.376∗∗∗ (0.041)
2-BEDROOM 0.358∗∗∗ (0.018) 0.086∗∗∗ (0.021) 0.378∗∗∗ (0.036)
3-BEDROOM 0.657∗∗∗ (0.031) 0.158∗∗∗ (0.031) 0.650∗∗∗ (0.039)
4-BEDROOM 0.873∗∗∗ (0.038) 0.220∗∗∗ (0.048) 0.848∗∗∗ (0.039)
5-BEDROOM 1.113∗∗∗ (0.059) 0.333∗∗∗ (0.082) 1.048∗∗∗ (0.049)
6-BEDROOM 1.277∗∗∗ (0.069) 0.393∗∗∗ (0.125) 1.040∗∗∗ (0.098)
7-BEDROOM 1.260∗∗∗ (0.104) 0.285 (0.186) 1.318∗∗∗ (0.196)
8-BEDROOM 1.627∗∗∗ (0.219) 0.929∗∗∗ (0.100) 0.907∗∗∗ (0.242)
9-BEDROOM 1.366∗∗∗ (0.220) 0.082 (0.176)
10-BEDROOM 0.850∗∗∗ (0.044)
PURPOSEBUILT 0.013 (0.026) -0.040 (0.025) -0.035∗ (0.020)
VERIFIED -0.066∗∗∗ (0.018) -0.062∗∗∗ (0.022) -0.100∗∗∗ (0.017)
ONEROUSGRRENT -0.107∗∗∗ (0.023) -0.068∗∗∗ (0.023) -0.130∗∗∗ (0.018)
LWGR-FLOOR -0.136∗∗∗ (0.032) -0.198∗∗∗ (0.029) -0.135∗∗∗ (0.022)
GR-FLOOR -0.026 (0.023) -0.034 (0.025) -0.019 (0.021)
2ND-FLOOR -0.067∗∗∗ (0.022) -0.030 (0.024) -0.060∗∗∗ (0.019)
3RD-FLOOR (LNR) -0.112∗∗∗ (0.028) -0.070∗∗∗ (0.022) -0.086∗∗∗ (0.022)
3RDORMORE FLOOR (JDW) -0.118∗∗∗ (0.045) -0.065∗∗ (0.030)
4TH-FLOOR (LNR) -0.087∗∗∗ (0.032) -0.071∗∗ (0.029) -0.066∗∗∗ (0.024)
5THORMORE-FLOOR (LNR) -0.017 (0.041) -0.019 (0.034) -0.020 (0.027)
MAISONETTE -0.008 (0.032) -0.113∗∗∗ (0.031) -0.015 (0.021)
MEWS 0.105∗ (0.063) 0.128 (0.177)
DETACHED 0.402∗∗ (0.185) 0.783∗∗∗ (0.188)
TWOORMORE-BATHROOM 0.096∗∗∗ (0.016) 0.047∗∗∗ (0.012) 0.128∗∗∗ (0.012)
GARDEN 0.083∗∗∗ (0.018) 0.034 (0.030) 0.094∗∗∗ (0.017)
BALCONY 0.058∗∗∗ (0.016) 0.069∗∗∗ (0.019) 0.077∗∗∗ (0.013)
TERRACE 0.076∗∗∗ (0.018) 0.068∗∗∗ (0.020) 0.091∗∗∗ (0.015)
PATIO -0.006 (0.021) -0.044 (0.029) -0.012 (0.018)
COMMUNALGARDEN 0.017 (0.021) 0.023 (0.015) -0.003 (0.016)
REFURBISHED 0.026∗∗ (0.012) 0.014 (0.014) 0.020∗ (0.011)
INNEED -0.142∗∗∗ (0.023) -0.158∗∗∗ (0.023) -0.164∗∗∗ (0.019)
FH-FLAT -0.018 (0.170) 0.069 (0.100)
log(SQFT) -0.316∗∗∗ (0.035)
Leasehold term X X
Quarter (sale date) X X X
Street X X
Street*Quarter X
Observations 5098 2034 5163
R squared 0.892 0.722 0.650
Standard errors in parentheses
clustered at the street level∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Figure 3.15: Distribution of residuals
Notes: The left-hand side chart shows the distribution of residuals, which look normal around zero.
The right-hand side chart plots the individual residuals against leasehold unexpired terms. Residuals
and lease length do not appear to be correlated; we do not see systematically larger residuals for some
lease lengths and smaller residuals for others.
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Table 3.5: Results of the Pesaran (2004) cross-sectional dependence (CD) test
Notes: House prices are correlated across space and time and most of these correlations are accounted
for by including the relevant explanatory variables. Even controlling for STREET and SALEQUARTER,
there is the possibility of correlations between sales in a specific street and time period with sales in
the same time period in another street. To check if this is the case, we look for correlations in the
residuals: we compute the average residual for each street in each year and then measure the cor-
relations between these residuals using all possible pairwise combinations of streets. To summarise
all these pairwise correlations in one unique number, which allows us to determine whether these
correlations are statistically significant, we use the method suggested by Pesaran (2004): we sum all
the correlations and multiply the resulting number by
√
2T
N(N−1) , where T is the number of years (5)
and N is the number of streets; we then compare the resulting number with the standard normal
distribution. We run the test both within postcodes and across the entire sample, and find no statist-
ically significant correlations. The table shows the values of the CD test in the first column, and the
associated standardised probabilities in the second column. As a robustness check, we run the same
tests on residuals obtained from a model with no controls and no streets (the last row of the table),
and indeed find that, in this case, the sum of all correlations is statistically significant.
CD statistic Prob (N(0,1) < CD)
SW1 -0.530 0.298
SW10 0.099 0.539
SW3 0.369 0.644
SW7 0.264 0.604
W1 -1.527 0.063
W11 -1.120 0.131
W14 -0.349 0.364
W2 0.853 0.803
W8 -1.099 0.136
PCL -0.401 0.344
PCL 26.803 1.000
(no explanatory variables)
Note: Estimation uses only streets where all years have data points
(SW5 does not have enough such streets)
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Figure 3.16: Paper’s findings vs existing practice
Notes: The main text reported that the shape of the curves we fit diverges substantially from the
curves in common use by practitioners. To visually illustrate these differences, we run a new specific-
ation designed to mirror the approach underlying most relativity curves, including houses as well
as flats and freeholds as well as leaseholds. We then fit a curve to leasehold dummies as in earlier
results, plotting in Figure 3.16 the results alongside another ‘relativity curve’, derived from a set of
601 Tribunal decisions in the London region, compiled by real estate agency John D Wood & Co. (The
analysis was run by James Wyatt and the aggregate data is available at http://www.johndwood.
co.uk/r/surveyors/pdfs/publications/The_Pure_Tribunal_Graph.pdf.) The figure
highlights the two differences with existing practice mentioned in the text: first, we find a larger
difference between a long leasehold and a freehold; second, our curve is higher in the middle range
of leasehold terms, between 30 and 70 years.
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Chapter 4
On the Climate Costs of Preservation
Policies: Evidence for England
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4.1 Introduction
Policies to preserve buildings for historical, cultural or visual reasons are wide-
spread across Europe and North America. They generate both benefits and costs.
While the external benefits—as measured by higher house prices outside of desig-
nated areas—have recently been well documented (Ahlfeldt et al., 2013; Been et al.,
2014), we know relatively little about the costs these policies may generate. In this
paper we quantify the cost in the form of foregone energy efficiency savings. We
find that these costs are substantial.
The theoretical mechanism we have in mind is straightforward. In the absence
of preservation policies, households can be expected to invest in energy efficiency
improvements as long as the expected private benefits from potential energy savings
exceed the additional upfront investment costs. Preservation policies drive a wedge
into this decision process because they often mandate restrictions on the type and
extent of changes that can be made to properties in designated areas (both internally
and externally). Restrictions on say the types of windows that can be installed may
increase the cost of adopting energy efficiency technologies or, in fact, may legally
prevent such installations altogether. Preservation policies may thus directly affect
the energy efficiency of affected buildings.
Our paper quantifies foregone energy efficiency savings by exploring the impact
of historical preservation policies in England on domestic energy consumption. To
do so, we focus on two well-established preservation policies: Conservation Areas
and Listed Buildings. We collate a rich panel dataset at the Middle Layer Super
Output Area (MSOA)-level (consisting of between 2k and 6k households) that spans
the period from 2005 to 2013—a period during which energy prices rose markedly
and per capita energy consumption fell by 23 percent.
We first document that rising national gas prices induce an increase in home en-
ergy efficiency installations and a corresponding reduction in energy consumption.
Our findings indicate that energy efficiency investments and energy consumption
are fairly price elastic. Next we explore the sensitivity of the price elasticity of energy
consumption with respect to the incidence of preservation. One difficulty in doing
this is that buildings in Conservation Areas and Listed Buildings are likely to be
correlated with income and other confounding factors. To condition out the various
confounding factors and thus focus our analysis on identifying the causal impact of
preservation policies on energy consumption, we control for location and year fixed
effects as well as linear time-trends for a range of 2001 Census area characteristics
and flexible Travel to Work Area and household income trends.
Doing this, we demonstrate that the energy saving effect is significantly less pro-
nounced (i.e., the elasticity of energy consumption with respect to the gas price
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is significantly less negative) in Conservation Areas and in places with high con-
centrations of Listed Buildings, consistent with the proposition that preservation
policies prevent investments in new technologies that reduce energy consumption.
Although we are unable to pin down the base price elasticity precisely, our findings
suggest that a one standard deviation increase in the share of dwellings in Con-
servation Areas reduces the price elasticity by at least 4.7%, while a one standard
deviation increase in the number of Listed Buildings per 100 dwellings reduces the
elasticity by at least 3.0%. We also provide evidence that the mechanism for this de-
cline in energy price elasticity was the capacity of the preservation policies to limit
the uptake of home energy efficiency improvements. Our findings are robust to the
use of alternative dependent variables and alternative demand shifters; changes in
the panel frequency or the lag structure of prices (which we use to examine house-
holds expectations of future energy prices as drivers of investment decisions); the
use of different parts of the income distribution to explore whether responses to
energy prices vary according to income group; and, the addition of Green Belts,
another preservation policy, as a placebo test.
Our counterfactual simulations suggest that limiting Conservation Areas and
Listed Buildings to 1980 levels—a fairly moderate reversion that would bring back
levels to a point in time when buildings with the highest heritage value were likely
already designated—would have lowered total domestic energy consumption in
England between 2005 and 2013 by 0.9 percent. This amounts to a monetary sav-
ing over the 9-year period of over £1.4 billion and a carbon reduction of 7.3 million
metric tons of carbon dioxide equivalent. It is important to note here that while this
decline accounts for a relatively small proportion of total domestic energy consump-
tion, the energy saving per affected dwelling would be substantial. This is because
9 out of 10 dwellings in England are not protected by preservation policies.
Our paper has important implications for climate policy. One measure by which
the UK hopes to meet its target of an 80% reduction in greenhouse gas emissions by
2050 is via a carbon tax, known as the Carbon Floor Price. Currently frozen at £18
per tonne of carbon dioxide, this is projected to increase ’rapidly’ after 2020.1 The
Committee on Climate Change suggested in 2008 that the least-cost path to meeting
the target would entail a major contribution from energy efficiency improvements in
buildings, reflecting their contribution to 37% of the UK’s greenhouse gas emissions
(GHG) emissions. Since newly-built homes account for only a small proportion of
the existing housing stock, the implication is that large energy efficiency improve-
ments would be needed from existing homes, including ones preserved for histor-
ical reasons. Our findings indicate that the existing magnitude of historic preser-
1This was announced as part of the UK’s 2015 Summer Budget. See: http://www.
carbonbrief.org/budget-2015-key-climate-and-energy-announcements.
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vation in the UK signifies an important obstacle to achieving the ambitious targets
set by the government. More generally, by demonstrating that historic preservation
policies limit the uptake of home energy efficiency improvements, we contribute to a
literature that seeks to understand low apparent uptake of energy efficient durables
(Allcott & Greenstone, 2012).
Our paper ties into a recent empirical literature that focuses on the house price
effects of preservation policies. The study by Ahlfeldt et al. (2013) is perhaps most
relevant for our investigation because, like us, it focuses on designated Conserva-
tion Areas in England. Their findings indicate that property price effects inside
newly designated areas are not statistically different from zero, yet outside of these
areas, the effects are positive and significant. Been et al. (2014) explore preserva-
tion policies in New York City in a similar exercise. They too find that properties
just outside the boundaries of historic districts consistently increase in value after
designation. The effect within these districts is more mixed; sometimes positive
sometimes zero. Been et al. also document a modest reduction in new construc-
tion in districts after designation. Finally, Koster et al. (2016) focus on the impact
of historic amenities on house prices and sorting of households within Dutch cities
and document that high income households sort themselves into designated areas,
suggesting that they have a higher willingness to pay for historic amenities.
While the studies by Ahlfeldt et al. (2013) and Been et al. (2014) both suggest
that preservation policies have significant localised external benefits, it is import-
ant to emphasise that this does necessarily imply that they increase social welfare.
First, as argued for example by Glaeser (2011), excessive historic preservation on a
wider scale—such as arguably the case in England—may generate adverse welfare
impacts through supply restrictions that raise prices in an entire city or even coun-
try (Hilber & Vermeulen, forthcoming). Second, there are factors other than supply
constraints that can drive a wedge between house price capitalization effects and the
public willingness to pay (Kuminoff & Pope, 2014). Positive price effects also don’t
necessarily imply positive net benefits because even internal benefits and costs are
not always fully capitalized into prices (Hilber, forthcoming).
One such reason for incomplete capitalization is lack of information; if the mar-
ginal house buyer is not well informed about certain benefits or costs associated
with the location or the property, they may not be accurately priced. Particularly
relevant to our analysis, if buyers of houses in Conservation Areas or of Listed
Buildings are not well informed about the policy induced constraints on energy
efficiency installations, they may underestimate the costs and housing transaction
prices may therefore not be a true reflection of future discounted net benefits. An-
other reason is simply that GHG—a global negative externality that arises from en-
ergy consumption—will not be capitalized into local house prices. Thus, while we
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can learn a lot from exploring the price effects of preservation policies, it would also
seem to be important to directly estimate the costs, and, in particular, the energy
and climate costs of these policies.
Our paper also ties into a growing literature on the energy and climate impacts
of land use regulations. This literature tends to focus more generally on land use
restrictions (e.g. Glaeser & Kahn (2010); Larson et al. (2012); Larson & Yezer (2015)).
Glaeser & Kahn (2010) document that there is a strong negative association between
carbon dioxide emissions and land use regulations. They point out that restrict-
ing new development in the cleanest areas of the United States effectively pushes
new development towards places with higher emissions. Larson et al. (2012) trace
the energy footprint of transportation, housing and land use policies in a general
equilibrium framework, allowing them to consider feedback or rebound effects that
work through the urban land market. Their simulations suggest that these indirect
effects can be very important and can lead to counterintuitive results. For example,
minimum lot zoning may reduce energy consumption despite a direct effect that
reduces residential densities and increases commuting distances in suburban areas.
The indirect effect arises because minimum lot zoning drives up the price of hous-
ing and this causes household densities in the unregulated inner parts of the city
to rise significantly. Larson & Yezer (2015) also employ simulations to demonstrate
that density limits and greenbelts can positively or negatively affect both city wel-
fare and energy use. The contribution of our study to this literature is the focus
specifically on the careful empirical identification of energy consumption effects of
historic preservation policies. To our knowledge, our paper is the first to evaluate
and quantify the energy and climate costs of preservation policies.
Our paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we discuss the institutional back-
ground and the various preservation policies. In the subsequent section we describe
the data, discuss our baseline specifications and present our main empirical results
and some additional findings from robustness checks. Section 4 provides a quant-
itative interpretation of our findings by conducting a counterfactual analysis. The
final section concludes.
4.2 Background
4.2.1 Regulation of the built environment
Regulations governing the built environment in England come in many forms. At
the national level, Building Regulations constitute technical building standards and
procedural regulations on the nature of building works that require approval and
how they can be obtained. Building standards covering local building construction
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date back to the 14th century, but the first set of national statutory Building Regu-
lations in England were established only in 1965. An overhaul in 1985 led to Build-
ing Regulations evolving into a catalogue of functional requirements for buildings
supported by codes of practice. Since, these regulations have been intermittently
updated, rewritten or consolidated. The latest have been operational since 2010.
Sections of the Building Regulations cover specific elements of buildings such
as structure, fire safety and drainage. Since 2006, the regulations have included
the conservation of fuel and power. Within each section, the regulations govern
the technical specification of individual elements of buildings e.g. loft insulation.
Most building projects, including new builds, must comply with the latest version
of the regulations and require approval. New regulations are not retrospective so
only when older buildings are upgraded, individual building elements covered by
works are required to comply.
Local Planning Authorities (LPA) have additional powers to control develop-
ment beyond those implied by Building Regulations. A planning permission or
consent is required for a range of projects including the construction of new build-
ings, redevelopment, demolition, changing the use of the building (for example res-
idential to commercial or vice-versa) but also for some smaller scale modifications
where these lead to a change the external appearance of the building. To obtain per-
mission, individuals must make a planning application to their LPA and pay a fee.
This process can be time consuming and the outcome of planning applications is
typically uncertain. Even when a planning consent is obtained, LPAs can stipulate
requirements for building works and impose other constraints on applicants (e.g.
through planning conditions and Section 106 agreements).
Aside from building regulations and planning control, preservation policies cov-
ering specific places or buildings add additional controls. Two widespread preser-
vation policies protecting buildings of historical or architectural interest are Listed
Buildings and Conservation Areas. These policies date back to 1953 for Listed Build-
ings (the Historic Buildings and Monuments Act) and 1967 for Conservation Areas
(the Civic Amenities Act), although the current legislation in England and Wales
dates from the Planning (Listed Buildings and Conservation Areas) Act 1990. Ac-
cording to Historic England2, Grade I Listed Buildings are of exceptional interest,
Grade II* are of particular importance and Grade II of special interest. Less than
0.5% of all Listed Buildings were built after 1945; about a third were built in each of
the 18th and 19th Centuries. Over 90% of all Listed Buildings have Grade II status.
Conservation Areas protect whole neighbourhoods rather than individual build-
ings, although Listed Buildings are found in these. By limiting what owners can do
with their properties, England’s heritage planning reflects its government’s ability
2See: https://historicengland.org.uk/listing/what-is-designation/listed-buildings/.
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Figure 4.1: Conservation Areas in England
Source: Historic England. Data missing for 50 LPAs (blue)
to limit homeowner’s property rights without the possibility of compensation (Hol-
man & Ahlfeldt, 2015). Indeed, altering a designated property without planning
permission can be a criminal offence.
Figure 4.1 shows the distribution of Conservation Areas in England from data
collected by Historic England (formerly English Heritage) in 2008 and 2012, at the
LPA scale. The time trend in total number of Conservation Areas since the late-1960s
is shown in Figure 4.2, based on the same data. There are currently just over 8,000
such areas, containing around 2 million dwellings, out of a total housing stock of
some 23 million dwellings as of 2014. The 1970s and 1980s witnessed rapid growth
in the designation of new Conservation Areas before tailing off in the 1990s. Similar
to Conservation Areas, Listed Buildings, including dwellings and non-dwellings,
are distributed all over England, particularly in the East and South-East (Figure 4.3).
Similar to Conservation Areas, after rapid growth in the 1980s, the designation of
new Listed Buildings plateaued in the 1990s, remaining at around 3-4 million build-
ings (Figure 4.4) through to the 2010s.
4.2.2 Home energy efficiency policy
The UK’s 2008 Climate Change Act set out a target of 80% reduction of GHG emis-
sions by 2050. Urban real estate is a major contributor of global GHG emissions
(Kahn & Walsh, 2015), with buildings in the UK accounting for 37% of all GHG emis-
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Figure 4.2: Conservation Areas by year of designation
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Figure 4.3: Listed Buildings in England
Source: Historic England
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Figure 4.4: Listed Buildings by year of listing
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sions. Given that space heating accounts for around 70% of domestic energy con-
sumption, the Committee on Climate Change suggested in 2008 that the least-cost
path to meeting the target would entail a major contribution from energy efficiency
improvements in buildings. Since two-thirds of built-upon land is in residential use,
and with newly-built homes accounting for only a small proportion of the existing
housing stock, the implication is that large energy efficiency improvements would
be needed from existing homes.
Various policies have sought to increase the energy efficiency of residential build-
ings via standards for new buildings, energy labelling and subsidy schemes. For
new buildings, changes to building regulations in 1976 (following the oil crisis) and
1985 and 2002 progressively tightened standards. In 2006, the government com-
mitted to new homes having a zero net carbon footprint by 2016, although this has
subsequently been scrapped. To raise awareness of energy efficiency, from 2007
onwards all homes in the UK were required to have an energy label (Energy Per-
formance Certificate) when sold or rented.
Energy-related subsidy schemes in the UK can be classified into those that offer
grants for microgeneration/low carbon power and those that aim at energy effi-
ciency. Schemes offering subsidies for individuals to install domestic microgener-
ation technologies have been in place since 2002 (initially the Clear Skies policy,
followed by the Low Carbon Building Programme (LCBP), and since 2011 the Re-
newable Heat Incentive). These schemes were relatively modest in scale e.g. LCBP
deployed around £140 million of funds and resulted in 200,000 grants between 2006
and 2010.
Alongside these grants, a number of policies have sought to increase home en-
ergy efficiency through the imposition of targets for carbon emission reductions on
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utility companies. These were to be achieved by the companies assisting their cus-
tomers in adopting energy efficiency measures. The first scheme (the Energy Ef-
ficiency Commitment (EEC) ran in two phases between 2002 and 2008. This was
superseded by the Carbon Emission Reduction Target (CERT) in 2008 and the En-
ergy Company Obligation in 2013. These schemes were large in scale with EEC
requiring companies to save 130 TWh of energy and CERT requiring 290m tonnes
of CO2 to be saved. The policies generally required companies to hit specific targets
for vulnerable households (defined as the elderly and those on low incomes). Al-
though subsides were made available to all, there is evidence that energy companies
targeted specific types of installations, and specific groups of individuals and dwell-
ings, for example, owner-occupiers, houses rather than flats, suburban and urban
areas rather than rural ones.3
4.2.3 Preservation policies and home energy efficiency improve-
ments
Preservation policies protect the heritage of the built environment by restricting the
development or modernisation of specific buildings. The economic rationale for the
policies centres on the external value of heritage. External benefits arise because
heritage embodied in historic buildings is enjoyed by individuals other than those
owning or occupying the designated buildings. However, alongside heritage bene-
fits, preservation policies may also impose costs. Private costs come about if owners
of designated buildings are unable to reconfigure, redevelop, or alter the fabric of
designated buildings in ways they wish, and if they are compelled to incur addi-
tional maintenance costs to comply with preservation policy standards. Social costs
may also arise if the policies impose costs on other parties. In the presence of social
costs, the rationale for preservation policies hinges on a comparison between social
costs and social benefits.
Our research focuses on the energy costs of preservation policies. We chiefly
examine private costs but also consider social costs that may come about due to the
negative externalities associated with energy consumption. These private and social
costs are the result of preservation policies placing specific constraints on making
several kinds of common energy efficiency improvements to buildings. Table 4.1
illustrates the constraints in undertaking specific energy efficiency improvements
for dwellings affected by each of the preservation policies. In many Conservation
Areas, planning consents are required for external improvement projects.4 These
3DECC estimates that the cost of the CERT programme until October 2011 was about £3.9 billion
(in 2010-11 prices) or about £140 per household. These costs were recovered by energy suppliers by
increasing energy prices. CERT therefore added roughly 2.5% to energy bills.
4Many Conservation Areas are subject to locally imposed Article 4 Directions which limit specific
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Table 4.1: Preservation policies and home energy efficiency improvements
Not Listed or CA Conservation Area Listed Buildings
Planning Building Planning Building Planning Building
Regs Regs Regs
Replacement Boiler ?
New boiler/heating AS AS ? AS
New doors and windows Flats* AS Flats*/Art4 AS ? AS
Loft insulation ? ?
External wall insulation X** X X X X X
Cavity wall insulation AS*** AS*** X
Wind turbine Flats AS Art4 AS X AS
Solar panels AS Art4 AS X AS
Ground/Air source heat pumps AS ? Add X Add
Notes: AS Can use a tradesman registered under an Approved scheme to avoid an application; Add Additional conditions
must be met; X Need to make application; ? You should consult with your Local Planning Authority ; Art4 Conservation
areas under Article 4 directions may require an application; Flats Application needed for flats but not houses
* Depending on the nature of the work - planning permission needed when not exactly like-for-like replacement; **
Since January 2013, external wall insulation on individual dwellings (houses) has been classed as an alteration for the
purposes of permitted development, meaning planning permission may not be required; *** No self-certification scheme
until 2010 i.e. until then there had to be a building notice from the householder
are normally permitted developments, including external wall insulation, and new
doors and windows. In Listed Buildings the requirements are much stricter and also
cover internal upgrades, e.g. cavity wall insulation. The planning guidance even
suggests that households should consult with planning authorities before installing
a new heating system or boiler in a Listed Building.
Allcott & Greenstone (2012) present a simple two-period model which helps to
clarify the role of preservation policies in investment in energy efficiency. In this,
homeowner i chooses the energy efficient good (such as energy-efficient windows)
if and only if:
γpimi(eo − e1)
(1 + r)
− θi > ci
where there are two different goods with energy intensities, e0 and e1, respect-
ively, with e0 > e1. The energy efficient good has incremental upfront capital cost
ci > 0 and an unobserved incremental utility cost or benefit, θi. The private cost of
energy is pi, while the risk-adjusted discount rate between the two periods is r > 0.
The variable mi represents the homeowners taste for use of the good, e.g. a high m
reflects a boiler user in a cold climate, and is implicitly a function of energy prices.
The parameter γ is an implicit weight on the energy cost savings in the homeowners
decision of whether to choose e0 or e1, i.e. the trade-off between upfront investment
costs and future energy savings. If γ < 1 then there are “investment inefficiencies
that lead households to value discounted energy savings less than upfront costs of
development rights such as making changes to windows or frontages.
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energy efficiency. In effect this means some households are choosing the less energy
efficient alternative despite this being unprofitable, given energy prices and costs.
Preservation policies could influence homeowners’ investment decisions through
several possible channels. Planning applications to LPAs are time-consuming and
costly. Where consent is refused the unobserved cost of an improvement becomes
very high because going ahead could constitute a criminal offence. Where consent
is given, the LPA could require specific materials or techniques to be used, which
may directly increase the capital cost of the upgrade, sometimes dramatically. For
instance, a homeowner living in a Conservation Area wishing to install new, energy-
efficient windows may need to ensure that they are consistent not only with the
character of the owners dwelling but also with the character of the surrounding
buildings. In some cases this could oblige owners to install expensive timber win-
dows, rather than much less costly and more energy-efficient aluminium or uPVC
windows.5
It also seems plausible that preservation policies could also operate through an
investment inefficiency channel. This may occur if, for example, home buyers are
imperfectly informed about – or inattentive to – the energy performance of desig-
nated homes, the constraints preservation policies imply on making particular en-
ergy efficiency investments, or the increased capital costs that would need to be in-
curred to meet the required heritage standards. For our purposes, the source of the
distortion-capital costs, unobserved costs, or investment inefficiencies-is not central
since the impacts either way are observationally equivalent: the policies will reduce
the uptake of energy efficient durables, and lead to higher energy consumption and
associated negative externalities.
Finally, we also note that if energy demand is more inelastic due to restrictions
on energy efficiency improvements, then a demand shifter like a carbon tax that
pushes up energy prices is less likely to move energy consumption to the socially
optimal level in designated dwellings vis-a-vis non-designated dwellings. In the
next section, we examine the extent to which preservation policies in England af-
fected the elasticity of demand for energy and the uptake of home energy efficiency
installations, between 2005 and 2013, a period of rapidly rising prices.
5Timber windows will usually be about twice as expensive as uPVC alternatives. In a public
consultation about a Conservation Area in London, residents opposing the Conservation Area policy
of timber replacement windows quoted replacement costs for a single timber window of £4,000 to
£5,000.
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Table 4.2: Summary statistics: MSOA regression sample
Std. Dev.
Obs. Mean overall b’ween within Min. Max.
Panel data
Log p.c domestic energy consump. 51734 8.92 0.26 0.23 0.13 5.01 9.64
Log p.c domestic gas consump. 51392 8.62 0.49 0.53 0.14 2.02 9.44
Log real mains gas price per unit 51734 1.35 0.20 0.0 0.21 0.96 1.63
Cross-Sectional data
Planning Variables
Grade II Listed per 100 dwellings 5759 1.45 2.74 27.00
Share of dwellings in CAs in % 5759 9.37 15.66 10
Share LPA dwellings in Green Belt % 5759 1.93 3.99 36.75
Census 2001 Variables
Share degree educated in % 5759 14.77 8.49 2.08 54.10
Share lone parents in % 5759 2.67 1.37 0.35 9.75
Share owner-occupier in % 5759 68.95 16.86 8.11 98.06
Share ethnicity white in % 5759 90.76 14.66 11.03 100.08
Share aged 45-59 in % 5759 18.84 3.59 4.47 29.61
Share aged 60 or above in % 5759 20.64 5.73 3.46 55.61
Share Manager & Professional in % 5759 39.80 12.44 13.07 82.21
Share employed in % 5759 45.90 6.59 17.25 67.32
Dwelling Characteristics
Share dwellings built before 1945 in % 5759 38.54 23.43 99.51
Share dwellings built 1946-1964 in % 5759 18.35 14.74 96.77
Share dwellings built 1965-1982 in % 5759 20.45 14.67 99.64
Share dwellings built 1983-1999 in % 5759 13.21 11.06 99.16
Share dwellings built since 2000 in % 5759 9.45 7.98 70.22
Share flats in % 5759 21.99 21.60 99.81
Share terraced in % 5759 27.41 17.13 94.66
Share detached in % 5759 26.02 21.26 85.23
Share semi-detached in % 5759 24.58 14.35 85.49
4.3 Empirical analysis
4.3.1 Data
There is currently no dataset, at least not for the UK, that combines—or could combine—
domestic energy consumption, the prevalence of preservation policies, and the up-
take of home energy efficiency installations at the same geographic scale. Therefore,
for the empirical analysis we construct two panels for the period from 2005 to 2013
at two different spatial scales. The first combines measures of the prevalence of
historical preservation policies with home energy consumption, while the second
combines the same policy measures, but with measures of uptake of home energy
efficiency installations. We briefly describe the data below and display summary
statistics for the two panels, in Tables 4.2 and 4.3. The Appendix provides the full
details for the underlying datasets.
The first panel describes domestic energy consumption per person, prevalence
of historical preservation policies, and various control variables at the neighbour-
hood level. The spatial unit of analysis in this panel is the Middle Layer Super
Output Areas (MSOAs) in England. MSOAs are small area statistical geographies
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Table 4.3: Summary statistics: LPA regression sample
Std. Dev.
Obs. Mean overall between within Min. Max.
Panel data
Home energy efficiency installations 1,510 18,637 19,170 15,545 11,244 1,369 259,336
Wall insulation 1,510 2,979 3,411 2,685 2,108 0 45,606
Loft insulation 1,510 795 1,068 782 728 1 17,584
Double glazing 906 4,321 4,079 3,361 2,316 253 55,096
Heating systems 906 812 1,006 847 544 35 13,445
New boiler 906 672 922 708 591 33 14,245
Log real mains gas price per unit 1,510 1.22 0.17 0.00 0.17 0.96 1.44
Cross-Sectional data
Planning Variables
Grade II Listed per 100 dwellings 302 1.90 2.10 0.06 11.90
Share of dwellings in CAs in % 302 10.03 9.18 0.23 65.10
introduced following the 2001 Census that contain between 2,000 and 6,000 house-
holds. Domestic energy consumption per person is generated at the MSOA-spatial
scale by linking sub-national consumption statistics data from the Department for
Energy and Climate Change (DECC) to annual population data from the Office of
National Statistic (ONS). Our dependent variable sums energy consumption across
electricity and mains gas - the two fuel types available at the MSOA level.
The second panel is constructed by combining data on home energy efficiency
installations from the Home Energy Efficiency Database (HEED) held by the Energy
Saving Trust with measures of historical preservation policies and control variables.
Since counts of home energy efficiency installations are not available at a finer spa-
tial scale, by necessity the spatial units in this panel are the 354 pre-2009 Local Plan-
ning Authorities (LPAs) in England.6 This panel runs only from 2005 to 2010, after
which Local Authorities were reorganised. The HEED data records a variety of in-
stallations including wall insulations, loft insulations, double glazing, new boilers,
new heating systems, micro-generation and energy efficient lighting. We treat these
installations as a stock-measure (because the upgrades we focus on are durable) and
specify dependent variables based on installations in levels, controlling for house-
hold counts.
Since the HEED data do not contain domestic energy consumption, we utilise
a third panel dataset to illustrate the impact of some of the most common types
of home energy efficiency installations on domestic energy consumption. The Na-
tional Energy Efficiency Database (NEED)—compiled by DECC between 2005 and
2012—contains no geographical identifiers at the dwelling scale. This precludes it
from further analysis with respect to preservation policies. NEED contains data for
energy consumption and some household and dwelling characteristics, including
6Given missing Conservation Areas data for some LPAs, we are only able to run regressions on
304 of the 354 LPAs
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Figure 4.5: UK energy price and production indices 2000-2014
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measures of fuel poverty, for almost four million dwellings in England.7
Despite the differences in spatial scale, there are some commonalities across the
first two panels and the corresponding empirical specifications we estimate. In both
cases, the demand shifter we utilise is the national unit price of mains gas, a vari-
able created from the real cost per unit of mains gas for the UK provided in DECC
Quarterly Energy Prices publications. Using the national UK gas price as a demand
shifter has two notable advantages. First, the national gas price can be considered
to be exogenous from the perspective of property owners and for the purposes of
our empirical analysis. Second, there is no block energy pricing in the UK, which
allows us to sidestep problems due to simultaneity between prices and consump-
tion.8 We should also note that there is little apparent spatial variation in the cost
of gas within the UK, presumably because customers are able to switch between
suppliers. National gas and electricity prices along with North Sea gas production
are illustrated in Figure 4.5. Prices for electricity and mains gas remained relatively
flat in real terms between 1990 and 2003 before rising rapidly until 2013.The rise
in energy prices coincided with a dramatic decline in North Sea gas production as
profitable reserves dwindled.
Our principal preservation policy variables are based on the estimated propor-
tion of residential addresses in each MSOA or LPA that are covered by each of the
7See: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_
data/file/437093/National_Energy_Efficiency_Data-Framework__NEED__Main_
Report.pdf
8See Ito (2014) and Reiss & White (2005) for recent contributions that discuss how non-linear
pricing schedules can cause problems in the estimation of energy demand elasticities and ways to
resolve these issues
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two policies; Conservation Area designations and Listed Buildings. In both cases
the denominator is calculated from counts of residential addresses for each post-
code in England from the Postcode Address File (PAF) contained in the 2010 Na-
tional Statistics Postcode Directory. For Listed Buildings the numerator is the count
of Grade II Listed Buildings in the MSOA or LPA. We use Grade II Listed Buildings
only and not the higher grades (Grade II* and Grade I) because these are more likely
to be buildings which are not in residential use e.g. churches. The resulting measure
– Grade II Listed Buildings per 100 dwellings – proxies for the local prevalence of
Listed dwellings which we are unable to observe directly. For Conservation Areas
the numerator is calculated by allocating postcodes to polygons using shapefiles
provided by Historic England and the postcode centroid.9
4.3.2 Identification strategy
We aim to test empirically the extent to which historical preservation policies in-
fluence domestic energy consumption per capita and investments in home energy
efficiency installations. We focus on dynamic effects because historical preservation
policies may restrict the ability of households to install energy efficiency measures
or make such installations more expensive. Additionally, dynamic effects are ar-
guably more policy relevant since: (i) the Climate Change Act focuses on reducing
GHG emissions from current levels and new buildings comprise a tiny proportion
of the overall housing stock, and; (ii) the strong growth in energy prices between
2005 and 2013—shown in Figure 4.5—mimics the effects of a rising carbon tax.
The empirical set-up we adopt is consistent across the two, MSOA- and LPA-
scale, panels to the extent feasible. We focus on describing the research design for
the neighbourhood-level analysis of domestic energy consumption per capita, indic-
ating any differences for the LPA home energy efficiency panel below. This neigh-
bourhood level panel is composed of all MSOAs in England (indexed by subscript
i) spanning the years 2005 to 2013 (indexed by subscript t).
We first estimate the following specification to obtain estimates of the energy
price elasticity:
eit = β1pt + α1wjt + α2hddt + γi + eit (4.1)
This specification regresses the natural log of domestic energy consumption per
capita eit on the log national gas price demand shifter pt and MSOA fixed effects
γi.10 Following the literature (for example Aroonruengsawat et al. (2012)) we also
9We also constructed several other measures from the underlying data to use in robustness checks
in Section 3.5. These include different energy price demand shifters and different measures of histor-
ical preservation policies. The construction of robustness measures is described in the Appendix.
10We use the fixed effect/within group MSOA transformation to eliminate time invariant MSOA
factors. We prefer this approach here over first differencing because domestic energy consumption
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include a measure of logged local wages wjt, measured at the LPA level (denoted
j)11, and national atmospheric conditions measured by log heating degree days hddt
to reflect that local income and weather conditions may influence domestic energy
consumption. Our theoretical priors are that, all else equal, consumers will respond
to higher energy prices by reducing energy consumption so that the price elasticity
will be negative (β1 < 0).12 Because energy prices vary at the national level we
are unable to include year fixed effects in this regression and we do not include
any trends in this regression since, as discussed below, we are unable to disentangle
these from the effect of energy prices. We therefore anticipate the parameter β1 to
be a biased estimate of the energy price elasticity.
As well as driving domestic energy consumption, we anticipate that increasing
energy prices will also impact on households incentives to undertake investments in
energy efficiency of their homes. To estimate this, we run similar regressions to that
shown in equation 4.1 but at the LPA level and replacing the dependent variable
with counts of home energy efficiency installations, aggregating across all types of
installations in our data.13 Our set of controls is slightly different to those shown
in equation 4.1: they are LPA fixed effects, time-varying counts of LPA households,
LPA wages, and additional demographic controls only available at the LPA level
(share with degree and share aged 16-29, 30-45, 45-65, 65 +). Regarding investments
in home energy efficiency installations, we expect consumers will respond to higher
prices with a greater likelihood of investment, so that all else equal (β1 > 0).
In further regressions, we explore the effect of preservation policies on these
price elasticities by interacting the log national gas price demand shifter pt with time
invariant measures of local preservation policies, denoted Listi and CAi ). Spatial
differences in these measures provides the variation from which we obtain results.
For ease of interpretation the planning variables are standardised by centring on the
mean and dividing by the standard deviation throughout. Despite the inclusion of
spatial fixed effects and control variables, the set-up in equation 4.1 likely suffers
from a number of endogeneity issues.14 One concern could be unobserved factors
may respond to energy prices with a lag, for example because it may take some time to select and
install energy efficiency measures. We return to questions about whether we pick up technology
changes or other responses to higher energy prices below.
11Local wage data is not available at MSOA-level.
12We can use the gas price as a shifter for total energy consumption because gas and electricity
prices were both increasing rapidly during our panel period. In a later robustness check we ob-
tain very similar results running regressions with a dependent variable constructed from main gas
consumption only.
13This includes wall insulations, loft insulations, double glazing, new boilers, new heating sys-
tems, micro-generation and energy efficient lighting. Note that we specify the dependent variable in
levels.
14See for example Kahn & Walsh (2015) who work on the assumption that four sets of factors drive
domestic energy consumption: household characteristics, housing structure characteristics, climatic
factors, and energy prices.
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at the national level that determine domestic energy consumption (or energy effi-
ciency installations) but are not captured by the inclusion of national gas prices and
heating degree days, e.g. macroeconomic conditions and national policy changes to
subsidise energy efficiency. In the next specification we therefore include year fixed
effects γt (which subsume national heating degree days as well as national energy
prices):
eit = β2pt × Listi + β3pt × CAi + α1wjt + γt + γi + eit (4.2)
Findings from this specification can be used to test whether the prevalence of
preservation policies conditions local energy demand responses to price changes.
The coefficient β1 can be interpreted as the elasticity of domestic energy consump-
tion with respect to real unit gas prices. Since we standardise the preservation policy
measures, the coefficients β2 andβ3 can be interpreted as the extent to which this
price elasticity is modified by a one standard deviation increase in the share of res-
idential Listed Buildings and the share of dwellings within Conservation Areas, re-
spectively. Our expectation is that all else equal historical preservation policies will
make domestic energy consumption less elastic to exogenous national energy price
changes (β2, β3 > 0). In the parallel regressions we run for energy efficiency in-
stallations, our expectation is that preservation policies will make investments less
likely (β2, β3 < 0).
Despite accounting for national factors through year fixed effects, the interaction
terms in these regressions could be picking up local trends in energy consumption
that are correlated with our time invariant measures of preservation policies, e.g.
due to sorting or other reasons. There are a variety of channels through which this
could operate. To take one example, people who have preferences for heritage may
be more likely to be wealthy individuals with relatively price inelastic demand for
energy. Such individuals may also be more likely to own their homes rather than
rent and hence may have greater incentives to make long-term investments in im-
proving home energy efficiency, as found empirically by Davis (2011).15 To address
these issues we first include a set of variables in which linear time trends are inter-
acted with a set of demographic and socio-economic variables drawn from the 2001
Census: share of residents with degree; share lone parents; share owner-occupiers;
share ethnicity white; share age 45-59, share age 60+; share managers, professionals,
or associate professionals; and share employed. Our estimated equation becomes:
eit = β2pt × Listi + β3pt × CAi + α1wjt + γt + γi + CensusTrends + eit (4.3)
We next add further semi-parametric time-varying controls, replacing the year
15See Koster et al. (2016) for empirical evidence that richer households have stronger preferences
for historical amenities and sort into historic neighbourhoods.
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fixed effects by year fixed effects interacted with a set of quintile dummies indic-
ating the MSOAs position within the national income distribution in 2004. This is
calculated from a modelled MSOA median household income dataset. Together,
the controls in estimated equation 4.4 mean we identify the impacts of preservation
policies off of trends in energy consumption in places that are similar in terms of
demographic and socio-economic make-up, which should capture the heterogen-
eity in household energy demand elasticities documented by Reiss & White (2005):
eit = β2pt × Listi + β3pt × CAi + α1wjt + γt + γi
+ CensusTrends + IncomeTrends + eit (4.4)
It is still possible that localised factors could be driving results, so we next in-
clude a full set of Travel to Work Area (TTWA) by year fixed effects. The inclusion
of these controls allow us to partial out patterns in energy consumption common to
labour market areas—for example those driven by localised changes in climate, and,
with around 140 TTWAs in England, mean that we are making comparisons across
places which are well-matched in terms of location (e.g. London). Despite lacking an
experimental research design, the parametric and semi-parametric trends recorded
in estimated equation 4.5 provide a powerful set of control variables for household
characteristics and climatic factors:
eit = β2pt × Listi + β3pt × CAi + α1wjt + γkt + γi
+ CensusTrends + IncomeTrends + eit (4.5)
Aside from household and climatic factors, the characteristics of the local hous-
ing stock may determine energy consumption and the scope for making energy ef-
ficiency improvements. For example, detached houses will usually, all else equal,
have more external wall area than other dwelling types. In some cases particular
dwelling types may entirely preclude some kinds of installation e.g. only top-floor
flats would be able to install loft insulation while this would be feasible for all other
dwelling types.16 The vintage or age of a dwelling is also likely to be an import-
ant factor in determining the scope and cost of potential energy efficiency improve-
ments.17 This reflects both rising building energy efficiency standards and changes
in building technologies. We anticipate that the older the house, the less likely it
16A second related issue is that leaseholders will usually have to get permission from the free-
holder to make certain energy efficiency upgrades. The share of leasehold dwellings is very highly
correlated with the share of flats.
17The relationship between building vintage and energy consumption is well-documented in the
literature; recent contributions using residential dwellings include Costa & Kahn (2010) and Brounen
et al. (2012). Kahn et al. (2014) provide evidence for commercial buildings.
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is that it was built with energy efficiency measures already installed. Houses built
prior to the introduction of national Building Regulations in 1965 were rarely insu-
lated, and there was no requirement to insulate until the 1980s when double glazing
and cavity wall insulation became commonplace in new builds. Indeed, how the in-
troduction of building codes reduces energy consumption is well-documented, e.g.
Jacobsen & Kotchen (2013) and Aroonruengsawat et al. (2012). Regarding building
technologies, houses built in England after the 1920s were generally built with cav-
ity walls whereas those built prior to this had solid walls and as such cannot benefit
from cavity wall insulation techniques. Technological issues can make it impractical
or more expensive to install floor insulation and double-glazing in older houses.
Thus, while older homes have greater scope for energy efficiency improvements,
such homes are typically hard to treat with energy efficiency upgrades (Beaumont,
2007; Dowson et al., 2012).18
We attempt to condition out the effects that derive from the characteristics of
the housing stock by including two further sets of trend variables, interacting linear
trends with share variables for building type (share flat, share terrace, share semi-
detached with omitted category share detached) and building vintage (share built
pre 1945, share built between 1945 and 1965, share built between 1964 and 1982,
share built 1983-1999 with omitted category share built after 2000):
eit = β2pt × Listi + β3pt × CAi + α1wjt + γkt + γi
+ CensusTrends + IncomeTrends + BuildingTrends + eit (4.6)
A final set of issues is that households in rural areas tend to rely on a different
mix of fuels to provide home heating. In particular DECC (2014) estimates that
over two million homes in England, about 10% of the total, are not connected to
the gas transmission network. The vast majority of these homes are in rural places.
These dwellings are heated by alternative fuels, including electrical heating, heating
oil, or Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) and are likely to consume a different mix
of fuels and be exposed to a different set of fuel prices, neither of which we can
observe in our data. Off-gas-grid homes are also considered to be hard-to-treat in
terms of improving home energy efficiency (Beaumont, 2007). In recognition of this
issue we adapt the specification described in equation 4.6 by dropping rural MSOAs,
which we define as MSOAs that have zero mains gas consumption and those places
recorded as being in a sparse or village setting in the 2011 Census.
18For a discussion of how to achieve energy efficiency in older homes, see also Boardman et al.
(2005); Exchange of Fire: bring on the bulldozer? in Green Futures magazine on 8th March 2006
or the Guardian article of 29th November 2013 Britain’s damp, leaky homes among Europe’s most
costly to heat.
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Table 4.4: Energy price elasticities
Dependent Variable: Log domestic energy Home energy efficiency
consumption per person installations
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log gas price -0.471*** -0.481*** 56,441*** 34,476***
(0.0120) (0.0114) (2,462) (3,729)
Log heating degree days 0.0864*** 42,036***
(0.00962) (4,038)
Log LPA male FT real median wage 0.173*** -1,522
(0.0324) (4,213)
Log LPA household count 628.5
(5,909)
Additional demographic controls X
MSOA fixed effects X X
LPA fixed effects X X
Observations 51,734 51,734 1,824 1,824
R-squared 0.901 0.902 0.534 0.616
Notes: Standard errors clustered at LPA level in parentheses, *** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1. Sample includes 304 LPAs with
Conservation Area data. Columns (1) and (2) are MSOA regressions, (3) and (4) are at the LPA level. Installations data from
the HEED database & include a wide variety of energy efficiency installations e.g. wall insulation, loft insulations, new boiler,
and heating, microgeneration and energy efficient lighting. Additional demographic controls are share with degree and share
age categories: 16-29, 30-45, 45-65, 65 +.
4.3.3 Energy price elasticities
Before exploring the effects of preservation policies on home energy-related out-
comes, Table 4.4 reports quantitative estimates of the elasticity with which domestic
energy consumption and home energy efficiency installations respond to changes
in energy prices. We do not seek to make a causal interpretation of these estim-
ates. Rather, the intention of this exercise is to provide benchmark elasticities against
which we can interpret the effects of preservation policies estimated in subsequent
tables.
The first two columns of Table 4.4 report estimates of the price elasticity of do-
mestic energy consumption. The specification in column (1) includes only MSOA
fixed effects while column (2) adds controls for the log number of heating degree
days and the log of median male full time wages at the LPA level, and corresponds
to equation 4.1 above. The estimated elasticity is insensitive to the additional con-
trols. The elasticity of -0.481, reported in column (2), implies that for every 10%
increase in the price of gas per unit, MSOA domestic energy consumption falls by
4.81%. This is high for a short-term elasticity when compared to estimates found
elsewhere in the literature.19 This likely reflects that the parameter estimate cap-
19For example Ito (2014) finds an average price elasticity of electricity consumption of -0.12 al-
though Reiss & White (2005) find an elasticity of -0.39 which is closer to our own estimates. Note our
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tures unobserved downward trends in per capita energy consumption, for example
because of the adoption of energy efficient technologies. Unfortunately, we are un-
able to disentangle these unobserved trends from the effects of energy prices with
our data. We therefore interpret these estimates as upper bounds on the price elasti-
city.
Theory suggests that the effects of preservation policies are likely to operate
through a home energy efficiency installation channel because making certain changes
to designated dwellings may be either more expensive or non-conforming with reg-
ulations, so technically illegal. In columns (3) and (4) of Table 4.4, we report estim-
ates of the price elasticity of home energy efficiency installations at the LPA level,
aggregating across all types of installations in our data.20 Conditional only on LPA
fixed effects and time-varying counts of LPA households the elasticity suggests that
a 1% increase in the unit gas price is associated with more than 56,000 new installa-
tions, although this falls to around 34,500 with the inclusion of the additional demo-
graphic controls available at the LPA level.
4.3.4 Baseline specifications — domestic energy consumption
In subsequent regressions we introduce preservation policies by including a term
that interacts the gas price demand shifter with our measures of historical preser-
vation policies. In Table 4.5, the dependent variable is the natural log of domestic
energy consumption per person. In this and all subsequent tables, except where
indicated, standard errors are clustered at the LPA level. Each column of Table 4.5
refers to three separate regressions undertaken with the same specification but us-
ing different interaction terms: the regressions in Panel A always includes the Listed
Building interaction; Panel B the Conservation Area interaction; and, Panel C both
preservation policy interactions. Moving from the left- to the right-hand side of the
table we progressively add controls to deal with the endogeneity issues discussed
previously, with each specification corresponding to one of the estimated equations
above.
Column (1) constitutes the analogue of equation 4.2 that includes MSOA and
year fixed effects and LPA wages as controls. Looking at Panels A to C of column
(1), it is evident that the interactions on Listed Buildings and Conservation Areas are
significant when each is included in turn but when both are included jointly, only
the Listed Building coefficient remains significant. We illustrate the broad mag-
nitude of effects this specification implies by comparing the coefficients on the in-
estimates are not directly comparable as we are estimating the elasticity of energy (gas + electricity)
consumption with respect to gas prices.
20This includes wall insulations, loft insulations, double glazing, new boilers, new heating sys-
tems, micro-generation and energy efficient lighting.
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teraction terms to the elasticity given in column (2) of Table 4.4. For example, the
coefficient in column (1) of Panel A of Table 4.5 (0.0549) implies that a one standard
deviation increase in the share of Listed Buildings reduces the energy price elasticity
by 0.0549/0.481 = 11.4%.
The remaining columns of Table 4.5 add further controls. Columns (2) to (4) ad-
dress the concern of correlated trends. In the first of these columns—column (2)
which corresponds to equation 4.3 above—we include a set of variables in which
linear time trends are interacted with a set of demographic and socio-economic vari-
ables drawn from the 2001 Census. Columns (3) and (4) add further semi-parametric
time-varying controls. In Column (3) we replace the year fixed effects by year fixed
effects interacted with a set of income quintile dummies. In column (4) we further
add Travel to Work Area (TTWA) by year fixed effects. Across columns (2) to (4) the
estimated effects for each of the preservation policies when considered individually
are fairly stable. However, when compared to column (1) the specifications in Panel
C suggest that the addition of control variables and trends allows us to disentangle
better the effects of the two policies such that each is separately significant condi-
tional on the other policy.
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In column (5) we attempt to condition out the effects that derive from the char-
acteristics of the housing stock by estimating the specification described in equation
4.6. As pointed out earlier, there may be more scope for energy efficiency upgrades
in older houses independent of the impact of preservation policies.21 The findings
in this specification demonstrate that when we compare like with like, the effects of
preservation policies become stronger. This is consistent with our expectation that
preservation policies apply to the dwellings with the most scope for improvement
due to the age of these dwellings.
The final column (6) of Table 4.5 includes the full set of controls but also drops
rural MSOAs. Our baseline specification is Panel C in column (6). This includes
both preservation policies, the full set of controls, and drops rural places. The coef-
ficients are slightly weaker than the corresponding specification in column (5) yet
remain highly significant. We estimate the broad magnitude of the impacts of the
two preservation policies on the elasticity of domestic energy with respect to main
gas prices, again using the estimate in column (2) of Table 4.4 as our benchmark
elasticity. The comparison suggests that all else equal, a one standard deviation
increase from the mean value in the number of Grade II Listed Buildings per 100
dwellings—implies a reduction in the elasticity of 0.0142/0.481 = 3.0%. A one stand-
ard deviation increase from its mean value in the share of dwellings in Conservation
Areas implies a reduction in the elasticity of 0.0224/0.481 = 4.7%. These comparis-
ons represent conservative estimates of the effects of preservation policies because
the benchmark price elasticity in the denominator is considerably more elastic than
estimates found elsewhere in the literature.
Despite the size of the coefficients and their implied quantitative magnitudes,
these estimates do not imply that Conservation Areas are more restrictive than Lis-
ted Buildings (which would be counter-intuitive) because the standard deviation of
the number of Listed Buildings per 100 dwellings (2.74) is only around a fifth of
the standard deviation of the share of all dwellings that are in Conservation Areas
(15.6%). In fact, when we do not scale the data, our findings suggest that Listed
Buildings reduce the price elasticity more than dwellings in Conservation Areas by
a factor of around three. This is more consistent with our observation in Section 2
that, all else equal, a Listed Building is regulated by a considerably more restrictive
regime than a dwelling in a Conservation Area.22
21Note that when including the additional trends in columns (5) and (6), some of the Census trends
are dropped because of collinearity. We are not overly concerned with this since (a) it suggests that
these trends are being picked up elsewhere and (b) we later perform a robustness check using the
change in shares between the 2001 and 2010 Census in which no trends are dropped. Results are
largely unchanged.
22To illustrate this, we calculate the effects corresponding to panel C column (6) but without stand-
ardising variables. We find coefficients that imply that a 1% increase in share of Listed Buildings
reduces the gas price elasticity by around 1% and a 1% increase in the share of dwellings in Con-
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4.3.5 Baseline specifications — home energy efficiency
Theory suggests that the effects of preservation policies are likely to operate through
a home energy efficiency installation mechanism because making certain changes to
designated dwellings may be either more expensive or unfeasible. Table 4.6 explores
whether this channel drives the effects we observe in Table 4.5. Here we report sim-
ilar regressions to those conducted in Table 4.5 but replace the dependent variable
with counts of home energy efficiency installations drawn from the Home Energy
Efficiency Database (HEED). As above, we treat installations as a stock and specify
the dependent variables in levels, controlling for household counts, demographics
and wages, and building type and vintage trends as well as the log gas price inter-
actions.
servation Areas reduces the elasticity by 0.3%. Note that the maximum share Listed Buildings in
our sample is 27% so we are unable to make in sample predictions above this limit. In general we
use the standardised versions since these allow us to simulate the effects of changing the intensity of
preservation policies in plausible ways.
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In column (4) of Table 4.4 we estimate that overall installations increase by around
34,500 for every 1% increase in the gas price. Column (1) of Table 4.6 suggests that
a one standard deviation increase in the share of Listed Buildings and Conservation
Area dwellings attenuates this relationship by 8,200 and 4,700 installations, respect-
ively. In the remainder of Table 4.6 we separate out specific installations to illustrate
that Conservation Area restrictions tend to bite on external changes while those on
Listed Buildings are more pervasive. For example, column (2) documents that both
policies reduce wall insulations (which will sometimes be external) but in column
(3) the effect of Conservation Areas on loft installations (which are internal) is insig-
nificant. Columns (4) to (6) of Table 4.6 show results only for 2005 to 2007 due to the
data being restricted to this period. The findings are quite similar: double glazing
is undertaken less frequently in a Conservation Area while there is no significant
effect on new heating systems and boilers. To the contrary, each of the installation
types is affected by the proportion of Listed Buildings.
While the results presented in Table 4.6 provide strong evidence in favour of
the proposition that preservation policies decrease the elasticity of home energy ef-
ficiency technology adoption in response to energy price increases, these findings
need to be interpreted with some caution due to data concerns (both because of
the more aggregated nature of the analysis and because of the lesser quality of the
underlying data relative to the energy consumption data). Table 4.7 quantitatively
evaluates the impact of adoption on domestic energy consumption using dwelling-
scale energy consumption and installations data drawn from the National Energy
Efficiency Database (NEED). Controlling for dwelling fixed effects as well as time
varying area level characteristics, we find that the installation of new boilers, loft
insulations, and wall insulations are associated with reductions in energy consump-
tion of 7%, 2.5%, and 8%, respectively. Taken together these additional results are
consistent with a technology adoption channel driving the relationship between pre-
servation policies and domestic energy consumption found in Table 4.5.
4.3.6 Robustness checks
In this section we conduct several additional regressions in order to explore our
results further and verify their robustness. These include: (i) regressions in which
we demonstrate robustness to changing the panel frequency or the lag structure of
prices; (ii) those in which we demonstrate that our findings are robust to using al-
ternative dependent variables, trends, preservation policy measures, and demand
shifters; (iii) those in which we examine effects in different parts of the income dis-
tribution; and, (iv) a placebo test using Green Belts as an alternative preservation
policy.
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Table 4.7: Home energy efficiency & consumption
(1) (2)
New boiler -0.0711*** -0.0703***
(0.0120) (0.0114)
Loft insulation - 0.0247*** -0.0244***
(0.0006) (0.0006)
Wall insulation -0.0771*** -0.0703***
(0.0007) (0.0007)
Dwelling fixed effects X X
Fuel poverty decile-by-year FX X
Deprivation decile-by-year FX X
Observations 27,803,027 27,803,027
R-squared 0.742 0.742
Notes: *** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1. Based on NEED database 2005-2012; dwellings in England. Estimates based on all
dwelling types and sizes
Table 4.8 considers timing issues. Results are reported in pairs of columns. The
first of each pair estimates the energy price elasticity, while the second reports a
regression corresponding to the baseline specification, column (6) of panel C in Table
4.5. Until now, our estimates for domestic energy consumption have been generated
from year-on-year variations at the MSOA level that deviate from the trends implied
by the initial characteristics of the Census. One concern may be that these changes
are unlikely to be sufficient to induce households to adopt new technologies. To
explore this possibility, columns (1) and (2) evaluate the long-term adjustment to
energy price changes by including only the first and last years (i.e. 2005 and 2013)
of our panel and dropping all of the years in between. Results are largely consistent
with our main results. A related issue is that households may respond to changes
in prices slowly, for example because it may take time to obtain a permission to
upgrade home energy efficiency. We evaluate this in the remaining columns of Table
4.8 by including different lagged energy price structures: columns (3) and (4) use the
first lag of gas prices; columns (5) and (6) us the second lag; and, columns (7) and
(8) use both the current gas price as well as the first lag. Results suggest that lagged
prices may be important but suggest our main findings are sufficient to capture
overall effects.
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Table 4.9 reports a further set of robustness checks by varying individual ele-
ments of our baseline specification while retaining the full set of controls in our
baseline specification that includes both polices (column (6) of Panel C in Table 4.5).
In the first column, we replace the dependent variable, log domestic energy (gas
+ electricity) consumption per capita, with a variable that is constructed using do-
mestic gas consumption only. The coefficients on the interactions are insensitive
to this change. In the remaining columns of Table 4.9 we document that the find-
ings are robust to varying our control trends, planning constraints measures, and
demand shifters.
One potential concern with our baseline specification is that our trends may not
adequately control for correlated variation. To mitigate this, we show that our find-
ings are robust to alternative trend specifications, by replacing 2001 Census trends
in column (2) with 2011 Census trends and with trend variables interacted with the
change in the share variables occurring between the two censuses, in column (3).23
Columns (4)-(6) demonstrate robustness to the specification of the planning vari-
ables. In the first of these columns we drop all MSOAs that include a Conservation
Area designated after 1 January 2005 and do not count any Listed Buildings desig-
nated since this date. In column (5) we re-specify the Conservation Area measure
as the share of developed (urban and suburban) land in a Conservation Area using
land cover data from a 1991 survey. In column (6) we re-specify the Listed Building
measure by counting all Listed Buildings rather than only Grade II ones. The final
two columns vary the demand shifter. In column (7) we instrument the log gas price
using the log North Sea gas production . In column (8) we use the national electri-
city price rather than the gas price. All of the results in Table 4.9 suggest robustness
to changes in specification and underlying data content.
23We cannot include all these trends at once due to collinearity.
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The third set of additional results, shown in Table 4.10, estimates the impact of
preservation policies on energy consumption patterns for different parts of the in-
come distribution. Specifically, we estimate effects for MSOAs in each income quin-
tile (where quintile 1 is the lowest and 5 the highest) after re-standardising preserva-
tion policies in each quintile. In the first column of Table 4.10 we estimate the energy
price elasticity in each quintile. As expected and consistent with the findings in Re-
iss & White (2005) as incomes increase, energy consumption appears to respond
less and less elastically to price changes. The second and third columns include the
interactions between gas prices and share Listed Buildings and share Conservation
Areas, respectively.24 These results suggest that both, in absolute terms and relative
to the within-quintile elasticity, the effects of preservation policies become stronger
higher up the income distribution i.e. preservation policies appear to bite harder
in higher income places. The reasons for this are unclear but may relate to budget
constraints in lower income places, which could prevent the adoption of expensive
technologies. Alternatively, this result could reflect the targeting strategies of energy
companies with mandates to deliver on energy efficiency.
In a final robustness check we conduct a test using a third type of preservation
policy: Green Belts. Green Belts surround many urban areas in England and are
covered by strict rules that make it very difficult for developers to build new houses
inside areas under this planning designation. However, unlike Conservation Areas
and Listed Buildings, there is little reason to expect Green Belts to act as a constraint
on investments in home energy efficiency improvements. Thus, we consider regres-
sions using Green Belts as a placebo test of our main results. In Panel A of Table
4.11 we replicate the specifications from Table 4.5 but, as our preservation policy
measure, use the number of dwellings in the Green Belt in each LPA. In Panel B we
then include all three preservation policies jointly. The coefficients on Green Belt in-
teractions are only positive in the regressions with year dummies but no other time
varying controls. The coefficients on the Conservation Area and Listed Building
interactions are largely unaffected by the inclusion of Green Belts.
24These estimates can be interpreted as comparing the effects of preservation policies in different
parts of the income distribution, i.e. the coefficients for the lowest income quantile are comparing
low income places with preservation policies to low income places without preservation policies.
Note that, as before, we allow for flexible trends in each income quantile and also TTWA-by-year
effects so the comparison is of geographically-matched places.
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Table 4.10: Robustness check: Effects across income distribution
(1) (2) (3)
Log gas price Log gas price x Log gas price x
CA Listed
Lowest Income Quintile -0.563∗∗∗ 0.0165∗∗∗ 0.00702
(0.00835) (0.00362) (0.00492)
2nd Income Quintile -0.506∗∗∗ 0.00971∗∗ 0.00946∗
(0.00788) (0.00454) (0.00565)
3rd Income Quintile -0.493∗∗∗ 0.0177∗∗∗ 0.0342∗∗∗
(0.00679) (0.00404) (0.00507)
4th Income Quintile -0.461∗∗∗ 0.0192∗∗∗ 0.0318∗∗∗
(0.00781) (0.00485) (0.00711)
Highest Income Quintile -0.406∗∗∗ 0.0390∗∗∗ 0.0494∗∗∗
(0.00905) (0.00514) (0.00818)
Controls, Fixed Effects and Trends
Log heating degree days X
Log LPA wages X X X
MSOA fixed effects X X X
2001 Census linear trends X X
Income quintile-by-year X X
TTWA-by-year X X
Building age & type linear trends X X
Drop rural MSOAs X X X
Observations 46849 46832 46832
R-squared 0.917 0.960 0.959
Notes: Standard errors clustered at LPA level in parentheses, *** p < 0.01, ** p <0.05, * p < 0.1. All policy variables are
standardised within each quintile.
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4.4 Counterfactual analysis
To understand the implications of our findings, this sub-section presents the results
from using our models to simulate energy consumption during our sample period
under a range of alternative counterfactual scenarios. In all cases, the baseline
model—column (6) of Panel C in Table 4.5—is used to make in-sample predictions.
Because this specification drops rural MSOAs, we capture effects in urban areas
only. Hence, we are likely to underestimate energy consumption for England as a
whole.
We first use the model to predict the total cumulative energy consumption between
2005 and 2013, not considering any counterfactual changes. We do this by taking the
fitted model values for log per capita domestic energy consumption for each MSOA,
converting this into total domestic energy consumption and then summing up over
the sample of MSOAs and years. As documented in Table 4.12, this gives a cumulat-
ive 2005 to 2013 total energy consumption of 2,856,750 GwH. The remaining rows of
Table 4.12 compare this baseline predicted energy consumption with modelled pre-
dictions when we vary the share of all buildings that are affected by preservation
policies. In all cases we assume the hypothetical change happens immediately at
the start of the panel period. This assumption ignores the fact that households may
not instantly adjust to changes in preservation policies. It allows us, however, to as-
sess the total impact of preservation policies on our outcomes of interest: domestic
energy consumption and carbon dioxide emissions.
The first set of scenarios in Panel A of Table 4.12—rows (1) to (3)—evaluates
the amount of domestic energy savings that were not realised during our sample
period due to historical preservation policies, by setting each preservation policy
to zero in turn and comparing the outcome to our baseline prediction.25 We find
that cumulative 2005 to 2013 domestic energy consumption would be reduced by:
1.7% if Conservation Areas are set to zero (row 1); 0.6% if Listed Buildings are set
to zero (row 2); and 2.3% if both preservation policies are set to zero (row 3). In the
remaining columns of Table 4.12 we calculate the financial and carbon costs under
DECC assumptions that: natural gas represents 73% of the domestic energy con-
sumed; each kWh of electricity and natural gas consumed produce 0.185 kg and
0.523 kg of CO2, respectively; and, the unit costs of electricity is 11.5p per kWh and
natural gas 3p per kWh. Based on these assumptions, the two preservation policies
collectively cost residents roughly £3.4 billion over the period 2005-13 and led to an
additional 17.8 million tonnes of CO2 emitted. In the final column we demonstrate
that, at 2.3%, the saving is a relatively small proportion of total energy consumption.
25This essentially assumes the preservation polices are removed instantly at the start of 2005. As
noted above, this is not meant as a realistic scenario but rather to provide some scale to the overall
quantitative effects.
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Table 4.12: Counterfactual scenarios
Total Gas + Predicted GwH Difference 2005-2013 (cumulative)
Electricity GwH 2005-2013 GwH £million CO2 %
(cumulative)
Baseline Prediction 2,856,750
Panel A: Remove All Preservation Policies
(1) Conservation Areas 2,809,045 -47,705 -2,526 -13.2 -1.7%
(2) Listed Buildings 2,839,272 -17,478 -925 -4.8 -0.6%
(3) Both Policies 2,792,339 -64,411 -3,411 -17.8 -2.3%
Panel B: Reduce to 1980 levels
(4) Conservation Areas 2,839,050 -17,701 -937 -4.9 -0.6%
(5) Listed Buildings 2,847,761 -8,989 -476 -2.5 -0.3%
(6) Both Policies 2,830,151 -26,599 -1,408 -7.3 -0.9%
Panel C: Decrease by 1 S.D
(7) Conservation Areas 2,828,348 -28,402 -1,504 -7.8 -1.0%
(8) Listed Buildings 2,843,536 -13,214 -700 -3.7 -0.5%
(9) Both Policies 2,815,394 -41,357 -2,190 -11.4 -1.5%
Panel D: Increase by 1 S.D
(10) Conservation Areas 2,943,155 86,405 4,575 23.9 3.1%
(11) Listed Buildings 2,911,478 54,728 2,898 15.1 1.9%
(12) Both Policies 2,999,578 142,828 7,563 39.5 4.9%
Notes: Table uses conversion factors for 2010 Electricity kWh = 0.523 kg CO2 and Natural gas kWh = 0.185 kg CO2 (Source:
DECCs “Tool for calculation of CO2 emissions from organisations). Calculations assume natural gas is 73% of total domestic
(gas + electricity) based on the average total consumption in the sample MSOAs in the sample timeframe. The average unit
prices for electricity and gas are taken from DECC publications for 2007 paying on credit, 11.5 pence per kWh electricity and
3 pence per kWh domestic gas.
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However, only around 10% of dwellings are covered by preservation policies. This
implies that absent the preservation policy restrictions these dwellings would have
reduced energy consumption by around a fifth.
The subsequent Panels B to D of Table 4.12 describe three further counterfactual
scenarios. In Panel B, the preservation policies are reverted back to 1980 levels, a
scenario that we deem highly plausible in that most buildings with high heritage
value were already designated at that point in time.26 As Figure 4.2 illustrates, the
1980s witnessed a major spike in the number of Listed Buildings. This was due to a
review of the Statutory List that accelerated following public outcry at the demoli-
tion of London’s unlisted Art Deco Firestone tyre factory, in 1980. Our data suggests
the number of properties in Conservation Areas grew very rapidly before 1980 but
then slowed to 2.7% annually during the 1980s and 1.5% during the 1990s. In es-
sence, our counterfactual reflects what may have occurred if the list review had not
taken place and preservation-growth had stopped. Reducing both policies back to
1980 levels has the effect of reducing Conservation Areas by around a third and the
number of Listed Buildings by around half. Under these assumptions 2005-2013
energy consumption is reduced by 1% or around 26,500 GWh. This implies a cu-
mulative saving to households of roughly £1.4 billion and 7.3 million tonnes less
carbon. Panels C and D illustrate the effects of decreasing or increasing preserva-
tion policies in each area by one standard deviation, albeit constraining the extent
of preservation policies to be within the feasible range of zero (minimum) to one
hundred (maximum).
4.5 Conclusions
We present evidence that restrictions on alterations to dwellings that are either ly-
ing in Conservation Areas or are designated as Listed Buildings increased domestic
energy consumption in England between 2005 and 2013 substantially. We find that
rising gas prices induce an increase in home energy efficiency installations and a
corresponding decrease in energy consumption. However such energy savings are
significantly less pronounced in Conservation Areas and Listed Buildings. Our find-
ings imply that policies that aim to induce energy savings and reduce greenhouse
26This is supported by the finding of Ahlfeldt et al. (2012) that property price premiums for Con-
servation Area dwellings increase with the time since designation and that those designated before
1981 trade at a slight premium to those designated thereafter. The idea that time since designation
is positively related to heritage value also finds support from some bloggers e.g. the NLP Planning
Blog in Feb 2012: “additions to conservation areas beyond the original designations are often sub-
stantial in size, and also because in my experience extended areas are: 1) not always closely related
to the character of the original designation; and, 2) often of lesser quality in historic and townscape
value terms than the original core designated areas. This often raises serious questions as to why
these additional areas were designated.”
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gas emissions in the UKs housing stock ought to account for regulations induced by
preservation policies.
The governments Home Energy Efficiency Policy Framework (Committee on
Climate Change, 2014) recognises that beyond 2017 low-cost potential [loft, cav-
ity wall] is increasingly exhausted. This has led to a shift in focus towards different
(and more tightly regulated) energy-saving technologies and a focus on 9.2 million
Hard-to-Treat homes. This includes many buildings in Conservation Areas as well
as Listed Buildings. To reach its energy savings targets the government will thus
either need to relax its preservation policy-induced building regulations or, altern-
atively, consider subsidising or enforcing certain energy efficiency improvements.
From a welfare economics point of view, deregulation is the optimal strategy as
long as the external costs we identify are deemed larger than the external benefits
associated with correcting market failures (the aim of preservation policies).
An obvious policy to consider in the absence of subsidies (or enforcement) is
to relax restrictions in designated dwellings. While our counterfactual scenarios
only allow for a blanket removal of restrictions for either policy, in practice the gov-
ernment has the option to relax regulations that are particularly prone to lead to
investment inefficiencies and keep those regulations in place that have particularly
positive impact on heritage values. This would require knowledge of heritage val-
ues, in terms of their distribution across England and their determinants. The wel-
fare effects of designation are likely to vary from place to place. Our finding that
preservation policy induced restrictions reduce the sensitivity of energy consumers
response to energy price shocks also has implications for future policy that attempts
to price energy use externalities via a carbon tax. The Carbon Floor Price, the UKs
top-up carbon tax, has been frozen at £18 per tonne of carbon dioxide since 2014.
This freeze is planned to remain until 2020 and then increase rapidly throughout
the 2020s. Our results imply that homeowners living in Listed Buildings or Con-
servation Areas—where energy savings potentials are possibly largest—are likely
to be less responsive to these projected price shocks and hence, will be less likely to
reduce their energy consumption towards the socially optimal level.
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4.6 Appendix A: Detailed description of data and sources
This appendix provides details on the various sources and computation of variables
used in our empirical analysis.
The analysis rests on a dataset of neighbourhood level domestic energy con-
sumption, historical preservation policies, and control variables at the Middle Layer
Super Output Area (MSOA) spatial scale. MSOAs are small area statistical geo-
graphies introduced following the 2001 Census. The 6,781 MSOAs in England with
which we perform our analysis were designed to be relatively homogeneous in
terms of their populations and contain between 2,000 and 6,000 households. Data for
domestic energy consumption are publically available through the Department for
Energy and Climate Change (DECC) sub-national consumption statistics. The data-
set we obtained records the total amount of domestic mains gas distributed through
the National Transmission System and electricity consumed in each MSOA in each
year between 2005 and 2013. 27 Population data from the Office of National Stat-
istic (ONS) (mid-year Population Estimates for Lower Layer Super Output Areas in
England and Wales by Single Year of Age and Sex) were then matched in to the data
and a small number of MSOAs missing data for energy consumption or population
dropped. Our main domestic energy measure is generated by taking the natural log
of energy consumption (summed across these two energy types) divided by popu-
lation.28
We also provide panel analysis of home energy efficiency installations at the
Local Authority level. This second panel is constructed using data on home energy
efficiency installations from the Home Energy Efficiency Database (HEED) held by
the Energy Saving Trust. Home energy efficiency installations are not available to us
at a more granular spatial scale, so by necessity the spatial units in this panel are the
354 pre-2009 Local Planning Authorities (LPAs) in England and the panel runs only
from 2005 to 2010 after which Local Authorities were reorganised. We use the HEED
data that records total number of annual installations, exploiting the richness of in-
stallation types, including wall insulations, loft insulations, double glazing, new
boilers, new heating systems, micro-generation and energy efficient lighting. We
treat these installations as a stock (because the upgrades we focus on are durable)
and specify dependent variables based on installations in levels. Control variables
27Data from before 2005 are available, but the earlier data was collected on a different
basis and we follow the advice of DECC(2014), pp. 22 & 37 to use 2005 as the base
year https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/
file/359302/subnational_methodology_and_guidance_booklet.pdf
28Although the gas data is weather corrected and the electricity data is not, DECC (2014) pp 34
reports that: “Despite these differences, the combined electricity and gas provide a good indication
of overall annual household energy consumption in Great Britain at local authority, MSOA/IGZ and
LSOA level, due to the robustness of the data collections and collation process.”
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in this panel include household counts, share with degree education, and full-time
male median wages from NOMIS, and population age groups based on information
obtained from ONS.
We also explore the quantitative effect of home energy installations on domestic
energy consumption using the National Energy Efficiency Data-Framework (NEED)
End-User License File. This provides a panel of household energy (gas & electri-
city) consumption and property characteristics for roughly 3.8 million dwellings in
England in the period 2005-2012 that have had energy performance certificates is-
sued. The data set is anonymised but contains property characteristics (property
age, type, and size brackets; region; area-based deciles for household fuel poverty
and neighbourhood deprivation), as well as energy efficiency variables (energy ef-
ficiency band; gas heating; economy 7 electricity; new boiler, cavity wall and loft
installations with year of installation. The public version of the dataset however
lacks information about householders, tenure, and the precise location of dwellings.
We merge annual energy prices into all these data sets. Energy prices measures
originate from DECCs Quarterly Energy Prices publications (Table 2.3.3). We used
UK average energy prices per unit for gas (and in a robustness check, electricity)
for customers paying on credit as data for this customer group is available for the
whole period 2005-2013. Per unit costs are generated from billing data by assum-
ing fixed annual consumption. They reflect the prices of all energy suppliers and
include standing charges and Value Added Tax. We specify our demand shifter by
transforming these unit costs into 2010 prices using the GDP deflator available from
Her Majestys Treasury and then taking the natural log.
Our main right-hand side variables measure two widespread preservation policies:
Conservation Areas and Listed Buildings. We obtained two shapefiles (for roughly
2008 and 2012) from Historic England (formerly English Heritage) with details of
the spatial scope of individual Conservation Areas in England. Because data for
some areas are missing in each file, we combined the files to minimise gaps but re-
mained short of data for 50 Local Authorities (out of 354). Throughout the analysis
we focused solely on the 5,759 MSOAs for which we have Conservation Area data.
A dataset of Listed Buildings can be downloaded from the Historic England
website. Since the data do not identify building type, we cannot easily distinguish
between residential and non-residential Listed Buildings. However, the dataset re-
cords three levels of listing which denotes their level of historical or architectural
interest: according to Historic England Grade buildings I are of exceptional interest,
Grade II* particular importance and Grade I of special interest.
We constructed several time invariant variables capturing the extent of local re-
strictions on domestic buildings at the MSOA and LPA level from this information.
Our principal measures are based on the proportion of residential addresses in each
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MSOA or LPA that are covered by each of the preservation policies. To generate
these measures, we first obtained counts of residential addresses for each postcode
in England from the Postcode Address File (PAF) contained in the 2010 National
Statistics Postcode Directory, which we then collapsed to the MSOA and LPA levels.
To measure the impact of Listed Buildings, in our baseline specifications we di-
vided the number of Grade II Listed Buildings by the total number of residential
addresses in each MSOA or LPA. This choice reflects our assumption that Grade II
Listed Buildings are more likely to be residential dwellings than higher grades. As
a robustness check we also use the total count of Listed Buildings in each MSOA as
the numerator (see Table 4.9).
To measure the impact of Conservation Areas, in our baseline specifications we
divided the number of residential addresses that lay within Conservation Areas by
the total number of residential addresses in each MSOA or LPA. This is possible
because the postcode centroid allows us to identify which individual postcodes are
within Conservation Areas and which are not. As a robustness check we use a meas-
ure based on the share of developed land in each MSOA that is within a Conserva-
tion Area (see Table 4.9). The denominator in this robustness measure is the area
of land in urban or semi-urban use in each MSOA in 1991, developed using data
for Enumeration Districts from the 1991 Census. It should be noted that unlike our
baseline Conservation Area measure, we were not able to spatially match land use to
Conservation Areas and hence cannot directly observe where these are coincident.
In general terms, our empirical estimations treat preservation policies as if they
were time invariant. The justification for this assumption is that new preservation
designations in our sample period are a very small proportion of the stock of Listed
buildings and Conservation Areas. Of the 8,349 Conservation Areas in our dataset,
302 (or 3.7%) were newly designated in the period 2005-2013 while 5,049 out of
376,025 (or 1.3%) Listed Buildings were added to the list in the same period. To
ensure that this does not bias or attenuate out results we conduct a robustness check
where we drop MSOAs that contained a newly designated Conservation Area as
well as any buildings that were listed after 2005 from our counts of Listed Buildings
(see Table 4.9).
We use a third preservation policy, Green Belts, as a placebo test (see Table
4.11). Shapefiles for Green Belts are not released as official sanctioned data. How-
ever, the area of land within Green Belts for each Local Authority is released in
spreadsheet format by the Department for Communities and Local Government.
We also obtained a GIS map of Green Belts as they were in 2011 from the website
www.sharegeo.ac.uk, and estimated the number of residential addresses in land
designated as Green Belt at the LPA level using these two data sources.
Our control variables include a variety of trends and fixed effects. We use the
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2001 Census to construct a series of share variables normalised by contemporan-
eous population at the MSOA level: share of residents with degree, share employed,
share owner-occupiers, share lone parents, share aged 45-59, share aged 60 or more.
To take account of the possibility that the stock of housing could determine sensit-
ivity of areas to energy prices, we extracted Valuation Office Agency (VOA) data for
the age (share built prior to 1945, between 1945 and 1964, 1965 and 1982, between
1983 and 1999 and share built after 2000) and type (detached, semi-detached, ter-
race, flat) of housing stock in each MSOA and LPA. These data date from 2014. We
also generated additional time varying controls by allowing for flexible Travel to
Work Area and household income trends. The latter is based on assigning MSOAs
to one of five income quintiles based on estimated MSOA household net income in
2004/5 and allowing for flexible trends in each quantile. The choice of this strategy
reflects that we are unaware of any time varying income data for MSOAs.
In robustness checks, we replace the 2001 Census trends with linear time trends
interacted with the same share variables calculated using the 2011 Census, as well
as the change in the same share variables between the two Censuses (see Table 4.9).
Finally, in some specifications we drop rural MSOAs on the basis that these
places often do not have access to mains gas and will likely have a different mix
of domestic energy types and exposure to fuel prices. We do so by dropping places
where mains gas consumption is zero and also those places that were recorded as
being in a sparse or village setting in the 2011 Census.
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4.7 Appendix B: First stages
Table 4.13: First stage results for IV regression, column (7) Table 4.9
Dependent Variable: Log gas price × Log gas price ×
Listed CA
(1) (2)
Log North Sea gas production * Grade II Listed -0.615*** -0.001
(0.0006) (0.0013)
Log North Sea gas production * CA 0.005*** -0.560***
(0.0007) (0.0032)
Controls, Fixed effects and Trends X X
Observations 46,849 46,849
R-squared 0.998 0.997
Notes: Standard errors clustered at LPA level in parentheses, *** p <0.001, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1.
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